commerce clause in Maine

2009According to the Association, the Legislature must have intended for the statute to exempt more than those instrumentalities that it would be unconstitutional to tax pursuant to the Commerce Clause because it enacted a statute that was different from the four-part test established several years earlier by the United States Supreme Court for Commerce Clause analysis in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 , reh’g denied, 430 U.S. 976 , 97 S.Ct. 1669 , 52 L.Ed.2d 371 (1977). 3 A. Standard of Review [¶ 20] Title 36 M.R.S. § 151 governs judicial

2009According to the Association, the Legislature must have intended for the statute to exempt more than those instrumentalities that it would be unconstitutional to tax pursuant to the Commerce Clause because it enacted a statute that was different from the four-part test established several years earlier by the United States Supreme Court for Commerce Clause analysis in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 , reh’g denied, 430 U.S. 976 , 97 S.Ct. 1669 , 52 L.Ed.2d 371 (1977). 3 A. Standard of Review [¶ 20] Title 36 M.R.S. § 151 governs judicial

1981Our Commerce Clause analysis of section 246-A is controlled by the clearly established rule that a state tax on interstate commerce will pass constitutional muster only if the tax “[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate *626 commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Compare Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), followed in Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. -, -, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2133 , 68 L.Ed.2d 57

1981Our Commerce Clause analysis of section 246-A is controlled by the clearly established rule that a state tax on interstate commerce will pass constitutional muster only if the tax “[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate *626 commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Compare Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), followed in Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. -, -, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2133 , 68 L.Ed.2d 57

2009Foster v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 205, ¶ 7 , 716 A.2d 1012, 1014 .

2009Foster v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 205, ¶ 7 , 716 A.2d 1012, 1014 .

2009According to the Association, the Legislature must have intended for the statute to exempt more than those instrumentalities that it would be unconstitutional to tax pursuant to the Commerce Clause because it enacted a statute that was different from the four-part test established several years earlier by the United States Supreme Court for Commerce Clause analysis in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 , reh’g denied, 430 U.S. 976 , 97 S.Ct. 1669 , 52 L.Ed.2d 371 (1977). 3 A. Standard of Review [¶ 20] Title 36 M.R.S. § 151 governs judicial

2007A Carbone, lnc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).

2007The commerce clause can be violated by a burden that is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, lnc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

1996In addition, the commerce clause is satisfied when the tax “ ‘(1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the ser *429 vices provided by the State.’” Id. at 311, 112 S.Ct. at 1912 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977)); U.S. Const, amend.

1991As the Supreme Court has recently held that section 1988 attorney fees may be awarded to plaintiffs alleging a denial of rights under the commerce clause, Dennis v. Higgins, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 865 , 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991) the contrary holding in Private Truck Council no longer stands as the governing law.

1991As the Supreme Court has recently held that section 1988 attorney fees may be awarded to plaintiffs alleging a denial of rights under the commerce clause, Dennis v. Higgins, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 865 , 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991) the contrary holding in Private Truck Council no longer stands as the governing law.

1991American expressly recognized that the court was bound to follow our precedent in Private Truck Council v. Secretary of State, 503 A.2d 214 (Me.1986), holding that section 1988 claims could not be based on the commerce clause.

1991In arguing that section 246-D does not violate the commerce clause, the State first argues that Maine’s Hazardous Materials Transport License Fee is a “Constitutionally Permissible Regulatory License Fee.” According to the State, we recognized a difference between a constitutionally impermissible tax and a constitutionally permissible fee in Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998 (Me.1980).

1991Applying the “internal consistency test” set forth in Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 , 104 S.Ct. 2620, 2623 , 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984), 3 and the proportionality test restated in Evansville-Vanderburgh, the Court in *1017 Scheiner found that a flat marker fee and a flat axle tax assessed by Pennsylvania on each truck traveling though the state (whether registered there or not) violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. 4 According to Scheiner , the marker fee and axle tax enacted by Pennsylvania were “wholly unlike” the user fees it upheld in Evansville-Vanderburgh and dist

1991Applying the “internal consistency test” set forth in Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 , 104 S.Ct. 2620, 2623 , 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984), 3 and the proportionality test restated in Evansville-Vanderburgh, the Court in *1017 Scheiner found that a flat marker fee and a flat axle tax assessed by Pennsylvania on each truck traveling though the state (whether registered there or not) violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. 4 According to Scheiner , the marker fee and axle tax enacted by Pennsylvania were “wholly unlike” the user fees it upheld in Evansville-Vanderburgh and dist

1991The State further argues that American Trucking Association v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 , 107 S.Ct. 2829 , 97 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987), which was relied on heavily by the Superior Court, prohibits only flat taxes that are designed to raise general revenue to pay for the use of the roads and not “fees” such as those upheld in Lee .

1991According to the Court, “imposition of the flat taxes for a privilege that is several times more valuable to a local business than to its out-of-state competitors is unquestionably discriminatory and thus offends the commerce clause.” Id. at 296, 107 S.Ct. at 2847 .

1986Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 , 186 n. 5 (3d Cir.1980); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F.Supp. 1297, 1304-05 , (D.Mont.1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976). 10 Neither of those cases analyzed the merits of extending section 1983 to encompass violations of the Commerce Clause, but rather merely relied on generalized statements in Supreme Court cases that did not involve the Commerce Clause issue.

1986Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 , 186 n. 5 (3d Cir.1980); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F.Supp. 1297, 1304-05 , (D.Mont.1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976). 10 Neither of those cases analyzed the merits of extending section 1983 to encompass violations of the Commerce Clause, but rather merely relied on generalized statements in Supreme Court cases that did not involve the Commerce Clause issue.

1986Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 , 186 n. 5 (3d Cir.1980); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F.Supp. 1297, 1304-05 , (D.Mont.1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976). 10 Neither of those cases analyzed the merits of extending section 1983 to encompass violations of the Commerce Clause, but rather merely relied on generalized statements in Supreme Court cases that did not involve the Commerce Clause issue.

1986Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 , 186 n. 5 (3d Cir.1980); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F.Supp. 1297, 1304-05 , (D.Mont.1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976). 10 Neither of those cases analyzed the merits of extending section 1983 to encompass violations of the Commerce Clause, but rather merely relied on generalized statements in Supreme Court cases that did not involve the Commerce Clause issue.

1973In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 , 71 S.Ct. 295 , 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951), the Supreme Court had before it a Commerce Clause challenge to a local milk ordinance.

1973In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 , 71 S.Ct. 295 , 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951), the Supreme Court had before it a Commerce Clause challenge to a local milk ordinance.

1964In Hunnewell Trucking, Inc. v. Johnson, 157 Me. 338 , a use tax was imposed on personal property owned by the taxpayer.

1960This is made clear in the case of Schwabacher v. United States, supra. ( 334 U. S. 182 ) Both the majority and minority opinions agree that Congress has such power.

1960This is made clear in the case of Schwabacher v. United States, supra. ( 334 U. S. 182 ) Both the majority and minority opinions agree that Congress has such power.

1959"But it seems, by recent decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court ( by which this Court, agreeing or not, is bound ) * * *." (emphasis supplied) Waterville Realty Corp. v. City of Eastport, 1939, 136 Me. 309, 315 , 8 A.2d 898, 901 . "* * * The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the question of the interpretation and application of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution * * * is conclusive and binding upon this court. * * *" (emphasis supplied), Higgins v. Carr Brothers Co., 1942, 138 Me. 264, 271 , 25 A.2d 214, 217 .

1959"But it seems, by recent decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court ( by which this Court, agreeing or not, is bound ) * * *." (emphasis supplied) Waterville Realty Corp. v. City of Eastport, 1939, 136 Me. 309, 315 , 8 A.2d 898, 901 . "* * * The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the question of the interpretation and application of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution * * * is conclusive and binding upon this court. * * *" (emphasis supplied), Higgins v. Carr Brothers Co., 1942, 138 Me. 264, 271 , 25 A.2d 214, 217 .

1959"But it seems, by recent decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court ( by which this Court, agreeing or not, is bound ) * * *." (emphasis supplied) Waterville Realty Corp. v. City of Eastport, 1939, 136 Me. 309, 315 , 8 A.2d 898, 901 . "* * * The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the question of the interpretation and application of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution * * * is conclusive and binding upon this court. * * *" (emphasis supplied), Higgins v. Carr Brothers Co., 1942, 138 Me. 264, 271 , 25 A.2d 214, 217 .

1959"But it seems, by recent decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court ( by which this Court, agreeing or not, is bound ) * * *." (emphasis supplied) Waterville Realty Corp. v. City of Eastport, 1939, 136 Me. 309, 315 , 8 A.2d 898, 901 . "* * * The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the question of the interpretation and application of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution * * * is conclusive and binding upon this court. * * *" (emphasis supplied), Higgins v. Carr Brothers Co., 1942, 138 Me. 264, 271 , 25 A.2d 214, 217 .

1952Ed. 1219 at 1223 , the court said: “It (meaning the Supreme Court of the United States) has uniformly held that in the absence of of pertinent Congressional legislation there is constitutional power in the states to regulate interstate commerce by motor vehicle wherever it affects the safety of the public or the safety and con *207 venient use of its highways, provided only that the regulation does not in any other respect unnecessarily obstruct interstate commerce.” In the case of California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725 , 93 L.