commerce clause in New Jersey

2023"The United States Supreme Court has set forth a four-part test in determining whether a tax can be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge: whether the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state." Stryker Corp., 168 N.J. at 152 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 282 (1977)).

2023"The United States Supreme Court has set forth a four-part test in determining whether a tax can be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge: whether the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state." Stryker Corp., 168 N.J. at 152 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 282 (1977)).

1991City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 , 98 S.Ct. 2531 , 57 L.Ed. 2d 475 (1978).

1991City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 , 98 S.Ct. 2531 , 57 L.Ed. 2d 475 (1978).

1991See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428-29 , 83 S.Ct. 1759, 1762-63 , 10 L.Ed. 2d 983, 987-88 (1963).

1991See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428-29 , 83 S.Ct. 1759, 1762-63 , 10 L.Ed. 2d 983, 987-88 (1963).

1987Consumer Discount Co. One v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 100 N.J. 27 ; see ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 , 102 S.Ct. 3103, 3108 , 73 L.Ed.2d 787, 794 (1982). “[Ejquity demands” — and as we held in Avco, the commerce clause permits — that “business carrying on activities in the State and exploiting the New Jersey market make some contribution to the costs of maintaining governmental operations and the services provided by the State____” Report, supra, at 22.

1987Consumer Discount Co. One v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 100 N.J. 27 ; see ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 , 102 S.Ct. 3103, 3108 , 73 L.Ed.2d 787, 794 (1982). “[Ejquity demands” — and as we held in Avco, the commerce clause permits — that “business carrying on activities in the State and exploiting the New Jersey market make some contribution to the costs of maintaining governmental operations and the services provided by the State____” Report, supra, at 22.

1992That requirement unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. 94 N.J. at 318 , 463 A. 2d 921 . *358 In Coons I, we relied on Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 , 95 S.Ct. 260 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 195 (1974), which found a commerce clause violation in a Mississippi statute that prohibited a foreign corporation from filing suit in that state's courts without first obtaining a certificate of authority.

1992That requirement unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. 94 N.J. at 318 , 463 A. 2d 921 . *358 In Coons I, we relied on Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 , 95 S.Ct. 260 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 195 (1974), which found a commerce clause violation in a Mississippi statute that prohibited a foreign corporation from filing suit in that state's courts without first obtaining a certificate of authority.

2014The distinction is simple; in the first category the other state lacks jurisdiction to tax, and in the second the state chooses not to exercise its jurisdiction. [ Id. at 168-69,26 A.3d 446 (footnote omitted).] When examining the external consistency prong of the Commerce Clause analysis, see Container Corp., supra, 463 U.S. at 169 , 103 S.Ct. at 2942 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 556 , the Court held that [t]he Throw-Out Rule’s external consistency depends on the rationale for throwing out the receipts.

2014The distinction is simple; in the first category the other state lacks jurisdiction to tax, and in the second the state chooses not to exercise its jurisdiction. [ Id. at 168-69,26 A.3d 446 (footnote omitted).] When examining the external consistency prong of the Commerce Clause analysis, see Container Corp., supra, 463 U.S. at 169 , 103 S.Ct. at 2942 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 556 , the Court held that [t]he Throw-Out Rule’s external consistency depends on the rationale for throwing out the receipts.

2014The distinction is simple; in the first category the other state lacks jurisdiction to tax, and in the second the state chooses not to exercise its jurisdiction. [ Id. at 168-69,26 A.3d 446 (footnote omitted).] When examining the external consistency prong of the Commerce Clause analysis, see Container Corp., supra, 463 U.S. at 169 , 103 S.Ct. at 2942 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 556 , the Court held that [t]he Throw-Out Rule’s external consistency depends on the rationale for throwing out the receipts.

2014The distinction is simple; in the first category the other state lacks jurisdiction to tax, and in the second the state chooses not to exercise its jurisdiction. [ Id. at 168-69,26 A.3d 446 (footnote omitted).] When examining the external consistency prong of the Commerce Clause analysis, see Container Corp., supra, 463 U.S. at 169 , 103 S.Ct. at 2942 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 556 , the Court held that [t]he Throw-Out Rule’s external consistency depends on the rationale for throwing out the receipts.

1984He further ruled, citing South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 , 58 S.Ct. 510 , 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938), that there was no Commerce Clause violation in this application for a state has the right to regulate use of its highways.

1984He further ruled, citing South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 , 58 S.Ct. 510 , 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938), that there was no Commerce Clause violation in this application for a state has the right to regulate use of its highways.

2023"The United States Supreme Court has set forth a four-part test in determining whether a tax can be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge: whether the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state." Stryker Corp., 168 N.J. at 152 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 282 (1977)).

2023"The United States Supreme Court has set forth a four-part test in determining whether a tax can be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge: whether the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state." Stryker Corp., 168 N.J. at 152 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 282 (1977)).

1991It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations *410 created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. [Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 , 64 S.Ct. 208, 214 , 88 L.Ed. 149, 155-56 (1943).] See Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-11 , 386 A.2d 366 (1978); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 153

1991It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations *410 created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. [Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 , 64 S.Ct. 208, 214 , 88 L.Ed. 149, 155-56 (1943).] See Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-11 , 386 A.2d 366 (1978); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 153

1988In Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 , 67 S.Ct. 274 , 91 L.Ed. 265 (1946), the Supreme Court, dealing with a Commerce Clause challenge to a state tax, stated: [T]he Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States.

1988In Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 , 67 S.Ct. 274 , 91 L.Ed. 265 (1946), the Supreme Court, dealing with a Commerce Clause challenge to a state tax, stated: [T]he Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States.

2021The motion judge concluded that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing prong three of the Complete Auto test, in part because plaintiffs conceded the tax only "indirectly violated" the dormant Commerce Clause, and 12 We hereafter refer to these as the four prongs of the Complete Auto test. 13 In Telebright Corp. v. Director, New Jersey Division of Taxation, we refused to consider a taxpayer's Commerce Clause challenge to the Corporation Business Tax Act as to three prongs of the Complete Auto test because its brief addressed the issues in "one sentence in the conclusion section

2021The motion judge concluded that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing prong three of the Complete Auto test, in part because plaintiffs conceded the tax only "indirectly violated" the dormant Commerce Clause, and 12 We hereafter refer to these as the four prongs of the Complete Auto test. 13 In Telebright Corp. v. Director, New Jersey Division of Taxation, we refused to consider a taxpayer's Commerce Clause challenge to the Corporation Business Tax Act as to three prongs of the Complete Auto test because its brief addressed the issues in "one sentence in the conclusion section

2021“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden[s].” Id. at 102 (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).

2021A compensatory tax “is merely a specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means.” Ibid.

2012See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J.Super. 648, 657 , 11 A.3d 420 (App.Div.2011).

2012See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J.Super. 648, 657 , 11 A.3d 420 (App.Div.2011).

2008On the contrary, we repeatedly have focused our Commerce Clause analysis on whether a challenged scheme is discriminatory in “effect” and we have emphasized that “equality for the purposes of ... the flow of commerce is measured in dollars and cents, not legal abstractions.” [Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, supra, 511 U.S. at 654 , 114 S.Ct. at 1824 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 651 (citations omitted).] Cf. Moorman Mfg.

2008On the contrary, we repeatedly have focused our Commerce Clause analysis on whether a challenged scheme is discriminatory in “effect” and we have emphasized that “equality for the purposes of ... the flow of commerce is measured in dollars and cents, not legal abstractions.” [Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, supra, 511 U.S. at 654 , 114 S.Ct. at 1824 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 651 (citations omitted).] Cf. Moorman Mfg.

2008Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 , 98 S.Ct. 2340, 2348 , 57 L.Ed. 2d 197, 209 (1978) (refusing to make a finding of unconstitutionality “based on speculative concerns with multiple taxation”).

2008Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 , 98 S.Ct. 2340, 2348 , 57 L.Ed. 2d 197, 209 (1978) (refusing to make a finding of unconstitutionality “based on speculative concerns with multiple taxation”).

2005In the equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. * * * The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the States. [ 470 U.S. at 881 , 105 S.

2005In the equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. * * * The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the States. [ 470 U.S. at 881 , 105 S.