commerce clause in Puerto Rico

1946Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 ; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 521 ; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 508-13 ; Baldwin v. G.A.F.

1912In the American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S., 500 , the opinion was hy Mr. Justice White, and the court held that goods brought in original packages from another State after they have arrived at their destination and are at rest within the State and are enjoying the protection which the laws of the State afford may, without violating the commerce clause of the Constitution, he taxed without discrimination like other ’property within the State, although at the time they are stored at the distributing point from which they are subsequently to be delivered in the same package through the

2012United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, supra, pág. 353, opinión concurrente del Juez Thomas.

2012Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. Rivera Vázquez, supra, pág. 9.

2007(Citas omitidas y énfasis suplido.) Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, supra, pág. 55.

2007In the Supreme Court’s words, “the purpose of Congress in the 1950 and 1952 legislation was to accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the Union ...” Examinig Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 594 , 96 S.Ct. 2264 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 65 (1976). (Énfasis suplido.) El mencionado foro expresó, además: The central rationale of this dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, as the Supreme Court has explained, is the dominant purpose of the Commerce Clause to foster economic integration and prevent local interference with the flow of the nation’s comme

2007In the Supreme Court’s words, “the purpose of Congress in the 1950 and 1952 legislation was to accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the Union ...” Examinig Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 594 , 96 S.Ct. 2264 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 65 (1976). (Énfasis suplido.) El mencionado foro expresó, además: The central rationale of this dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, as the Supreme Court has explained, is the dominant purpose of the Commerce Clause to foster economic integration and prevent local interference with the flow of the nation’s comme

1964For example, the Court has approved property taxes on the instruments employed in commerce, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney General, 125 U.S. 530 (1888); on property devoted to interstate transportation fairly apportioned to its use within the State, Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); on profits derived from foreign or interstate commerce by way of a net income tax, William E.

1964For example, the Court has approved property taxes on the instruments employed in commerce, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney General, 125 U.S. 530 (1888); on property devoted to interstate transportation fairly apportioned to its use within the State, Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); on profits derived from foreign or interstate commerce by way of a net income tax, William E.

1957Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed this out in his concurring opinion in Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340 at 353: “ ‘Due process’ and ‘commerce clause’ conceptions are not always sharply separable in dealing with these problems.

1954This point has already been decided against the petitioners by the Court of Appeals in Mora v. Mejías, supra. It said at p. 387, footnote 6: “It is interesting to note that appellant in this case made a separate constitutional argument that Administrative Order No. 228 constituted an undue and unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce.

1948Under these cases and Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253 , it might be argued that the commerce clause does not inhibit insular legislation on the same subject-matter covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

1948Ballester Hnos. v. Tax Court, 66 P.R.R. 531 , Part II, reversed on other grounds but approved as to this point, 162 F.2d 805 (C.C.A. 1st, 1947), cert. denied 332 U. S. 816 ; South Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Buscaglia, 154 F.2d 96, 101 (C.C.A. 1st, 1946); Buscaglia v. Tax Court; Pérez Vahamonde, Intervener, 68 P.R.R. 322 , and cases cited therein.

1948Ballester Hnos. v. Tax Court, 66 P.R.R. 531 , Part II, reversed on other grounds but approved as to this point, 162 F.2d 805 (C.C.A. 1st, 1947), cert. denied 332 U. S. 816 ; South Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Buscaglia, 154 F.2d 96, 101 (C.C.A. 1st, 1946); Buscaglia v. Tax Court; Pérez Vahamonde, Intervener, 68 P.R.R. 322 , and cases cited therein.

1946Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 ; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 521 ; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 508-13 ; Baldwin v. G.A.F.

1946Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 ; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 521 ; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 508-13 ; Baldwin v. G.A.F.

1946Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 ; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 521 ; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 508-13 ; Baldwin v. G.A.F.

1946Lugo v. Suazo, 59 F.(2d) 386, 390 (C.C.A. 1st, 1932); Sancho v. Bacardí Corporation of America, 109 F.(2d) 57, 62-63 (C.C.A. 1st, 1940), reversed on other grounds, 311 U. S. 150 ; see Porto Rico Tax Appeals, 16 F.(2d) 545, 549 (C.C.A. 1st, 1927), reversed on other grounds, 275 U. S. -56. 6 Rut even if we assume that the commerce clause applies and restricts the power of the Insular Legislature to impose taxes, 7 we are unable to agree with the contention of the taxpayer that property already transported from one State to another is immune under the commerce clause from local taxation in the St

1946Lugo v. Suazo, 59 F.(2d) 386, 390 (C.C.A. 1st, 1932); Sancho v. Bacardí Corporation of America, 109 F.(2d) 57, 62-63 (C.C.A. 1st, 1940), reversed on other grounds, 311 U. S. 150 ; see Porto Rico Tax Appeals, 16 F.(2d) 545, 549 (C.C.A. 1st, 1927), reversed on other grounds, 275 U. S. -56. 6 Rut even if we assume that the commerce clause applies and restricts the power of the Insular Legislature to impose taxes, 7 we are unable to agree with the contention of the taxpayer that property already transported from one State to another is immune under the commerce clause from local taxation in the St

1946Cf. McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414, 428 ; Board of Trustees v. V.

1946Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 , decided June 3, 1946; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33 , 45.

1946Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 , decided June 3, 1946; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33 , 45.

1939In Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1 , 4 L. ed. 359, the plaintiff was taking his herd of sheep from the Territory of Utah to the State of Nebraska crossing through the State of Wyoming.

1939The Federal Supreme Court upheld the validity of the tax and said: “With these facts in hand we are of opinion that the court below was right in deciding that the goods were not in transit, but, on the contrary, had reached their destination at Memphis, and were there held in store at the risk of the Steel Company, to be sold and delivered as contracts for that purpose were completely consummated. ’ ’ See: General Oil Co. v. Craim, 209 U. S. 211 , 52 L. ed. 754; Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665 ; Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 ; State v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 171

1939The Federal Supreme Court upheld the validity of the tax and said: “With these facts in hand we are of opinion that the court below was right in deciding that the goods were not in transit, but, on the contrary, had reached their destination at Memphis, and were there held in store at the risk of the Steel Company, to be sold and delivered as contracts for that purpose were completely consummated. ’ ’ See: General Oil Co. v. Craim, 209 U. S. 211 , 52 L. ed. 754; Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665 ; Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 ; State v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 171

1939The Federal Supreme Court upheld the validity of the tax and said: “With these facts in hand we are of opinion that the court below was right in deciding that the goods were not in transit, but, on the contrary, had reached their destination at Memphis, and were there held in store at the risk of the Steel Company, to be sold and delivered as contracts for that purpose were completely consummated. ’ ’ See: General Oil Co. v. Craim, 209 U. S. 211 , 52 L. ed. 754; Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665 ; Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 ; State v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 171