commerce clause in Utah

2008With respect to the Commerce Clause claim, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the validity of state taxing authority under the Commerce Clause if the tax "[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [8] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). 'I 45 We see no Commerce Clause violation in this case.

2008With respect to the Commerce Clause claim, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the validity of state taxing authority under the Commerce Clause if the tax "[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [8] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). 'I 45 We see no Commerce Clause violation in this case.

2025Id. 12 Cite as: 2025 UT 24 Opinion of the Court ¶45 Decades ago, the Supreme Court likened dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to a “quagmire.” Nw.

2025So, when we are faced with a dormant Commerce Clause issue, “we are reluctant to extend dormant Commerce Clause precedent in new directions not yet endorsed by [the U.S. Supreme Court].” DIRECTV, 2015 UT 93 , ¶ 45. ¶46 Given our general posture of reluctance in this area of law, thorough and substantial briefing on this claim is critical.

2025The Court’s concern that this carried “the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids,” id., does not apply here. ¶49 By not providing reasoned analysis or sufficient authority, Tischmak has not carried his burden to persuade us that the Domicile Statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

2015Because we conclude that the Utah sales tax scheme does not dis- criminate against interstate commerce as a matter of law, howev- er, we conclude that dismissal on the pleadings is proper. 17 DIRECTV v. UTAH STATE TAX COMM‘N Opinion of the Court Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127 .

2004We share that Court’s concern that Ansari and Lagana’s facial challenge “carries too much promise of premature interpretatio[n] of [the] statute[] on the basis of [a] factually bare-bones record[ ].” — U.S.-,-, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1948 , 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (quotation and citation omitted).

2004We share that Court’s concern that Ansari and Lagana’s facial challenge “carries too much promise of premature interpretatio[n] of [the] statute[] on the basis of [a] factually bare-bones record[ ].” — U.S.-,-, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1948 , 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (quotation and citation omitted).

2004Deciding the issue now would have no conceivable concrete benefit to anyone.” Id. ¶ 37 In turning now to the facial Commerce Clause challenge made by Ansari and Lagaña, we note at the outset that their challenge triggers many of the concerns addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Sabri v. United States.

1997Id. at 317 , 112 S.Ct. at 1916 .

1997Id. at 317 , 112 S.Ct. at 1916 .

1997In defining the scope of Commerce Clause application, the United States Supreme Court has declared: *415 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844, 847 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). *414 Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is

1997In defining the scope of Commerce Clause application, the United States Supreme Court has declared: *415 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844, 847 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). *414 Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is

1994Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180 , 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2948 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 , 100 S.Ct. 2109, 2118-19 , 65 L.Ed.2d 66 (1980)).

1994Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180 , 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2948 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 , 100 S.Ct. 2109, 2118-19 , 65 L.Ed.2d 66 (1980)).

1994Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180 , 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2948 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 , 100 S.Ct. 2109, 2118-19 , 65 L.Ed.2d 66 (1980)).

1994Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180 , 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2948 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 , 100 S.Ct. 2109, 2118-19 , 65 L.Ed.2d 66 (1980)).

1992Cases following Complete Auto have established a four-part test for determining when a tax will be sustained against a commerce clause challenge: [A] state tax will withstand scrutiny under the Commerce Clause if “[(1)] the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [ (2) ] is fairly apportioned, [ (3) ] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [(4)] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. at 257 , 109 S.Ct. at 586 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. at 1079 ).

1992Cases following Complete Auto have established a four-part test for determining when a tax will be sustained against a commerce clause challenge: [A] state tax will withstand scrutiny under the Commerce Clause if “[(1)] the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [ (2) ] is fairly apportioned, [ (3) ] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [(4)] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. at 257 , 109 S.Ct. at 586 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. at 1079 ).

1991The Commission held that under the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), and National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 , 97 S.Ct. 1386 , 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977), there is a substantial nexus with the state and a tax is not precluded by the commerce clause.

1991The Commission held that under the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), and National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 , 97 S.Ct. 1386 , 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977), there is a substantial nexus with the state and a tax is not precluded by the commerce clause.

1956Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 1947, 330 U.S. 767 , 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1031 , 91 L.Ed. 1234 , involved the question of whether the state board could certify a foremen’s union subject to the National Labor Relations Act where the national board had refused to certify that union as a matter of board policy.

1956Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 1947, 330 U.S. 767 , 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1031 , 91 L.Ed. 1234 , involved the question of whether the state board could certify a foremen’s union subject to the National Labor Relations Act where the national board had refused to certify that union as a matter of board policy.

1946The court said [ 278 U. S. 492 , 49 S. Ct. 209 ] : “From those eases [Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 , 43 S. Ct. 556 , 67 L.

1946The court said [ 278 U. S. 492 , 49 S. Ct. 209 ] : “From those eases [Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 , 43 S. Ct. 556 , 67 L.

1946The court said [ 278 U. S. 492 , 49 S. Ct. 209 ] : “From those eases [Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 , 43 S. Ct. 556 , 67 L.

1938California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 1, 39 , 8 S. Ct. 1073 , 32 L.

1938California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 1, 39 , 8 S. Ct. 1073 , 32 L.

1908Such a conclusion was also reached by the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Bacon v. Locke, 42 Wash. 215 , 83 Pac. 721 , upon a similar statute.

1908Such a conclusion was also reached by the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Bacon v. Locke, 42 Wash. 215 , 83 Pac. 721 , upon a similar statute.