commerce clause (Louisiana) · Go Syfert
← Louisiana issues

commerce clause in Louisiana

48 Louisiana opinions name it 3 courts 1892–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrisongreen
scotus · 1997 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009See e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 , 117 S.Ct. 1590 , 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997) (Thomas, J„ joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application.”). 11 .

2009See e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 , 117 S.Ct. 1590 , 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997) (Thomas, J„ joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application.”). 11 .

11
Ex Parte Hoover, Inc.green
ala · 2006 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
1 sentence

2009As noted by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Hoover, Inc., 956 So.2d 1149, 1153 (Ala.2006), dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not without criticism.

11
Jerry Bainbridge v. John Bushgreen
ca11 · 2002 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008Accordingly, the question by what test to substantiate the State's 21st Amendment interest against a so-called first-tier Commerce Clause claim is not presented. [9] In *329 the absence of any discrimination, this case at most presents a so-called second-tier Commerce Clause claim: "`When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits."' Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v

2008Noting that the Sherman Act has long been interpreted as prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade, he suggested that conduct in conformity with State policy on alcoholic beverages "could not be deemed an `unreasonable' restraint of interstate commerce." Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 302 , 65 S.Ct. at 665 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). [9] For the particular combination of a first-tier Commerce Clause claim and a core-concern 21st Amendment interest, the Bainbridge court proposed the following: "When such a concern is implicated, the Amendment removes the constitutional cloud from the

11
Bridges v. Autozone Properties, Inc.green
la · 2005 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008See Bridges v. Autozone Properties, Inc., 04-0814 (La.3/24/05), 900 So.2d 784 (wherein the court followed the Due Process analysis articulated in Quill and determined that Louisiana had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident shareholder when Louisiana has provided benefits, opportunities, and protections, which helped to create the income); Kevin Associates, L.L.C. v. Crawford, 03-0211 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So.2d 34 (following Quill and determining that imposition of corporate income and franchise tax on a corporation that had a commercial domicile in Louisiana did not violate the Due Process a

11
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.green
scotus · 1945 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008Noting that the Sherman Act has long been interpreted as prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade, he suggested that conduct in conformity with State policy on alcoholic beverages "could not be deemed an `unreasonable' restraint of interstate commerce." Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 302 , 65 S.Ct. at 665 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). [9] For the particular combination of a first-tier Commerce Clause claim and a core-concern 21st Amendment interest, the Bainbridge court proposed the following: "When such a concern is implicated, the Amendment removes the constitutional cloud from the

2008Noting that the Sherman Act has long been interpreted as prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade, he suggested that conduct in conformity with State policy on alcoholic beverages "could not be deemed an `unreasonable' restraint of interstate commerce." Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 302 , 65 S.Ct. at 665 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). [9] For the particular combination of a first-tier Commerce Clause claim and a core-concern 21st Amendment interest, the Bainbridge court proposed the following: "When such a concern is implicated, the Amendment removes the constitutional cloud from the

11
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.green
scotus · 1940 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970
11
Sioux Remedy Co. v. Copegreen
scotus · 1914 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 1930–1930
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (73)

CaseCitedYears
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

2008As the Court in Quill reiterated, a tax will be sustained against a commerce clause challenge so long as it meets the four-part test enunciated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), which requires that the tax is (1) applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state.

2008As the Court in Quill reiterated, a tax will be sustained against a commerce clause challenge so long as it meets the four-part test enunciated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 , 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), which requires that the tax is (1) applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state.

82001–2009
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District green
scotus · 1887
2 sentences

1939Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489 , 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ; Caldwell v. State of North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 , 23 S.Ct. 229 , 47 L.Ed. 336 ; International Text-Book Company v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 , 30 S.Ct. 481 , 54 L.Ed. 678 , 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 493, 18 Ann.Cas. 1103; People’s Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 , 38 S.Ct. 233 , 62 L.Ed. 587 , Ann.Cas.1918C, 537; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325 , 45 S.Ct. 525 , 69 L.Ed. 982 ; McClellan v. Pettigrew, 44 La.Ann. 356 , 10 So. 853 ; Pegues v. Ray, 50 La.Ann. 574 , 23 So. 904 ; State

1939Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489 , 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ; Caldwell v. State of North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 , 23 S.Ct. 229 , 47 L.Ed. 336 ; International Text-Book Company v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 , 30 S.Ct. 481 , 54 L.Ed. 678 , 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 493, 18 Ann.Cas. 1103; People’s Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 , 38 S.Ct. 233 , 62 L.Ed. 587 , Ann.Cas.1918C, 537; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325 , 45 S.Ct. 525 , 69 L.Ed. 982 ; McClellan v. Pettigrew, 44 La.Ann. 356 , 10 So. 853 ; Pegues v. Ray, 50 La.Ann. 574 , 23 So. 904 ; State

41912–1939
Caldwell v. North Carolina green
scotus · 1903
2 sentences

1934The Supreme Court said: “A privilege tax imposed by a state statute Upon residents of that state as merchandise brokers whose business is exclusively confined to soliciting orders from jobbers and wholesale dealers within the state, as agents for nonresident parties, firms, or corporations, for goods to be shipped by such nonresident principals to such jobbers or dealers, is an unconstitutional invasion of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.” This doctrine was approved in Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622 , 23 S. Ct. 229 , 47 L.

1934The Supreme Court said: “A privilege tax imposed by a state statute Upon residents of that state as merchandise brokers whose business is exclusively confined to soliciting orders from jobbers and wholesale dealers within the state, as agents for nonresident parties, firms, or corporations, for goods to be shipped by such nonresident principals to such jobbers or dealers, is an unconstitutional invasion of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.” This doctrine was approved in Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622 , 23 S. Ct. 229 , 47 L.

41931–1939
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkamp red
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

2008Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 , 112 S.Ct. at 1912 . *123 With regard to the "substantial nexus" prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, the Court in Quill maintained the bright-line physical presence requirement in the area of sales and use taxes originally established by National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 , 87 S.Ct. 1389 , 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967).

2008Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 , 112 S.Ct. at 1912 . *123 With regard to the "substantial nexus" prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, the Court in Quill maintained the bright-line physical presence requirement in the area of sales and use taxes originally established by National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 , 87 S.Ct. 1389 , 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967).

32004–2008
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

2008Accordingly, the question by what test to substantiate the State's 21st Amendment interest against a so-called first-tier Commerce Clause claim is not presented. [9] In *329 the absence of any discrimination, this case at most presents a so-called second-tier Commerce Clause claim: "`When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits."' Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v

2008Accordingly, the question by what test to substantiate the State's 21st Amendment interest against a so-called first-tier Commerce Clause claim is not presented. [9] In *329 the absence of any discrimination, this case at most presents a so-called second-tier Commerce Clause claim: "`When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits."' Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v

21996–2008
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Broussard green
la · 1995
2 sentences

2006This court discussed both the "taxable moment" doctrine and the Complete Auto, supra, four-prong test in Columbia Gulf v. Broussard, 94-1650 (La.04/10/95), 653 So.2d 522 , a case involving Louisiana's use tax and natural gas. [17] *1242 In Columbia Gulf v. Broussard, 94-1650 (La.04/10/95), 653 So.2d 522 , this court held that natural gas had come to rest in the state and was thus, subject to the state use tax, and that the commerce clause did not preclude imposition of the tax.

2006This court discussed both the "taxable moment" doctrine and the Complete Auto, supra, four-prong test in Columbia Gulf v. Broussard, 94-1650 (La.04/10/95), 653 So.2d 522 , a case involving Louisiana's use tax and natural gas. [17] *1242 In Columbia Gulf v. Broussard, 94-1650 (La.04/10/95), 653 So.2d 522 , this court held that natural gas had come to rest in the state and was thus, subject to the state use tax, and that the commerce clause did not preclude imposition of the tax.

22001–2006
Pledger v. Arkla, Inc. green
ark · 1992
2 sentences

1995Similarly, in Pledger v. Arkla, Inc., 309 Ark. 10 , 827 S.W.2d 126 (1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 203 , 121 L.Ed.2d 144 (1992), the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that compressor fuel consumed in the state was subject to the state sales tax.

1995Similarly, in Pledger v. Arkla, Inc., 309 Ark. 10 , 827 S.W.2d 126 (1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 203 , 121 L.Ed.2d 144 (1992), the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that compressor fuel consumed in the state was subject to the state sales tax.

21995–1995
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor red
scotus · 1951
2 sentences

1995Five years later, the case of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 , 71 S.Ct. 508 , 95 L.Ed. 573 (1951), reaffirmed Freeman , holding that a tax imposed for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce is per se a violation of the commerce clause.

1995Five years later, the case of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 , 71 S.Ct. 508 , 95 L.Ed. 573 (1951), reaffirmed Freeman , holding that a tax imposed for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce is per se a violation of the commerce clause.

21964–1995
Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission green
utah · 1991
2 sentences

1995Questar Pipeline v. Tax Com’n, 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991), held that gas used by a pipeline company’s Utah compressor stations was subject to the state’s use tax.

1995Questar Pipeline v. Tax Com'n, 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991), held that gas used by a pipeline company's Utah compressor stations was subject to the state's use tax.

21995–1995
Bankers Trust New York Corp. v. Department of Finance of New York green
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

1995Similarly, in Pledger v. Arkla, Inc., 309 Ark. 10 , 827 S.W.2d 126 (1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 203 , 121 L.Ed.2d 144 (1992), the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that compressor fuel consumed in the state was subject to the state sales tax.

1995Similarly, in Pledger v. Arkla, Inc., 309 Ark. 10 , 827 S.W.2d 126 (1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 203 , 121 L.Ed.2d 144 (1992), the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that compressor fuel consumed in the state was subject to the state sales tax.

21995–1995
Chunn v. Texas green
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

1995Similarly, in Pledger v. Arkla, Inc., 309 Ark. 10 , 827 S.W.2d 126 (1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 203 , 121 L.Ed.2d 144 (1992), the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that compressor fuel consumed in the state was subject to the state sales tax.

1995Similarly, in Pledger v. Arkla, Inc., 309 Ark. 10 , 827 S.W.2d 126 (1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 203 , 121 L.Ed.2d 144 (1992), the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that compressor fuel consumed in the state was subject to the state sales tax.

21995–1995
Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. Cocreham green
la · 1975
2 sentences

1979In the recent case of Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. Cocreham, 317 So.2d 605 (La.1975), the Supreme Court held that "the Louisiana Use Tax as applied to labor and shop overhead of the out of state manufacturer-user is unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable, because violative of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution." During the period from January, 1973, through August, 1975, plaintiff Sperry Rand Corporation had paid without protest the Louisiana Use Tax levied on labor and shop overhead, in the amount of $31,000.00.

1976The Collector further argues that since the cases of Halliburton, and Chicago Bridge & Iron, supra, covered a different audit period from the instant case, their factual determination that an in-state manufacturer-user does not pay taxes on labor, shop overhead on items manufactured at in-state plants is not controlling in this case.

21976–1979
International Textbook Co. v. Pigg green
scotus · 1910
2 sentences

1939Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489 , 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ; Caldwell v. State of North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 , 23 S.Ct. 229 , 47 L.Ed. 336 ; International Text-Book Company v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 , 30 S.Ct. 481 , 54 L.Ed. 678 , 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 493, 18 Ann.Cas. 1103; People’s Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 , 38 S.Ct. 233 , 62 L.Ed. 587 , Ann.Cas.1918C, 537; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325 , 45 S.Ct. 525 , 69 L.Ed. 982 ; McClellan v. Pettigrew, 44 La.Ann. 356 , 10 So. 853 ; Pegues v. Ray, 50 La.Ann. 574 , 23 So. 904 ; State

1939Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489 , 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ; Caldwell v. State of North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 , 23 S.Ct. 229 , 47 L.Ed. 336 ; International Text-Book Company v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 , 30 S.Ct. 481 , 54 L.Ed. 678 , 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 493, 18 Ann.Cas. 1103; People’s Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 , 38 S.Ct. 233 , 62 L.Ed. 587 , Ann.Cas.1918C, 537; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325 , 45 S.Ct. 525 , 69 L.Ed. 982 ; McClellan v. Pettigrew, 44 La.Ann. 356 , 10 So. 853 ; Pegues v. Ray, 50 La.Ann. 574 , 23 So. 904 ; State

21939–1939
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Louisiana Tax Commission green
la · 2010
2 sentences

2011Additionally, the taxpayers’ argument based on a potential Commerce Clause claim lacks merit in light of the supreme court’s decision in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 09-1988 (La.3/16/10), 32 So.3d 199 , concluding that the Louisiana ad valorem tax scheme is not unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

2011Additionally, the taxpayers' argument based on a potential Commerce Clause claim lacks merit in light of the supreme court's decision in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 09-1988 (La.3/16/10), 32 So.3d 199 , concluding that the Louisiana ad valorem tax scheme is not unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

12011–2011
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation, New Jersey Department of the Treasury green
scotus · 1989
2 sentences

2010The court examined the ad valorem tax assessment procedures under the Amerada Hess factors: “A state tax discriminates against interstate commerce if it: (1) is facially discriminatory; (2) has a discriminatory intent; or (3) has the effect of unduly burdening interstate commerce.” Id. at 342 .(citing Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation, New Jersey Department of the Treasury, 490 U.S. 66 , 109 S.Ct. 1617 , 104 L.Ed.2d 58 (1989)).

2010The court examined the ad valorem tax assessment procedures under the Amerada Hess factors: “A state tax discriminates against interstate commerce if it: (1) is facially discriminatory; (2) has a discriminatory intent; or (3) has the effect of unduly burdening interstate commerce.” Id. at 342 .(citing Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation, New Jersey Department of the Treasury, 490 U.S. 66 , 109 S.Ct. 1617 , 104 L.Ed.2d 58 (1989)).

12010–2010
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy green
scotus · 1997
2 sentences

2010This legitimate clas- sifieation would indeed be unconstitutional if the classification and subsequent tax served to burden interstate commerce, however, in this case, the plaintiffs have not overcome the presumption of validity, as the plaintiffs failed to show the tax scheme in practical effect actually serves to place any burden whatsoever on interstate commerce. 128The United States Supreme Court, in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, upheld an Ohio tax against a Commerce Clause challenge from out-of-state independent marketers of natural gas alleging that tax exemptions granted to local distr

2010This legitimate clas- sifieation would indeed be unconstitutional if the classification and subsequent tax served to burden interstate commerce, however, in this case, the plaintiffs have not overcome the presumption of validity, as the plaintiffs failed to show the tax scheme in practical effect actually serves to place any burden whatsoever on interstate commerce. 128The United States Supreme Court, in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, upheld an Ohio tax against a Commerce Clause challenge from out-of-state independent marketers of natural gas alleging that tax exemptions granted to local distr

12010–2010
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Louisiana Tax Commission green
lactapp · 2009
2 sentences

2010The court of appeal stated, “All parties agree that the natural gas pipeline companies operating in Louisiana, both those operating intrastate and interstate, are direct competitors and similarly situated; therefore, dormant Commerce Clause analysis is appropriate.” Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., et al. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, et al., 09-0628 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/10/09) , 23 So.3d 329, 340 .

2010The court of appeal stated, "All parties agree that the natural gas pipeline companies operating in Louisiana, both those operating intrastate and interstate, are direct competitors and similarly situated; therefore, dormant Commerce Clause analysis is appropriate." Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., et al. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, et al., 09-0628 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/10/09) , 23 So.3d 329, 340 .

12010–2010
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue green
scotus · 1967
2 sentences

2008Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 , 112 S.Ct. at 1912 . *123 With regard to the "substantial nexus" prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, the Court in Quill maintained the bright-line physical presence requirement in the area of sales and use taxes originally established by National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 , 87 S.Ct. 1389 , 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967).

2008Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 , 112 S.Ct. at 1912 . *123 With regard to the "substantial nexus" prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, the Court in Quill maintained the bright-line physical presence requirement in the area of sales and use taxes originally established by National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 , 87 S.Ct. 1389 , 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967).

12008–2008
Tax Commissioner v. MBNA America Bank, N.A. green
wva · 2007
2 sentences

2008MBNA America *127 Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 234 .

2008MBNA America *127 Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 234 .

12008–2008
Kevin Associates, LLC v. Crawford green
la · 2004
1 sentence

2008See Bridges v. Autozone Properties, Inc., 04-0814 (La.3/24/05), 900 So.2d 784 (wherein the court followed the Due Process analysis articulated in Quill and determined that Louisiana had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident shareholder when Louisiana has provided benefits, opportunities, and protections, which helped to create the income); Kevin Associates, L.L.C. v. Crawford, 03-0211 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So.2d 34 (following Quill and determining that imposition of corporate income and franchise tax on a corporation that had a commercial domicile in Louisiana did not violate the Due Process a

12008–2008
Secretary v. Gap (Apparel), Inc. green
lactapp · 2004
1 sentence

2008See Bridges v. Autozone Properties, Inc., 04-0814 (La.3/24/05), 900 So.2d 784 (wherein the court followed the Due Process analysis articulated in Quill and determined that Louisiana had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident shareholder when Louisiana has provided benefits, opportunities, and protections, which helped to create the income); Kevin Associates, L.L.C. v. Crawford, 03-0211 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So.2d 34 (following Quill and determining that imposition of corporate income and franchise tax on a corporation that had a commercial domicile in Louisiana did not violate the Due Process a

12008–2008
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority green
scotus · 1986
2 sentences

2008Accordingly, the question by what test to substantiate the State's 21st Amendment interest against a so-called first-tier Commerce Clause claim is not presented. [9] In *329 the absence of any discrimination, this case at most presents a so-called second-tier Commerce Clause claim: "`When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits."' Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v

2008Accordingly, the question by what test to substantiate the State's 21st Amendment interest against a so-called first-tier Commerce Clause claim is not presented. [9] In *329 the absence of any discrimination, this case at most presents a so-called second-tier Commerce Clause claim: "`When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits."' Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v

12008–2008
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation green
scotus · 1990
2 sentences

2005In McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept. of Business Regulation of Fl., 496 U.S. 18, 40-41 , 110 S.Ct. 2238, 2252 , 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990), wholesale liquor distributors filed suit, challenging the Florida excise tax that gave preferential treatment to beverages that were manufactured from Florida-grown citrus and other agricultural crops and bottled in state.

2005In McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept. of Business Regulation of Fl., 496 U.S. 18, 40-41 , 110 S.Ct. 2238, 2252 , 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990), wholesale liquor distributors filed suit, challenging the Florida excise tax that gave preferential treatment to beverages that were manufactured from Florida-grown citrus and other agricultural crops and bottled in state.

12005–2005
Bridges v. Autozone Properties, Inc. neutral
lactapp · 2004
1 sentence

2005Bridges v. Autozone Properties, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 1st Cir.1/5/04), 873 So.2d 25 , 28 n. 2.

12005–2005
Ramsey v. Brown neutral
la · 2003
12004–2004
ANR Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana Tax Com'n green
lactapp · 2002
1 sentence

2004Following an appeal to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, we determined that “a taxpayer who pays his taxes under protest, thereby creating a justicia-ble controversy, may choose to ask the district court for a declaratory judgment on constitutional issues without waiting for a final adjudication by the Commission.” ANR Pipeline Company v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 2001-2594, 2001-2595, 2001-2599, 2001-2597, 2001-2598, 2001-2596, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/20/02), 815 So.2d 178, 186 , writ granted, 2002-1479 (La.3/21/03), 840 So.2d 527 (affirmed and remanded). 2 Thereafter, the portion

12004–2004
Saunders v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. green
scotus · 1995
12001–2001
Davis v. Alabama neutral
scotus · 1995
12001–2001
Reebok Internationale Ltd. v. Banque Internationale A. Luxembourg S. A. green
scotus · 1995
12001–2001
Crescent Towing & Salvage Co. v. Ormet Corp. neutral
lactapp · 1997
11998–1998
J. Manoco, Inc. v. State ex rel. Louisiana Gaming Control Board green
la · 1997
11998–1998
Southern Pac. Transp. v. ST. CHARLES PAR. POL. JURY neutral
laed · 1983
11996–1996
City of Lake Charles v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. neutral
lactapp · 1975
11996–1996
Dennis v. Higgins green
scotus · 1991
11993–1993
Rowan Companies, Inc. v. LOUISIANA STATE TAX COM'N green
la · 1990
11993–1993
Rowan Companies v. State Tax Com'n green
lactapp · 1990
11993–1993
D. H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamara green
scotus · 1988
11992–1992
Simon v. Simon neutral
la · 1982
11987–1987
Department of Revenue v. Ass'n of Washington Stevedoring Companies green
scotus · 1978
11987–1987
Bunge Corp. v. Secretary of Dept. of Rev. green
lactapp · 1982
11987–1987

Statutes the citing opinions construe

LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 1 (15) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:302 (10) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:305 (10) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 3 (9) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:1512 (8) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:301 (7) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:1576 (5) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:1851 (4) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 29 (3) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:1856 (3) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:1998 (3) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 47:2110 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 229 (1914–2025) NY 147 (1892–2026) IL 136 (1893–2024) WA 125 (1906–2025) PA 88 (1900–2024) NJ 82 (1905–2023) TX 77 (1884–2024) MA 70 (1912–2022) AL 60 (1914–2025) FL 55 (1894–2016) KS 51 (1892–2019) MI 50 (1918–2023) LA 48 (1892–2011) IN 42 (1908–2015) MN 40 (1911–2026) MO 39 (1901–2023) AR 36 (1892–2007) OR 36 (1900–2025) IA 35 (1882–2015) WI 35 (1929–2011) GA 33 (1909–2006) WV 33 (1903–2023) OH 33 (1910–2024) NC 32 (1812–2025) OK 31 (1911–2020) MD 29 (1899–2026) TN 29 (1900–2025) VA 29 (1851–2018) CT 28 (1952–2019) NM 26 (1931–2019) MS 25 (1917–2018) AK 23 (1975–2025) KY 21 (1907–2016) ME 20 (1901–2026) AZ 20 (1953–2019) CO 19 (1962–2016) HI 18 (1903–2025) NE 18 (1904–2005) NH 17 (1909–2020) UT 16 (1908–2025) VT 14 (1916–2024) SC 12 (1906–2018) RI 11 (1925–2009) PR 11 (1912–2012) MT 11 (1931–2000) WY 10 (1972–2011) ID 10 (1897–2010) SD 9 (1908–1985) DC 9 (1974–2023) ND 9 (1894–2003) DE 8 (1948–2018) NV 5 (1952–2017) VI 2 (2011–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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