commerce clause in Alabama

2008“Hence, the salient feature of the position petitioner ‘should have occupied’ absent any Commerce Clause violation is its equivalence to the position actually occupied by petitioner’s favored competitors.” McKesson, 496 U.S. at 42 . “ ‘Under the facts presented in this case, [Vulcan] offered no specific evidence of a domestic competitor, and consequently there is no injury and therefore no refund due.

2008"Hence, the salient feature of the position petitioner `should have occupied' absent any Commerce Clause violation is its equivalence to the position actually occupied by petitioner's favored competitors." McKesson , 496 U.S. at 42 . "`Under the facts presented in this case, [Vulcan] offered no specific evidence of a domestic competitor , and consequently there is no injury and therefore no refund due.

2008TradeWinds contends that "where a transaction calls on an out-of-state company to perform unique or specialized labor, as opposed to general construction, that labor is `necessary and incidental' to the interstate business . . . and the [contract] is protected by the commerce clause." TradeWinds cites Wallace Construction Co. v. Industrial Boiler Co. , 470 So.2d 1151 (Ala. 1985), in which "Wallace was the successful bidder for a contract with the University of Montevallo for, among other things, the installation of a heating system at the school." Wallace Construction , 470 So.2d 1151 .

2008TradeWinds contends that "where a transaction calls on an out-of-state company to perform unique or specialized labor, as opposed to general construction, that labor is `necessary and incidental' to the interstate business . . . and the [contract] is protected by the commerce clause." TradeWinds cites Wallace Construction Co. v. Industrial Boiler Co. , 470 So.2d 1151 (Ala. 1985), in which "Wallace was the successful bidder for a contract with the University of Montevallo for, among other things, the installation of a heating system at the school." Wallace Construction , 470 So.2d 1151 .

2004Hawaii argued that the Twenty-First Amendment saved its tax scheme from the Commerce Clause challenge and that its locally produced liquors-okolehao and pineapple wine — did not compete with imported liquor subject to the excise tax. 10 The Supreme Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment "did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce Clause." 468 U.S. at 275 , 104 S.Ct. 3049 .

2004Hawaii argued that the Twenty-First Amendment saved its tax scheme from the Commerce Clause challenge and that its locally produced liquors-okolehao and pineapple wine — did not compete with imported liquor subject to the excise tax. 10 The Supreme Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment "did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce Clause." 468 U.S. at 275 , 104 S.Ct. 3049 .

2000However, while presenting this warning as to the scope of the interstate-commerce power, the Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel expanded the commerce power by upholding "the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge, and in the process, depart[ing] from the distinction between `direct' and `indirect' effects on interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 .

2000However, while presenting this warning as to the scope of the interstate-commerce power, the Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel expanded the commerce power by upholding "the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge, and in the process, depart[ing] from the distinction between `direct' and `indirect' effects on interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 .

1999We also note that the Seventh Circuit expressed concern that "[i]f the statute is limited today as it once was to commerce that is not within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, it is a dead letter because there are virtually no sales, in Alabama or anywhere else in the United States, that are intrastate in that sense." 123 F.3d at 613 .

1999We also note that the Seventh Circuit expressed concern that "[i]f the statute is limited today as it once was to commerce that is not within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, it is a dead letter because there are virtually no sales, in Alabama or anywhere else in the United States, that are intrastate in that sense." 123 F.3d at 613 .

1946Louis, 250 U.S. 459 , 39 S.Ct. 522, 523 , 63 L.Ed. 1084 , decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1919, it was held that the commerce clause of the federal Constitution was not contravened by an ordinance of the City of St.

1946Louis, 250 U.S. 459 , 39 S.Ct. 522, 523 , 63 L.Ed. 1084 , decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1919, it was held that the commerce clause of the federal Constitution was not contravened by an ordinance of the City of St.

1993In fact, one case cited in Complete Auto Transit, supra, predated the original enactment of Alabama’s use tax provisions and stated the following: “It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to reheve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business. ‘Even interstate business must pay its way,’ and the bare fact that one is carrying on interstate commerce does not reheve him from many forms of state taxation which add to the cost of his business- [I]f the property devoted to interstate transportation is us

1993In fact, one case cited in Complete Auto Transit, supra, predated the original enactment of Alabama’s use tax provisions and stated the following: “It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to reheve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business. ‘Even interstate business must pay its way,’ and the bare fact that one is carrying on interstate commerce does not reheve him from many forms of state taxation which add to the cost of his business- [I]f the property devoted to interstate transportation is us

1941Motor Trading Co. et al. v. Ingels, 110 P.2d 132 .

1941Motor Trading Co. et al. v. Ingels, 110 P.2d 132 .

1940Gibbons v. Ogden [ 22 U.S. 1 ], 9 Wheat. 1 [ 6 L.Ed. 23 ].” In the case of Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 , 42 S.Ct. 106, 108 , 66 L.Ed. 239 , in an opinion by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, it was held: “The commerce clause of the Constitution (article 1, § 8, cl. 3) expressly commits to Congress and impliedly withholds from the several states the power to regulate commerce among the latter.

1940Gibbons v. Ogden [ 22 U.S. 1 ], 9 Wheat. 1 [ 6 L.Ed. 23 ].” In the case of Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 , 42 S.Ct. 106, 108 , 66 L.Ed. 239 , in an opinion by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, it was held: “The commerce clause of the Constitution (article 1, § 8, cl. 3) expressly commits to Congress and impliedly withholds from the several states the power to regulate commerce among the latter.

1939We are not unmindful of the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States that, under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, in the absence of Congressional Action, state taxation, whatever its form, is precluded if it discriminates against interstate commerce or undertakes to- lay a privilege tax measured by gross receipts derived from activities in such commerce which' extend beyond the territorial limits of the taxing state; and that such a tax, at least when not apportioned to the activities carried on within the state, “burdens the commerce

1939We are not unmindful of the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States that, under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, in the absence of Congressional Action, state taxation, whatever its form, is precluded if it discriminates against interstate commerce or undertakes to- lay a privilege tax measured by gross receipts derived from activities in such commerce which' extend beyond the territorial limits of the taxing state; and that such a tax, at least when not apportioned to the activities carried on within the state, “burdens the commerce

2025Nance, supra. D.

2010“For these reasons, the district court properly concluded that § 601 does not violate the Commerce Clause.” Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1508-09 .

2010The Tenth Circuit responded to this argument stating: “Finally, although § [14501] may have had some unintended effects, such as freeing the reins on intrastate towing and wrecker services, plaintiffs have not cited any cases holding that unintended effects of legislation, by themselves, serve to make the legislation irrational for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis.” 69 F.3d at 1509 .

2010To reach this conclusion, the Supreme Court examined the applicable federal statutes and recognized that “if the restrictions imposed by the city on construction projects financed in part by federal funds are directed by Congress then no dormant Commerce Clause issue is presented.” 460 U.S. at 213 , 103 S.Ct. 1042 .

2010To reach this conclusion, the Supreme Court examined the applicable federal statutes and recognized that “if the restrictions imposed by the city on construction projects financed in part by federal funds are directed by Congress then no dormant Commerce Clause issue is presented.” 460 U.S. at 213 , 103 S.Ct. 1042 .

2008Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869), and thus ‘negative implication from the commerce clause was held not to place any limitation upon state power over the [insurance] business.’ Prudential Ins.

2008Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869), and thus ‘negative implication from the commerce clause was held not to place any limitation upon state power over the [insurance] business.’ Prudential Ins.

2008Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 , 61 S.Ct. 246 , 85 L.Ed. 267 (1940)) (emphasis added).

2008Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 , 61 S.Ct. 246 , 85 L.Ed. 267 (1940)) (emphasis added).

2008In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court adopted language from cases in which it “considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect, and ... sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 (citing in a footnote General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra; Northwestern C

2008In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court adopted language from cases in which it “considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect, and ... sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 (citing in a footnote General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra; Northwestern C

2008In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court adopted language from cases in which it “considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect, and ... sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 (citing in a footnote General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra; Northwestern C

2008In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court adopted language from cases in which it “considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect, and ... sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 (citing in a footnote General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra; Northwestern C