commerce clause in Texas

2015See, e.g., Rylander v. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet, denied) (franchise tax case, citing Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312-14 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 ). 17 , The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied for purposes of an ad valorem tax by the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state in the form of physical storage of tangible personal property, Because ETC Marketing was physically present in the state, and the activity being taxed — ownership and storage of natural gas — occurred in Harris County, 18 there is a substanti

2015See, e.g., Rylander v. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet, denied) (franchise tax case, citing Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312-14 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 ). 17 , The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied for purposes of an ad valorem tax by the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state in the form of physical storage of tangible personal property, Because ETC Marketing was physically present in the state, and the activity being taxed — ownership and storage of natural gas — occurred in Harris County, 18 there is a substanti

2015Ed. 2d 326 , 97 S. Ct. 1076 intended to be (1977),[HN10] we will sustain a tax against Commerce Clause challenge so long as "the tax is applied to an "curative, expressing the original intent activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is of the legislature that the single business fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against tax . . . is an indivisible value added type interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services of tax and not a combination or series of provided by the State." We applied this four-part test in several smaller taxes and that relief from later c

2004Then, the court applied the four-part test articulated in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady to sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).

2008The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied by the taxpayer's physical presence in the state. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc., 2 S.W.3d at 570 ; Lawrence Indus., Inc. v. Sharp, 890 S.W.2d 886 , 892–93 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, writ denied); see also Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312–14.

2008The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied by the taxpayer's physical presence in the state. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc. , 2 S.W.3d at 570 ; Lawrence Indus., Inc. v. Sharp , 890 S.W.2d 886, 892-93 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, writ denied); see also Quill Corp. , 504 U.S. at 312-14 .

1999See Vinmar v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , 947 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1997) (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady , 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).

1999See Vinmar v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , 947 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1997) (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady , 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).

1999See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana , 453 U.S. 609, 629 (1981).

1999See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana , 453 U.S. 609, 629 (1981).

2015See, e.g., Rylander v. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) (franchise tax case, citing Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312–14, 112 S. Ct. 1904 ).15 The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied for purposes of an ad valorem tax by the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state in the form of physical storage of tangible personal property.

2015See, e.g., Rylander v. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet, denied) (franchise tax case, citing Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312-14 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 ). 17 , The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied for purposes of an ad valorem tax by the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state in the form of physical storage of tangible personal property, Because ETC Marketing was physically present in the state, and the activity being taxed — ownership and storage of natural gas — occurred in Harris County, 18 there is a substanti

2017This fourth prong “requires no detailed accounting of the services provided to the taxpayer on account of the activity being taxed.” Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 199 .

2017This fourth prong “requires no detailed accounting of the services provided to the. taxpayer on account of the activity being taxed.” Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 199 , 115 S.Ct. 1331 .

1999The commerce clause requires "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Tax , 504 U.S. 768, 777 (1992) (quoting Miller Bros.

1999The commerce clause requires "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Tax , 504 U.S. 768, 777 (1992) (quoting Miller Bros.

1999Co. v. Maryland , 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).

1999Co. v. Maryland , 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).

2015They are present for relatively prolonged periods during which they receive local services such as police and fire protection.” Id. at 925 (Hecht, J., dissenting); see also Peoples Gas, 270 S.W.3d at 218 (“The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied by the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state.”). 15 taxed—ownership and storage of natural gas—occurred in Harris County, 16 there is a substantial nexus between the activity being taxed and the state of Texas.

2015They are present for relatively prolonged periods during which they receive local services such as police and fire protection.” Id. at 925 (Hecht, J., dissenting); see also Peoples Gas, 270 S.W.3d at 218 ("The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied by the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state.”). .

2015They are present for relatively prolonged periods during which they receive local services such as police and fire protection.” Id. at 925 (Hecht, J., dissenting); see also Peoples Gas, 270 S.W.3d at 218 (“The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied by the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state.”). 15 taxed—ownership and storage of natural gas—occurred in Harris County, 16 there is a substantial nexus between the activity being taxed and the state of Texas.

2015They are present for relatively prolonged periods during which they receive local services such as police and fire protection.” Id. at 925 (Hecht, J., dissenting); see also Peoples Gas, 270 S.W.3d at 218 ("The Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus with the taxing state is satisfied by the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state.”). .

2008Significantly, as relevant here, the court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis and holding were limited to "sales and activity that take place directly in Texas." Id. at 335 .

2008Significantly, as relevant here, the court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis and holding were limited to "sales and activity that take place directly in Texas." Id. at 335 .

1995See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 175-76 , 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2945-46 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545, 560 (1983); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 537-38 , 71 S.Ct. 377, 380 , 95 L.Ed. 517 , 521 (1951).

1995See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 175-76 , 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2945-46 , 77 L.Ed.2d 545, 560 (1983); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 537-38 , 71 S.Ct. 377, 380 , 95 L.Ed. 517 , 521 (1951).

1990Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824). 6 The current test employed by the Supreme Court in determining whether a state regulation violates the commerce clause is not the four-prong test for state taxation schemes set forth in Complete Auto Transit, supra; instead, the court invokes a balancing test first adopted in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 , 768-71 (1945). 7 Essentially, the court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to state economic regulation under the commerce clause.

1990Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824). 6 The current test employed by the Supreme Court in determining whether a state regulation violates the commerce clause is not the four-prong test for state taxation schemes set forth in Complete Auto Transit, supra; instead, the court invokes a balancing test first adopted in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 , 768-71 (1945). 7 Essentially, the court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to state economic regulation under the commerce clause.

1990See, e.g., Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986).

1987See, e.g., Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 106 S.Ct. 2369 (1986).

2017Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).

1950“But it was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce of their ‘ust share of state tax burdens, merely because an inci- ental or consequential etfect of the tax is an increase in the cost of doing the business, Western Live Stock v. Bu- reau. 303 U.S. 250, 254 .

1990In Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989) the United Supreme Court held that the Illinois Excise Tax, which imposed an excise tax on interstate calls that separated local exchange costs from the costs associated with the actual use of the interstate interexchange carrier's line, did not violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.

1990In Goldbera v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989) the United Supreme Court held that the Illinois Excise Tax, which imposed an excise tax on interstate calls that separated local exchange costs from the costs associated with the actual use of the interstate interexchange carrier's line, did not violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.

1996They contend the commerce clause does not condemn discrimination of the type found by the trial court but instead precludes state taxation “which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.” Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 , 97 S.Ct. 599, 607 , 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (citing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 , 79 S.Ct. 357, 362 , 3 L.Ed.2d 421 (1959)).

1996They contend the commerce clause does not condemn discrimination of the type found by the trial court but instead precludes state taxation “which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.” Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 , 97 S.Ct. 599, 607 , 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (citing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 , 79 S.Ct. 357, 362 , 3 L.Ed.2d 421 (1959)).

2016See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970).

2016See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 , 90 S.Ct. 844 , 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970).

2004Blastfax , Inc ., 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1087 B 88 (holding Commerce Clause challenge to TCPA failed).

2004Blastfax, Inc., 121 F.Supp.2d at 1087-88 (holding Commerce Clause challenge to TCPA failed).

1993Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. at 1079 ; see Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 750 , 98 S.Ct. at 1399 .

1993Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 , 97 S.Ct. at 1079 ; see Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 750 , 98 S.Ct. at 1399 .