commerce clause in California

2018There Are Triable Issues of Fact About the Existence of Discriminatory Effect The gravamen of discriminatory action is "differential treatment of in-state *891 and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." ( Oregon Waste , supra , 511 U.S. at p. 99 , 114 S.Ct. 1345 .) Discrimination that puts a higher tax burden on in-state businesses than on interstate businesses does not violate the commerce clause because it does not discourage commerce among the states.

2018There Are Triable Issues of Fact About the Existence of Discriminatory Effect The gravamen of discriminatory action is "differential treatment of in-state *891 and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." ( Oregon Waste , supra , 511 U.S. at p. 99 , 114 S.Ct. 1345 .) Discrimination that puts a higher tax burden on in-state businesses than on interstate businesses does not violate the commerce clause because it does not discourage commerce among the states.

2018Nor did it solicit customers in California or make any deliveries to customers in California." ( Id. at p. 849, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 .) However, since Northwest had registered as an LLC with the California Secretary of State, it was subject to the levy pursuant to section 17941, subdivision (b), and former section 17942. ( Id. at pp. 849-850, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 .) Under these circumstances, Division Five of this District concluded that the levy "more closely resemble[d] a tax" than a fee, given its general revenue raising purpose. ( Id. at pp. 852-861, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 .) It further determined

2018Nor did it solicit customers in California or make any deliveries to customers in California." ( Id. at p. 849, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 .) However, since Northwest had registered as an LLC with the California Secretary of State, it was subject to the levy pursuant to section 17941, subdivision (b), and former section 17942. ( Id. at pp. 849-850, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 .) Under these circumstances, Division Five of this District concluded that the levy "more closely resemble[d] a tax" than a fee, given its general revenue raising purpose. ( Id. at pp. 852-861, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 .) It further determined

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

1998In short, the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States. . . .’ (Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 252 [ 91 L.Ed. 265 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ]; see also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945) 325 U.S. 761 , 769 . . . .” (Barclays Bank Internat., Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 708, 722 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 31 , 829 P.2d 279 ].) “In this respect, the commerce clause resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, ‘defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.’ ([San Diego Unified Port Dist.

1998In short, the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States. . . .’ (Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 252 [ 91 L.Ed. 265 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ]; see also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945) 325 U.S. 761 , 769 . . . .” (Barclays Bank Internat., Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 708, 722 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 31 , 829 P.2d 279 ].) “In this respect, the commerce clause resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, ‘defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.’ ([San Diego Unified Port Dist.

2022(Edgar, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 627 ; NCAA, supra, 10 F.3d at p. 639.) Neither Edgar nor NCAA involves a Commerce Clause violation that arises from a private actor’s decision to take action that is permitted, but not required or even encouraged, by state law.

2022(Edgar, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 627 ; NCAA, supra, 10 F.3d at p. 639.) Neither Edgar nor NCAA involves a Commerce Clause violation that arises from a private actor’s decision to take action that is permitted, but not required or even encouraged, by state law.

2022(Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 281 .) The commerce clause power could be exercised to preempt state law without showing any effect upon interstate commerce if, in the aggregate, the economic activity represents “ ‘a general practice . . . subject to federal control.’ ” (Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 .) “Only that general practice need bear on interstate commerce in a substantial way.” (Ibid.) The party asserting FAA preemption has the burden of demonstrating that the subject matter of the agreement involves interstate commerce.

2016(Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 273-274 [ 130 L.Ed.2d 753 , 115 S.Ct. 834 ] (Allied-Bruce); accord, Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56 [ 156 L.Ed.2d 46 , 123 S.Ct. 2037 ] (Alafabco).) The Federal Arbitration Act’s reach is expansive and coincides with that of the commerce clause.

2012The commerce clause is phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, but it “has long been seen as a limitation on state regulatory powers, as well as an affirmative grant of congressional authority.” (Fulton, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 330 .) Fulton tells us that in this negative aspect—also referred to as the dormant commerce clause—the clause “ ‘prohibits economic protectionism—that is, “regulatory measures designed to benefit instate economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” ’ ” ( 516 U.S. at p. 330 .) This construction furthers “the Framers’ purpose to ‘prevent a State f

2012The commerce clause is phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, but it “has long been seen as a limitation on state regulatory powers, as well as an affirmative grant of congressional authority.” (Fulton, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 330 .) Fulton tells us that in this negative aspect—also referred to as the dormant commerce clause—the clause “ ‘prohibits economic protectionism—that is, “regulatory measures designed to benefit instate economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” ’ ” ( 516 U.S. at p. 330 .) This construction furthers “the Framers’ purpose to ‘prevent a State f

2014And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” (Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970) 397 U.S. 137, 142 .) “Statutes affecting public safety carry a strong presumption of validity [citation], and the definition and enforcement of criminal laws lie primarily with states.” (People v. Hsu (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 976, 983-984 .) Applying these principles, we conclude section 288.3 does not violate the commerce clause.

2011Challenges to state statutes under the commerce clause are typically addressed under the test set out in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970) 397 U.S. 137, 142 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 174 , 90 S.Ct. 844 ]: “Where [a challenged] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” California’s overtime law, applying to all work performed in the state, regulates evenhandedly to effectuate the legi

1995As will appear, we shall conclude that the Department’s proffered justifications for its discriminatory fee structure cannot withstand the exacting demands of “strictest scrutiny.” The weakness of the Department’s position is foreshadowed by its preliminary contention that charging a fee for inspecting foreign commerce serves what it describes as “the ‘pay-as-you-play’ principle,” i.e., that “those who are subject to a regulation should pay for it to be implemented.” We agree with the well-established notion that every class of commerce is obliged to “ ‘pay its own way’ ” (Complete Auto Transi

1995As will appear, we shall conclude that the Department’s proffered justifications for its discriminatory fee structure cannot withstand the exacting demands of “strictest scrutiny.” The weakness of the Department’s position is foreshadowed by its preliminary contention that charging a fee for inspecting foreign commerce serves what it describes as “the ‘pay-as-you-play’ principle,” i.e., that “those who are subject to a regulation should pay for it to be implemented.” We agree with the well-established notion that every class of commerce is obliged to “ ‘pay its own way’ ” (Complete Auto Transi

2015The deferral was available, however, only if the stock sold and purchased was issued by corporations that used 80 percent of their assets in the conduct of business in California and that maintained 80 percent of their payrolls in California.” (Cutler, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250 .) The court stated it was bound by Fulton, supra, 516 U.S. at page 330 to “conclude that, because the statute affords taxpayers a deferral for income received from the sale of stock in corporations maintaining assets and payroll in California, while no deferral is afforded for income from the sale of stock in c

2012Code, § 18152.5, subds. (c)(2)(A), (e)(1)(A) & (9).) Under the teaching of the high court in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner (1996) 516 U.S. 325, 330 [ 133 L.Ed.2d 796 , 116 S.Ct. 848 ] (Fulton), we are bound to and do conclude that, because the statute affords taxpayers a deferral for income received from the sale of stock in corporations maintaining assets and payroll in California, while no deferral is afforded for income from the sale of stock in corporations that maintain assets and payroll elsewhere, the deferral provision discriminates on its face on the basis of an interstate element in viola

2017The high court has cautioned that notwithstanding the scope of Congress's authority under the commerce clause, "[r]estraint in this area is ... counseled by considerations of state sovereignty, the role of each State ' "as guardian and trustee for its people," ' [citation], and 'the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.' [Citation.]" ( Reeves , supra , 447 U.S. at pp. 438-439, 100 S.Ct. 2271 , fns. omitted.) *735 The high court has cautioned that whereas t

1988Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States . . . .” “The restriction implicit in the Commerce Clause is designed to prohibit States from burdening the free flow of commerce, . . .” (Massachusetts v. United States (1978) 435 U.S. 444, 462 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 403, 417 , 98 S.Ct. 1153 ].) “Although [the commerce clause] grants Congress power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Foun

1958Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 69, 73 [ 32 S.Ct. 13 , 56 L.Ed. 96 ]; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294 [ 64 S.Ct. 950 , 88 L.Ed. 1283 , 153 A.L.R. 245 ]; Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Eq. &A., 347 U.S. 590, 602 [ 74 S.Ct. 757 , 98 L.Ed. 967 ]; Olson v. City & County of San Francisco, 148 Cal. 80, 83, 84 [ 82 P. 850 , 113 Am.St.Rep. 191 , 7 Ann.Cas. 443, 2 L.R.A. 197 ]; California Shipping Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 150 Cal. 145, 146 [ 88 P. 704 ].) To the extent that the property is taxable elsewhere it cannot be taxed by the domiciliary sta

1958Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 69, 73 [ 32 S.Ct. 13 , 56 L.Ed. 96 ]; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294 [ 64 S.Ct. 950 , 88 L.Ed. 1283 , 153 A.L.R. 245 ]; Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Eq. &A., 347 U.S. 590, 602 [ 74 S.Ct. 757 , 98 L.Ed. 967 ]; Olson v. City & County of San Francisco, 148 Cal. 80, 83, 84 [ 82 P. 850 , 113 Am.St.Rep. 191 , 7 Ann.Cas. 443, 2 L.R.A. 197 ]; California Shipping Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 150 Cal. 145, 146 [ 88 P. 704 ].) To the extent that the property is taxable elsewhere it cannot be taxed by the domiciliary sta

2005It did not review any such law, and it adopted the principle SBC cites from a non-antitrust case (Edgar v. MITE Corp. (1982) 457 U.S. 624 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 269 , 102 S.Ct. 2629 ] [Illinois law requiring registration of takeover bids]), which in turn cited another non-antitrust case (Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945) 325 U.S. 761 [ 89 L.Ed. 1915 , 65 S.Ct. 1515 ] [Arizona law limiting train length].) That Healy did not specifically consider state antitrust laws is important, because its understanding of the commerce clause’s purpose and scope may be consistent with giving extraterritorial effec

2000Pataki cited several cases in which laws purporting to regulate only intrastate matters of local concern were struck down under the commerce clause because they affected a form “ ‘of the national commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority.’ [(Quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, 325 U.S. at p. 767 [ 65 S.Ct. at p. 1519 ].)]” ( Pataki, supra, 969 F.Supp. at pp. 181-182.) Pataki reasoned that the Internet, like the rail and highway regulations at issue in Southern Pacific Co. and Bibb v. Navajo

2023(Voss, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 517 .) 30 We find the analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause issue contained in Hignell- Stark to be persuasive.

2023(Voss, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 517 .) 30 We find the analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause issue contained in Hignell- Stark to be persuasive.

1972But the same degree of certainty may exist though no common, carrier is involved.” (Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board (1946) 329 U.S. 69, 82 [ 91 L.Ed. 80, 92-93 , 67 S.Ct. 156 ].) (Fn. omitted.) In cases arising under the import-export clause, “ . . goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common, earner for transportation to another State, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey.’ ” (Richfield Oil C

1972But the same degree of certainty may exist though no common, carrier is involved.” (Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board (1946) 329 U.S. 69, 82 [ 91 L.Ed. 80, 92-93 , 67 S.Ct. 156 ].) (Fn. omitted.) In cases arising under the import-export clause, “ . . goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common, earner for transportation to another State, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey.’ ” (Richfield Oil C

2018(Barclays, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 303 ; see also Container Corp., supra, 463 U.S. at p. 164 .) The court in Container Corp. explained that separate accounting "often ignores or captures inadequately the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the components of a single 12 enterprise." (Container Corp., at pp. 164–165.) While these compelling reasons were stated in the context of a due process claim, they provide the same rational basis for supporting the state's legitimate interest in requiring combined reporting when it is challenged as discriminatory un

2000General Principles The commerce clause has two aspects: it is an affirmative grant of power to the federal government to regulate interstate commerce, and it restricts the power of states to regulate interstate commerce. ( Pacific Merchant Shipping Assn. v. Voss (1995) 12 Cal.4th 503, 514-515 , 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 582 , 907 P.2d 430 .) The state restriction aspect is commonly referred to as the "dormant" commerce clause (see Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California (1994) 512 U.S. 298, 310, fn. 9 , 114 S.Ct. 2268 , 129 L.Ed.2d 244 ).

1988Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States . . . .” “The restriction implicit in the Commerce Clause is designed to prohibit States from burdening the free flow of commerce, . . .” (Massachusetts v. United States (1978) 435 U.S. 444, 462 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 403, 417 , 98 S.Ct. 1153 ].) “Although [the commerce clause] grants Congress power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Foun

1988Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States . . . .” “The restriction implicit in the Commerce Clause is designed to prohibit States from burdening the free flow of commerce, . . .” (Massachusetts v. United States (1978) 435 U.S. 444, 462 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 403, 417 , 98 S.Ct. 1153 ].) “Although [the commerce clause] grants Congress power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Foun

2023(See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison (1997) 520 U.S. 564, 575-576 .) The complaint’s undisputed 1 allegations of Measure T’s adoption and its terms were the only facts necessary to plead a facial dormant Commerce Clause violation.

2012In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison (1997) 520 U.S. 564 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 852 , 117 S.Ct. 1590 ] (Camps Newfound), the court found that an exemption from state property tax for property owned by charitable institutions, which excluded from the exemption organizations operated principally for the benefit of nonresidents, violated the commerce clause. (520 U.S. at pp. 572, 576 [“As a practical matter, the statute encourages affected entities to limit their out-of-state clientele, and penalizes the principally nonresident customers of businesses catering to a primarily interstate mar

2012The commerce clause is phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, but it “has long been seen as a limitation on state regulatory powers, as well as an affirmative grant of congressional authority.” (Fulton, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 330 .) Fulton tells us that in this negative aspect—also referred to as the dormant commerce clause—the clause “ ‘prohibits economic protectionism—that is, “regulatory measures designed to benefit instate economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” ’ ” ( 516 U.S. at p. 330 .) This construction furthers “the Framers’ purpose to ‘prevent a State f

2012The commerce clause is phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, but it “has long been seen as a limitation on state regulatory powers, as well as an affirmative grant of congressional authority.” (Fulton, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 330 .) Fulton tells us that in this negative aspect—also referred to as the dormant commerce clause—the clause “ ‘prohibits economic protectionism—that is, “regulatory measures designed to benefit instate economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” ’ ” ( 516 U.S. at p. 330 .) This construction furthers “the Framers’ purpose to ‘prevent a State f

2002The Commerce Clause A. The commerce clause provides that “Congress shall have power . . . [H] . . . [1[] [t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several states . . . .” “It has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce. [Citations.]” (New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach (1988) 486 U.S. 269, 273 [ 108 S.Ct. 1803, 1807 , 100 L.Ed.2d 302 ]; Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 [ 6 L.Ed. 23, 70-71 ]; Cooley v.

2002The Commerce Clause A. The commerce clause provides that “Congress shall have power . . . [H] . . . [1[] [t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several states . . . .” “It has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce. [Citations.]” (New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach (1988) 486 U.S. 269, 273 [ 108 S.Ct. 1803, 1807 , 100 L.Ed.2d 302 ]; Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 [ 6 L.Ed. 23, 70-71 ]; Cooley v.

1998The commerce clause “protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.” (Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland (1978) 437 U.S. 117, 127-128 [ 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2215 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 ]; Kleenwell Biohazard Waste v. Nelson (9th Cir. 1995) 48 F.3d 391 , 397.) Unlike the flow control ordinance declared violative of the commerce clause in Carbone, the ordinance here regulates only solid waste generated and processed entirely “within the City.” It imposes an exclusively intrastate restriction on the processing of waste.

1998The commerce clause “protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.” (Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland (1978) 437 U.S. 117, 127-128 [ 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2215 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 ]; Kleenwell Biohazard Waste v. Nelson (9th Cir. 1995) 48 F.3d 391 , 397.) Unlike the flow control ordinance declared violative of the commerce clause in Carbone, the ordinance here regulates only solid waste generated and processed entirely “within the City.” It imposes an exclusively intrastate restriction on the processing of waste.

1983Co. v. Benjamin (1946) 328 U.S. 408, 429-430 [ 90 L.Ed. 1342, 1359-1360 , 66 S.Ct. 1142 , 164 A.L.R. 476 ], excepts state regulation of insurers from the restraints imposed by the commerce clause. 4 The full paragraph in which the statement appears is as follows: “But the limits of the state’s legislative jurisdiction to tax, prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment, are to be ascertained by reference to the incidence of the tax upon its objects rather than the ultimate thrust of the economic benefits and burdens of transactions within the state.

1983Co. v. Benjamin (1946) 328 U.S. 408, 429-430 [ 90 L.Ed. 1342, 1359-1360 , 66 S.Ct. 1142 , 164 A.L.R. 476 ], excepts state regulation of insurers from the restraints imposed by the commerce clause. 4 The full paragraph in which the statement appears is as follows: “But the limits of the state’s legislative jurisdiction to tax, prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment, are to be ascertained by reference to the incidence of the tax upon its objects rather than the ultimate thrust of the economic benefits and burdens of transactions within the state.

2017Provisions like the Fourteenth Amendment and the contract clause 'confer fundamental rights on individual citizens'; the supremacy clause, in contrast, 'establishes a structure of government which defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.' [Citation.] Political subdivisions cannot assert 'constitutional rights which are intended to limit governmental action [vis-à -vis] individual citizens' but may invoke the supremacy clause to challenge preempted state law. [Citation.] Otherwise 'such legislation and regulation often would go unchecked even though expressly prohibited

2017Provisions like the Fourteenth Amendment and the contract clause 'confer fundamental rights on individual citizens'; the supremacy clause, in contrast, 'establishes a structure of government which defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.' [Citation.] Political subdivisions cannot assert 'constitutional rights which are intended to limit governmental action [vis-à -vis] individual citizens' but may invoke the supremacy clause to challenge preempted state law. [Citation.] Otherwise 'such legislation and regulation often would go unchecked even though expressly prohibited

2018(Barclays, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 303 ; see also Container Corp., supra, 463 U.S. at p. 164 .) The court in Container Corp. explained that separate accounting "often ignores or captures inadequately the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the components of a single 12 enterprise." (Container Corp., at pp. 164–165.) While these compelling reasons were stated in the context of a due process claim, they provide the same rational basis for supporting the state's legitimate interest in requiring combined reporting when it is challenged as discriminatory un

1992(New Energy Co. v. Limbach (1988) 486 U.S. 269, 273 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 302, 308 , 108 S.Ct. 1803 ]; Container, supra, 463 U.S. atp. 170 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 556-557].) This latter limitation is within the “ ‘negative’ ” aspect of the commerce clause.

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour

2015I, § 8, cl. 3.) The commerce clause reflects “ ‘the Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.’ ” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ], quoting Healy v. Beer Institute (1989) 491 U.S. 324, 335-336 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 275 , 109 S.Ct. 2491 ] (Healy).) Though the commerce clause imposes no express constraints “on ‘the several States,’ ” the United States Supreme Cour