commerce clause in Connecticut

1995Under Complete Auto's four-part test, a tax will be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge, so long as the "tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. ___ , 112 S.Ct. 1904 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992), citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra, 430 U.S. 279 .

1995Under Complete Auto's four-part test, a tax will be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge, so long as the "tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. ___ , 112 S.Ct. 1904 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992), citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra, 430 U.S. 279 .

1994Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S.C. 2009 U.S. (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 112 S.C. 2019 U.S. (1992).

1994In any event, the two cases relied on by RESOL were implicitly overruled in Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Mich. Dept. , 504 U.S. ___ , 119 L.Ed.2d 139 , 112 S.Ct. ___ (1992), which rejected the motion that the availability of other waste disposal facilities within a state for out-of-state waste and evenhanded treatment of in-state and out-of-state waste by a discriminatory restriction insulate it from the commerce clause.

1994For this reason those restrictions were deemed not to be per se violations of the commerce clause, such as a law "that blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders." City of CT Page 5675 Philadelphia v. New Jersey , 437 U.S. 617 , 623-24 (1978) Condition 25 contains a discriminatory Provision expressly directed against out-of-state waste and, therefore, constitutes a per se violation of the commerce clause.

1992Even if the state had proven a nondiscriminatory purpose to 134 or if such a purpose could be assumed; cf. State v. Shuster, 145 Conn. 554 , 560 , 145 A.2d 196 (1958); such as the prevention of fraudulent lotteries victimizing Connecticut residents, the statute still would fail Commerce Clause analysis. "[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, 626 .

1988This court recently noted in State v. Zach, 198 Conn. 168, 181 , 502 A.2d 896 (1985), where the plaintiffs were also claiming that their yachts were engaged in interstate commerce and were beyond the taxing authority of the state of Connecticut, that “more than a bald assertion is necessary to sustain the conclusion that these vessels were engaged in interstate commerce.” The trial court put this claim to rest in its memorandum of decision as follows: “So far as the plaintiff’s reliance upon a claim that imposition of the use tax was prohibited by the Commerce clause of the United States Const

1988This court recently noted in State v. Zach, 198 Conn. 168, 181 , 502 A.2d 896 (1985), where the plaintiffs were also claiming that their yachts were engaged in interstate commerce and were beyond the taxing authority of the state of Connecticut, that “more than a bald assertion is necessary to sustain the conclusion that these vessels were engaged in interstate commerce.” The trial court put this claim to rest in its memorandum of decision as follows: “So far as the plaintiff’s reliance upon a claim that imposition of the use tax was prohibited by the Commerce clause of the United States Const

1988While concluding that the tax could not constitutionally be imposed on the foreign instrumentalities at issue, the court assumed that if the instrumentalities had been used in ‘purely interstate commerce, Complete Auto would apply and be satisfied, and our Commerce Clause inquiry would be at an end.’ Id., 445 .

1985While concluding that the tax could not constitutionally be imposed on the foreign instrumentalities at issue, the court assumed that if the instrumentalities had been used in “purely interstate commerce, Complete Auto would apply and be satisfied, and our Commerce Clause inquiry would be at an end.” Id., 445 .

2016I, § 8, cl. 3. ‘‘Although the [c]lause is framed as a positive grant of power to Congress, [the United States Supreme Court has] consistently held this lan- guage to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause, prohibiting certain state [regulation] even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 , 191 L.

2016I, § 8, cl. 3. ‘‘Although the [c]lause is framed as a positive grant of power to Congress, [the United States Supreme Court has] consistently held this lan- guage to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause, prohibiting certain state [regulation] even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 , 191 L.

2003In re Tax Appeal of Family of Eagles, Ltd., 275 Kan. 479 , 66 P.3d 858 (2003) (Family of Eagles).

2003In re Tax Appeal of Family of Eagles, Ltd., 275 Kan. 479 , 66 P.3d 858 (2003) (Family of Eagles).

2000The department in its decision ruled that “funding of the Lifeline Program credit should be based on each carrier’s intrastate and interstate gross revenues subject to Connecticut sales tax. . . .” 7 This court previously has held that “the constitutionality of a statute [should not] be made to depend upon the way in which it is finally administered by those who are charged with its execution.” State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 196 , 113 A. 385 (1921).

2000The department in its decision ruled that “funding of the Lifeline Program credit should be based on each carrier’s intrastate and interstate gross revenues subject to Connecticut sales tax. . . .” 7 This court previously has held that “the constitutionality of a statute [should not] be made to depend upon the way in which it is finally administered by those who are charged with its execution.” State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 196 , 113 A. 385 (1921).

2000Pursuant to § 42-110b (a), "[i]n order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of were performed in a "trade' or "business."' Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 28 Conn. App. 660 , 669 , 613 A.2d 838 (1992).

2000Pursuant to § 42-110b (a), "[i]n order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of were performed in a "trade' or "business."' Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 28 Conn. App. 660 , 669 , 613 A.2d 838 (1992).

2000True, the Court has broadened the strict language of the Amendment to state that Congress may not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity through the commerce clause of Article One of the Constitution, and, more recently, the Court has held that Eleventh Amendment considerations bar citizen-suits based on federal rights against states even in state courts. cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida , 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S. 706 (1999).

2000True, the Court has broadened the strict language of the Amendment to state that Congress may not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity through the commerce clause of Article One of the Constitution, and, more recently, the Court has held that Eleventh Amendment considerations bar citizen-suits based on federal rights against states even in state courts. cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida , 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S. 706 (1999).

1999“The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the [United States] Constitution . . . prevent States that impose an income-based tax on nonresidents from tax[ing] value earned outside [the taxing State’s] borders.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298, 303 , 114 S. Ct. 2268 , 129 L.

1999“The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the [United States] Constitution . . . prevent States that impose an income-based tax on nonresidents from tax[ing] value earned outside [the taxing State’s] borders.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298, 303 , 114 S. Ct. 2268 , 129 L.

1998The Sage court opened its discussion of the commerce clause with an analysis of Gibbons v. Ogden, supra , 22 U.S. 1 (1824), and found that the matter before the court involved issues that plainly met the definition of commerce first set out by Justice Marshall in Gibbons, supra .

1998The Sage court opened its discussion of the commerce clause with an analysis of Gibbons v. Ogden, supra , 22 U.S. 1 (1824), and found that the matter before the court involved issues that plainly met the definition of commerce first set out by Justice Marshall in Gibbons, supra .

1998"As the Supreme Court said in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n , 322 U.S. 533 , 552 , 64 S.Ct. 1162 , 1173 (1944), the power granted Congress by the Commerce Clause is `a positive power,' a power `to govern affairs which the individual states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not fully capable of governing.' Exercising that positive power Congress has often passed legislation to help the States solve problems that defy local solution.

1998"As the Supreme Court said in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n , 322 U.S. 533 , 552 , 64 S.Ct. 1162 , 1173 (1944), the power granted Congress by the Commerce Clause is `a positive power,' a power `to govern affairs which the individual states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not fully capable of governing.' Exercising that positive power Congress has often passed legislation to help the States solve problems that defy local solution.

1997Id., 31 .

1994"Appropriate deference to a coordinate branch of government exercising its essential functions demands that we refrain from deciding constitutional challenges to its enactments until the need to do so is plainly evident." State v. Madera , 198 Conn. 92 , 105 (1985).

1994Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S.C. 2009 U.S. (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 112 S.C. 2019 U.S. (1992).

1994It relies on two cases, Medical Waste Assoc. v. Mayor and City Council , 966 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1992) and Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metro.

1992Even if the state had proven a nondiscriminatory purpose to 134 or if such a purpose could be assumed; cf. State v. Shuster, 145 Conn. 554 , 560 , 145 A.2d 196 (1958); such as the prevention of fraudulent lotteries victimizing Connecticut residents, the statute still would fail Commerce Clause analysis. "[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, 626 .

1992Even if the state had proven a nondiscriminatory purpose to 134 or if such a purpose could be assumed; cf. State v. Shuster, 145 Conn. 554 , 560 , 145 A.2d 196 (1958); such as the prevention of fraudulent lotteries victimizing Connecticut residents, the statute still would fail Commerce Clause analysis. "[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, 626 .

1992Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 777-78 , 112 S. Ct. 2251 , 119 L.

1992Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 777-78 , 112 S. Ct. 2251 , 119 L.

1992The state argues that the defendant's Commerce Clause claim is controlled by State v. Harbourne, 70 Conn. 484 , 40 A. 179 (1898).

1992The state argues that the defendant's Commerce Clause claim is controlled by State v. Harbourne, 70 Conn. 484 , 40 A. 179 (1898).

1992Even CT Page 4556 where a statute serves a legitimate local purpose, where it also discriminates against interstate commerce, "the burden falls on the State to demonstrate . . . that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means." Maine v. Taylor, supra, 138 .

1988See Connecticut Theater Foundation, Inc. v. Brown, 179 Conn. 672, 677 [ 427 A.2d 873 (1980);] Caldor v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 575 [ 440 A.2d 767 (1981);] Fusco-Amatruda Co. v. Tax Commissioner, [supra, 608-10;] and New England Yacht Sales v. Tax Commissioner, 198 Conn. 624, 636-37 [ 504 A.2d 506 (1986)], where the court observed that ‘the plaintiff cannot rely on an exemption that did not yet exist when its tax obligation became due.’ See also State v. Zach, [supra].” Even if we assume, arguendo,, that the plaintiff’s yacht was engaged in interstate commerce, “ ‘a state tax is not per se i

1988See Connecticut Theater Foundation, Inc. v. Brown, 179 Conn. 672, 677 [ 427 A.2d 873 (1980);] Caldor v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 575 [ 440 A.2d 767 (1981);] Fusco-Amatruda Co. v. Tax Commissioner, [supra, 608-10;] and New England Yacht Sales v. Tax Commissioner, 198 Conn. 624, 636-37 [ 504 A.2d 506 (1986)], where the court observed that ‘the plaintiff cannot rely on an exemption that did not yet exist when its tax obligation became due.’ See also State v. Zach, [supra].” Even if we assume, arguendo,, that the plaintiff’s yacht was engaged in interstate commerce, “ ‘a state tax is not per se i

1988See Connecticut Theater Foundation, Inc. v. Brown, 179 Conn. 672, 677 [ 427 A.2d 873 (1980);] Caldor v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 575 [ 440 A.2d 767 (1981);] Fusco-Amatruda Co. v. Tax Commissioner, [supra, 608-10;] and New England Yacht Sales v. Tax Commissioner, 198 Conn. 624, 636-37 [ 504 A.2d 506 (1986)], where the court observed that ‘the plaintiff cannot rely on an exemption that did not yet exist when its tax obligation became due.’ See also State v. Zach, [supra].” Even if we assume, arguendo,, that the plaintiff’s yacht was engaged in interstate commerce, “ ‘a state tax is not per se i

1988See Connecticut Theater Foundation, Inc. v. Brown, 179 Conn. 672, 677 [ 427 A.2d 873 (1980);] Caldor v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 575 [ 440 A.2d 767 (1981);] Fusco-Amatruda Co. v. Tax Commissioner, [supra, 608-10;] and New England Yacht Sales v. Tax Commissioner, 198 Conn. 624, 636-37 [ 504 A.2d 506 (1986)], where the court observed that ‘the plaintiff cannot rely on an exemption that did not yet exist when its tax obligation became due.’ See also State v. Zach, [supra].” Even if we assume, arguendo,, that the plaintiff’s yacht was engaged in interstate commerce, “ ‘a state tax is not per se i