commerce clause in Kansas

1995While for a time the United States Supreme Court granted states much latitude under the twenty-first amendment to the United States constitution to regulate liquor unfettered by the commerce clause, see, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves , 308 U.S. 132 , 138-139 , 84 L.Ed. 128 , 135 (1939), State v. Payne , 183 Kan. 396 , 403 (1958), it has more recently rejected the view that "the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to `repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324 , 331-332 , 84 S.Ct. 1293 , 12 L.Ed.2d 3

1995While for a time the United States Supreme Court granted states much latitude under the twenty-first amendment to the United States constitution to regulate liquor unfettered by the commerce clause, see, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves , 308 U.S. 132 , 138-139 , 84 L.Ed. 128 , 135 (1939), State v. Payne , 183 Kan. 396 , 403 (1958), it has more recently rejected the view that "the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to `repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324 , 331-332 , 84 S.Ct. 1293 , 12 L.Ed.2d 3

1995While for a time the United States Supreme Court granted states much latitude under the twenty-first amendment to the United States constitution to regulate liquor unfettered by the commerce clause, see, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves , 308 U.S. 132 , 138-139 , 84 L.Ed. 128 , 135 (1939), State v. Payne , 183 Kan. 396 , 403 (1958), it has more recently rejected the view that "the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to `repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324 , 331-332 , 84 S.Ct. 1293 , 12 L.Ed.2d 3

1980This court has followed the rationale of U.S. Supreme Court cases, commencing with State v. Payne, 183 Kan. 396, 403 , 327 P.2d 1071 (1958), where we stated: “It has been repeatedly held that under the 21st Amendment a state may absolutely prohibit the manufacture, transportation, importation, sale or possession of alcoholic liquors irrespective of when or where produced or obtained, or the use to which they are to be put, and may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate those inhibitions and exercise full police authority in respect to them, unfettered by the due process clause, th

2017We are of the opinion [that the legislation in question] amount[s] to a tax and a revenue measure levied 16 under the guise of a regulatory fee, and violate[s] article 11, section 1 of our state constitution, the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal constitution." (Emphasis added.) 183 Kan. at 808 .

2015We are of the opinion that [the bills at issue] amount to a tax and a revenue measure levied under the guise of a regulatory fee, and violate article 11, section 1 of our state constitution, the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal constitution.” 183 Kan. at 808 .

2019The National Century court reviewed the approaches to the Commerce Clause inquiry used in MITE and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America., 481 U.S. 69 , 107 S. Ct. 1637 , 95 L.

2019The National Century court reviewed the approaches to the Commerce Clause inquiry used in MITE and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America., 481 U.S. 69 , 107 S. Ct. 1637 , 95 L.

2005The Complete Auto test applied to state taxes subject to a Commerce Clause challenge requires: (1) "the tax [be] applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with" Kansas; (2) the tax be "fairly apportioned"; (3) the tax "not discriminate against interstate commerce"; and (4) the tax "fairly [relate] to the services provided by" Kansas. 430 U.S. at 279 .

2005The Complete Auto test applied to state taxes subject to a Commerce Clause challenge requires: (1) "the tax [be] applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with" Kansas; (2) the tax be "fairly apportioned"; (3) the tax "not discriminate against interstate commerce"; and (4) the tax "fairly [relate] to the services provided by" Kansas. 430 U.S. at 279 .

1998The Commerce Clause has historically been interpreted “not only as an authorization for congressional action, but also, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute, as a restriction on permissible state regulation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 , 60 L.

1998The Commerce Clause has historically been interpreted “not only as an authorization for congressional action, but also, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute, as a restriction on permissible state regulation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 , 60 L.

1995The commerce clause, article I , section 8 , clause 3 of the United States constitution, has been interpreted to act as a "substantive restriction on permissible state regulation of interstate commerce." Dennis v. Higgins , 498 U.S. 439 , 447 , 11 S.Ct. 865 , 870 , 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991).

1915In the case of In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 , holding constitutional the Wilson bill which removed from interstate shipments of liquor the former protection of the right of sale in the original package after reaching the state of importation, it was pointed out that the constitution does not provide that interstate commerce shall be free but by the commerce clause left it free except as restrained by congress.

1980This court has followed the rationale of U.S. Supreme Court cases, commencing with State v. Payne, 183 Kan. 396, 403 , 327 P.2d 1071 (1958), where we stated: “It has been repeatedly held that under the 21st Amendment a state may absolutely prohibit the manufacture, transportation, importation, sale or possession of alcoholic liquors irrespective of when or where produced or obtained, or the use to which they are to be put, and may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate those inhibitions and exercise full police authority in respect to them, unfettered by the due process clause, th

1966This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.” (Syl. ¶ 6.) *679 These general principles were recently reaffirmed in Tri-State Hotel Co. v. Londerholm, 195 Kan. 748 , 408 P. 2d 864 .

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

1958(State Board v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 , 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243, 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L.

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

1965(State Board v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 , 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77 ; Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U. S. *752 401, 82 L. ed. 1424, 58 S. Ct. 952 ; Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 , 83 L. ed. 243; 59 S. Ct. 254 ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 , 83 L. ed. 246, 59 S. Ct. 256 ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 , 84 L. ed. 128, 60 S. Ct. 163 ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 , 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98 ; United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 .) This greater power to prohibit includes the lesser power to permit under definitely prescribed conditions.

2011Mfrs., Inc. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602 , 612-13 (2d Cir. 1996) (summary judgment on Commerce Clause claim concerning preemption inappropriate; “[s]ince there are genuine factual issues as to both the claimed-burdens and the putative benefits created by the New York bumper statute, we remand for further development of the record in order to permit the district court to apply the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test”); Blue Circle Cement, Inc., 27 F.3d at 1512 (district court erroneously failed to conduct the Pike analysis after plaintiff had presented evidence creating material fact issues as to the

2011The Court noted the ordinance "erect[ed] an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the State." Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354 , 71 S.Ct. 295 ; cf. Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 83 , 11 S.Ct. 213 , 34 L.Ed. 862 (1891) ("`a burden imposed by a state upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the states, including the people of the state enacting such statute'").

2011The Court noted the ordinance "erect[ed] an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the State." Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354 , 71 S.Ct. 295 ; cf. Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 83 , 11 S.Ct. 213 , 34 L.Ed. 862 (1891) ("`a burden imposed by a state upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the states, including the people of the state enacting such statute'").

2005Thus the Supreme Court held the local distributors and the marketers were not similarly situated for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 519 U.S. at 310 .

2005Thus the Supreme Court held the local distributors and the marketers were not similarly situated for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 519 U.S. at 310 .

2005The PVD also cites In re Tax Appeal of ANR Pipeline Co., 254 Kan. 534, 546-48 , 866 P.2d 1060 , cert. denied 513 U.S. 917 (1994), abrogation recognized by Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Beshears, 271 Kan. 596 , 24 P.3d 113 (2001).

2005The PVD also cites In re Tax Appeal of ANR Pipeline Co., 254 Kan. 534, 546-48 , 866 P.2d 1060 , cert. denied 513 U.S. 917 (1994), abrogation recognized by Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Beshears, 271 Kan. 596 , 24 P.3d 113 (2001).

2005The PVD also cites In re Tax Appeal of ANR Pipeline Co., 254 Kan. 534, 546-48 , 866 P.2d 1060 , cert. denied 513 U.S. 917 (1994), abrogation recognized by Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Beshears, 271 Kan. 596 , 24 P.3d 113 (2001).

2005The PVD also cites In re Tax Appeal of ANR Pipeline Co., 254 Kan. 534, 546-48 , 866 P.2d 1060 , cert. denied 513 U.S. 917 (1994), abrogation recognized by Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Beshears, 271 Kan. 596 , 24 P.3d 113 (2001).

2005The PVD also cites In re Tax Appeal of ANR Pipeline Co., 254 Kan. 534, 546-48 , 866 P.2d 1060 , cert. denied 513 U.S. 917 (1994), abrogation recognized by Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Beshears, 271 Kan. 596 , 24 P.3d 113 (2001).

2005The PVD also cites In re Tax Appeal of ANR Pipeline Co., 254 Kan. 534, 546-48 , 866 P.2d 1060 , cert. denied 513 U.S. 917 (1994), abrogation recognized by Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Beshears, 271 Kan. 596 , 24 P.3d 113 (2001).

2003Very truly yours, PHILL KLINE Attorney General of Kansas Theresa Marcel Nuckolls Assistant Attorney General PK:JLM:TMN:jm 1 The county has a permit from the Kansas Department of Health and Environment allowing it to operate its solid waste processing facility. 2 The Cities of Almena and Lenora maintain Kansas Department of Health permits for burn piles. 3 See also K.S.A. 12-2110 (a city which provides no refuse or solid waste collection and disposal service may regulate and license garbage or trash collectors, or both, and limit the number of licenses and pass ordinances as authorized by K.S.A

1996Quill restated the four-part test used in evaluating the validity of state taxes under the Commerce Clause: “[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ [Citation omitted.]” 504 U.S. at 311 .

1996Quill restated the four-part test used in evaluating the validity of state taxes under the Commerce Clause: “[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ [Citation omitted.]” 504 U.S. at 311 .

1995While for a time the United States Supreme Court granted states much latitude under the twenty-first amendment to the United States constitution to regulate liquor unfettered by the commerce clause, see, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves , 308 U.S. 132 , 138-139 , 84 L.Ed. 128 , 135 (1939), State v. Payne , 183 Kan. 396 , 403 (1958), it has more recently rejected the view that "the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to `repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324 , 331-332 , 84 S.Ct. 1293 , 12 L.Ed.2d 3

1995While for a time the United States Supreme Court granted states much latitude under the twenty-first amendment to the United States constitution to regulate liquor unfettered by the commerce clause, see, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves , 308 U.S. 132 , 138-139 , 84 L.Ed. 128 , 135 (1939), State v. Payne , 183 Kan. 396 , 403 (1958), it has more recently rejected the view that "the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to `repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324 , 331-332 , 84 S.Ct. 1293 , 12 L.Ed.2d 3

1995While for a time the United States Supreme Court granted states much latitude under the twenty-first amendment to the United States constitution to regulate liquor unfettered by the commerce clause, see, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves , 308 U.S. 132 , 138-139 , 84 L.Ed. 128 , 135 (1939), State v. Payne , 183 Kan. 396 , 403 (1958), it has more recently rejected the view that "the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to `repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324 , 331-332 , 84 S.Ct. 1293 , 12 L.Ed.2d 3

1995While for a time the United States Supreme Court granted states much latitude under the twenty-first amendment to the United States constitution to regulate liquor unfettered by the commerce clause, see, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves , 308 U.S. 132 , 138-139 , 84 L.Ed. 128 , 135 (1939), State v. Payne , 183 Kan. 396 , 403 (1958), it has more recently rejected the view that "the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to `repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324 , 331-332 , 84 S.Ct. 1293 , 12 L.Ed.2d 3