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19 Colorado opinions name it 3 courts 1962–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Allegro Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authoritygreen2 sentences1999See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-57 , 71 S.Ct. 295 , 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951) (striking Madison’s sale of milk ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 64 Cal.App.4th 1217 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 297, 300-01 (1998) (denying a Commerce Clause challenge to a city’s parking tax); Allegro Servs., Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 172 Ill.2d 243 , 216 Ill.Dec. 689 , 665 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-60 (1996) (upholding an airport departure tax imposed by the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority). . 1999See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-57 , 71 S.Ct. 295 , 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951) (striking Madison’s sale of milk ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 64 Cal.App.4th 1217 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 297, 300-01 (1998) (denying a Commerce Clause challenge to a city’s parking tax); Allegro Servs., Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 172 Ill.2d 243 , 216 Ill.Dec. 689 , 665 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-60 (1996) (upholding an airport departure tax imposed by the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority). . | 2 | 2 |
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madisongreen2 sentences1999See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-57 , 71 S.Ct. 295 , 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951) (striking Madison’s sale of milk ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 64 Cal.App.4th 1217 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 297, 300-01 (1998) (denying a Commerce Clause challenge to a city’s parking tax); Allegro Servs., Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 172 Ill.2d 243 , 216 Ill.Dec. 689 , 665 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-60 (1996) (upholding an airport departure tax imposed by the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority). . 1999See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-57 , 71 S.Ct. 295 , 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951) (striking Madison’s sale of milk ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 64 Cal.App.4th 1217 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 297, 300-01 (1998) (denying a Commerce Clause challenge to a city’s parking tax); Allegro Servs., Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 172 Ill.2d 243 , 216 Ill.Dec. 689 , 665 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-60 (1996) (upholding an airport departure tax imposed by the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority). . | 2 | 2 |
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. City of Burbankgreen2 sentences1999See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-57 , 71 S.Ct. 295 , 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951) (striking Madison’s sale of milk ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 64 Cal.App.4th 1217 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 297, 300-01 (1998) (denying a Commerce Clause challenge to a city’s parking tax); Allegro Servs., Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 172 Ill.2d 243 , 216 Ill.Dec. 689 , 665 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-60 (1996) (upholding an airport departure tax imposed by the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority). . 1999See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-57 , 71 S.Ct. 295 , 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951) (striking Madison’s sale of milk ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 64 Cal.App.4th 1217 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 297, 300-01 (1998) (denying a Commerce Clause challenge to a city’s parking tax); Allegro Servs., Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 172 Ill.2d 243 , 216 Ill.Dec. 689 , 665 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-60 (1996) (upholding an airport departure tax imposed by the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority). . | 2 | 2 |
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences1993Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, supra. Here, plaintiffs’ complaint states that both builder and dealer are engaged in the interstate commerce of manufactured homes which comply with HUD regulations. 1986Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 , 100 S.Ct. 2009, 2015 , 64 L.Ed.2d 702 (1980); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State of Colorado, 690 P.2d 177, 182 (Colo.1984). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Foleygreen2 sentences2016But the court in American Libraries Association pointed out that the plaintiffs in that ease had not challenged the portion of the statute prohibiting “adults from luring children into sexual contact by communicating with them via the Internet.” 969 F.Supp. at 179 . ¶ 22 In People v. Foley, 94 N.Y.2d 668 , 709 N.Y.S.2d 467 , 731 N.E.2d 123 (2000), the court rejected a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to just such a -luring statute, one which, similar to the statute at issue in this case, prohibits a person from using Internet communication to “importune[ ],- invite[ ], or induee[ ] a minor to 2016But the court in American Libraries Association pointed out that the plaintiffs in that ease had not challenged the portion of the statute prohibiting “adults from luring children into sexual contact by communicating with them via the Internet.” 969 F.Supp. at 179 . ¶ 22 In People v. Foley, 94 N.Y.2d 668 , 709 N.Y.S.2d 467 , 731 N.E.2d 123 (2000), the court rejected a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to just such a -luring statute, one which, similar to the statute at issue in this case, prohibits a person from using Internet communication to “importune[ ],- invite[ ], or induee[ ] a minor to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hsugreen2 sentences2016Hatch v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 170 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 472-73 (2000); see also People v. Hsu, 82 Cal.App.4th 976 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 184, 191-92 (2000). 2016Hatch v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 170 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 472-73 (2000); see also People v. Hsu, 82 Cal.App.4th 976 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 184, 191-92 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Thorpe v. Stategreen1 sentence2015"Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970); see, eg., Thorpe v. State, 107 P.3d 1064, 1072-73 (Colo.App.2004) (finding no Commerce Clause violation where statutes provided a sales tax refund to full-year state residents but not part-year state residents or nonresidents because | 1 | 1 |
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstowngreen2 sentences2010See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 , 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (the threshold inquiry in dormant Commerce Clause analysis is whether interstate commerce is even at issue); cf. AT & T Commc'ns of Mountain States, Inc. v. State, 778 P.2d 677, 682 (Colo.1989) (state telephone services tax statute did not violate or even implicate the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, as such statute limited taxation to intrastate telephone services). 2010See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 , 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (the threshold inquiry in dormant Commerce Clause analysis is whether interstate commerce is even at issue); cf. AT & T Commc'ns of Mountain States, Inc. v. State, 778 P.2d 677, 682 (Colo.1989) (state telephone services tax statute did not violate or even implicate the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, as such statute limited taxation to intrastate telephone services). | 1 | 1 |
At & T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2010See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 , 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (the threshold inquiry in dormant Commerce Clause analysis is whether interstate commerce is even at issue); cf. AT & T Commc'ns of Mountain States, Inc. v. State, 778 P.2d 677, 682 (Colo.1989) (state telephone services tax statute did not violate or even implicate the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, as such statute limited taxation to intrastate telephone services). | 1 | 1 |
Dennis v. Higginsgreen2 sentences1993The commerce clause, in addition to giving Congress preemptive authority over the regulation of interstate commerce, is a substantive “restriction on permissible state regulation” of interstate commerce and “has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 , -, 111 S.Ct. 865, 870 , 112 L.Ed.2d 969, 978 (1991) (the commerce clause of its own force imposes limitations on state regulation of commerce). 1993The commerce clause, in addition to giving Congress preemptive authority over the regulation of interstate commerce, is a substantive “restriction on permissible state regulation” of interstate commerce and “has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 , -, 111 S.Ct. 865, 870 , 112 L.Ed.2d 969, 978 (1991) (the commerce clause of its own force imposes limitations on state regulation of commerce). | 1 | 1 |
| Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015"Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970); see, eg., Thorpe v. State, 107 P.3d 1064, 1072-73 (Colo.App.2004) (finding no Commerce Clause violation where statutes provided a sales tax refund to full-year state residents but not part-year state residents or nonresidents because 2015"Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970); see, eg., Thorpe v. State, 107 P.3d 1064, 1072-73 (Colo.App.2004) (finding no Commerce Clause violation where statutes provided a sales tax refund to full-year state residents but not part-year state residents or nonresidents because | 2 | 1988–2015 |
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.
green
2 sentences1999See D.R.M.C. § 53-96(1) (imposing Denver’s use tax on the privilege of storing, using, distributing, or consuming property within the city); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 587 , 57 S.Ct. 524 , 81 L.Ed. 814 (1937) (rejecting a challenge that a use tax violated the Commerce Clause where the challenge asserted that the tax “though in form upon the use, was in fact upon the foreign sale, and not upon the use at all, the form being a subterfuge”). 1999See D.R.M.C. § 53-96(1) (imposing Denver’s use tax on the privilege of storing, using, distributing, or consuming property within the city); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 587 , 57 S.Ct. 524 , 81 L.Ed. 814 (1937) (rejecting a challenge that a use tax violated the Commerce Clause where the challenge asserted that the tax “though in form upon the use, was in fact upon the foreign sale, and not upon the use at all, the form being a subterfuge”). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki
green
1 sentence2016But the court in American Libraries Association pointed out that the plaintiffs in that ease had not challenged the portion of the statute prohibiting “adults from luring children into sexual contact by communicating with them via the Internet.” 969 F.Supp. at 179 . ¶ 22 In People v. Foley, 94 N.Y.2d 668 , 709 N.Y.S.2d 467 , 731 N.E.2d 123 (2000), the court rejected a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to just such a -luring statute, one which, similar to the statute at issue in this case, prohibits a person from using Internet communication to “importune[ ],- invite[ ], or induee[ ] a minor to | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hatch v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2016Hatch v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 170 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 472-73 (2000); see also People v. Hsu, 82 Cal.App.4th 976 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 184, 191-92 (2000). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis
green
2 sentences2011Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 , 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1808 , 170 L.Ed.2d 685 (2008). 2011Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 , 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1808 , 170 L.Ed.2d 685 (2008). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Buckley Powder Co. v. State
green
1 sentence1997We granted certiorari to determine if the court of appeals erred in Buckley Powder Co. v. State, 924 P.2d 1133 (Colo.App.1996), when it reversed the district court’s denial of class certification under C.R.C.P. 23 for lack of need. 1 Buckley Powder Co. (Buckley) brought suit on behalf of itself and others alleging that the State’s motor vehicle registration and tax statutes as amended in 1989 and 1990 violated the commerce clause and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and refunds of the allegedly improperly collected taxes. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Riverton Produce Co. v. State
green
1 sentence1997Because our intervening decision in Riverton Produce Co. v. State, 871 P.2d 1213 (Colo.1994), rendered Buckley’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot, certification of a class under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(2) is likewise mooted. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach
green
2 sentences1994New Energy, 486 U.S. at 276 , 108 S.Ct. at 1809 . 1994New Energy, 486 U.S. at 276 , 108 S.Ct. at 1809 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lucchesi v. State
green
1 sentence1993Here, plaintiffs have alleged that the individual county officials, see Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo.App.1990) (county officials are persons against whom § 1983 action may be brought), acting in their official capacities, deprived plaintiffs of constitutional rights under the commerce clause. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority
green
2 sentences1988Mountain Bell urges us to reach a result similar to the one in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 , 106 S.Ct. 2080 , 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a state liquor regulation as violative of the commerce clause. 1988Mountain Bell urges us to reach a result similar to the one in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 , 106 S.Ct. 2080 , 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a state liquor regulation as violative of the commerce clause. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
New York v. United States
green
2 sentences1988Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 , 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1010-15 , 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (rejecting the governmental/proprietary distinction in the context of regulatory immunity under the commerce clause); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 , 66 S.Ct. 310, 314-15 , 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (rejecting the distinction in the context of intergovernmental tax immunity). 6 . 1988Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 , 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1010-15 , 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (rejecting the governmental/proprietary distinction in the context of regulatory immunity under the commerce clause); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 , 66 S.Ct. 310, 314-15 , 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (rejecting the distinction in the context of intergovernmental tax immunity). 6 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
green
2 sentences1988Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 , 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1010-15 , 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (rejecting the governmental/proprietary distinction in the context of regulatory immunity under the commerce clause); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 , 66 S.Ct. 310, 314-15 , 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (rejecting the distinction in the context of intergovernmental tax immunity). 6 . 1988Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 , 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1010-15 , 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (rejecting the governmental/proprietary distinction in the context of regulatory immunity under the commerce clause); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 , 66 S.Ct. 310, 314-15 , 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946) (rejecting the distinction in the context of intergovernmental tax immunity). 6 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1986Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. at 255 , 58 S.Ct. at 548 ; Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. at 26 , 11 S.Ct. at 879 . 1986Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. at 255 , 58 S.Ct. at 548 ; Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. at 26 , 11 S.Ct. at 879 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Exxon Corporation v. City of New York
green
1 sentence1986In Exxon Corp. v. the City of New York , D.C.N.Y. (1973), 356 F. Supp. 660 (D.C. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue
green
2 sentences1986“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.” General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 , 84 S.Ct. 1564, 1567 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964), quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 , 58 *1259 S.Ct. 546, 548, 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938). 1986“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.” General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 , 84 S.Ct. 1564, 1567 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964), quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 , 58 *1259 S.Ct. 546, 548, 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
General Motors Corp. v. Washington
red
2 sentences1986“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.” General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 , 84 S.Ct. 1564, 1567 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964), quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 , 58 *1259 S.Ct. 546, 548, 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938). 1986“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.” General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 , 84 S.Ct. 1564, 1567 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964), quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 , 58 *1259 S.Ct. 546, 548, 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 , 100 S.Ct. 2009, 2015 , 64 L.Ed.2d 702 (1980); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State of Colorado, 690 P.2d 177, 182 (Colo.1984). 1986Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 , 100 S.Ct. 2009, 2015 , 64 L.Ed.2d 702 (1980); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State of Colorado, 690 P.2d 177, 182 (Colo.1984). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission
green
2 sentences1986Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 328-29 , 97 S.Ct. 599, 605-06 , 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977). 1986Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 328-29 , 97 S.Ct. 599, 605-06 , 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt.
green
2 sentences1986Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 443 , 100 S.Ct. 1223, 1234 , 63 L.Ed.2d 510 (1980); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). 1986Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 443 , 100 S.Ct. 1223, 1234 , 63 L.Ed.2d 510 (1980); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady
green
2 sentences1986Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 443 , 100 S.Ct. 1223, 1234 , 63 L.Ed.2d 510 (1980); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). 1986Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 443 , 100 S.Ct. 1223, 1234 , 63 L.Ed.2d 510 (1980); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Geer v. Connecticut red | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Best & Co. v. Maxwell green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Washington v. Davis green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Heyman v. Hays green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Toomer v. Witsell green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| WILLSON AND OTHERS v. the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia Ex Rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots red | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| California v. Thompson green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.