parole violation in Colorado

2024See People v. Carillo , 70 P.3d 529, 530-31 (Colo. App. 2002) (concerning the DOC’s collection of restitution from the defendant ’s inmate bank account) ; People v. Huerta , 87 P.3d 266, 267 (Colo. App. 2004) (contesting the DOC ’s application of a parole statute) ; see a lso People v. Melnick , 2019 COA 28, ¶¶ 6-7 (challenging the parole 6 board’s decision not to grant a parole hearing) ; cf. People v. Shackelford , 729 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (Colo. App. 1986) (until the defendant claims a right to be released, his request to compel the DOC to recalculate good-time credits is not ripe).

2024See People v. Carillo , 70 P.3d 529, 530-31 (Colo. App. 2002) (concerning the DOC’s collection of restitution from the defendant ’s inmate bank account) ; People v. Huerta , 87 P.3d 266, 267 (Colo. App. 2004) (contesting the DOC ’s application of a parole statute) ; see a lso People v. Melnick , 2019 COA 28, ¶¶ 6-7 (challenging the parole 6 board’s decision not to grant a parole hearing) ; cf. People v. Shackelford , 729 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (Colo. App. 1986) (until the defendant claims a right to be released, his request to compel the DOC to recalculate good-time credits is not ripe).

2024See People v. Carillo , 70 P.3d 529, 530-31 (Colo. App. 2002) (concerning the DOC’s collection of restitution from the defendant ’s inmate bank account) ; People v. Huerta , 87 P.3d 266, 267 (Colo. App. 2004) (contesting the DOC ’s application of a parole statute) ; see a lso People v. Melnick , 2019 COA 28, ¶¶ 6-7 (challenging the parole 6 board’s decision not to grant a parole hearing) ; cf. People v. Shackelford , 729 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (Colo. App. 1986) (until the defendant claims a right to be released, his request to compel the DOC to recalculate good-time credits is not ripe).

2024See People v. Carillo , 70 P.3d 529, 530-31 (Colo. App. 2002) (concerning the DOC’s collection of restitution from the defendant ’s inmate bank account) ; People v. Huerta , 87 P.3d 266, 267 (Colo. App. 2004) (contesting the DOC ’s application of a parole statute) ; see a lso People v. Melnick , 2019 COA 28, ¶¶ 6-7 (challenging the parole 6 board’s decision not to grant a parole hearing) ; cf. People v. Shackelford , 729 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (Colo. App. 1986) (until the defendant claims a right to be released, his request to compel the DOC to recalculate good-time credits is not ripe).

2024See People v. Carillo , 70 P.3d 529, 530-31 (Colo. App. 2002) (concerning the DOC’s collection of restitution from the defendant ’s inmate bank account) ; People v. Huerta , 87 P.3d 266, 267 (Colo. App. 2004) (contesting the DOC ’s application of a parole statute) ; see a lso People v. Melnick , 2019 COA 28, ¶¶ 6-7 (challenging the parole 6 board’s decision not to grant a parole hearing) ; cf. People v. Shackelford , 729 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (Colo. App. 1986) (until the defendant claims a right to be released, his request to compel the DOC to recalculate good-time credits is not ripe).

2024See People v. Carillo , 70 P.3d 529, 530-31 (Colo. App. 2002) (concerning the DOC’s collection of restitution from the defendant ’s inmate bank account) ; People v. Huerta , 87 P.3d 266, 267 (Colo. App. 2004) (contesting the DOC ’s application of a parole statute) ; see a lso People v. Melnick , 2019 COA 28, ¶¶ 6-7 (challenging the parole 6 board’s decision not to grant a parole hearing) ; cf. People v. Shackelford , 729 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (Colo. App. 1986) (until the defendant claims a right to be released, his request to compel the DOC to recalculate good-time credits is not ripe).

2024See People v. Carillo , 70 P.3d 529, 530-31 (Colo. App. 2002) (concerning the DOC’s collection of restitution from the defendant ’s inmate bank account) ; People v. Huerta , 87 P.3d 266, 267 (Colo. App. 2004) (contesting the DOC ’s application of a parole statute) ; see a lso People v. Melnick , 2019 COA 28, ¶¶ 6-7 (challenging the parole 6 board’s decision not to grant a parole hearing) ; cf. People v. Shackelford , 729 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (Colo. App. 1986) (until the defendant claims a right to be released, his request to compel the DOC to recalculate good-time credits is not ripe).

2024See People v. Carillo , 70 P.3d 529, 530-31 (Colo. App. 2002) (concerning the DOC’s collection of restitution from the defendant ’s inmate bank account) ; People v. Huerta , 87 P.3d 266, 267 (Colo. App. 2004) (contesting the DOC ’s application of a parole statute) ; see a lso People v. Melnick , 2019 COA 28, ¶¶ 6-7 (challenging the parole 6 board’s decision not to grant a parole hearing) ; cf. People v. Shackelford , 729 P.2d 1016, 1017-18 (Colo. App. 1986) (until the defendant claims a right to be released, his request to compel the DOC to recalculate good-time credits is not ripe).

2008The People support this argument in two ways: (1) Norton should not guide our decision in this case because Norton is factually distinguishable from the present case; and (2) the word "sentence" as used in the first three sentences of section 405 must refer only to incarceration because, if a trial court credited PSCC against an offender's mandatory parole term, the court would impermis-sibly "impact" the terms of the offender's parole in violation of both section 17-22.5-403(1), C.R.S. (2008), which reserves exclusive authority over parole terms to the parole board, and our decision in People

2003See People v. Luther, supra (when defendant is reincarcerated on mandatory parole revocation, he is serving a revocation of parole period); Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846 (Colo.2001)(offender who has completed his sentence of incarceration has not discharged his sentence in its entirety); People v. Lucero, 772 P.2d 58 (Colo.1989)(defendant's release on parole in no way alters the fact that he is still under sentence); People v. Perea, supra, (offender is no longer serving a period of parole, but instead is serving a penalty period of confinement).

1999See Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1128 . .We acknowledge that our decision in People v. District Court, 868 P.2d 400, 405 (Colo.1994), stated that a defendant need not be advised of the length of a parole term in order to enter a valid plea.

1999See Birdsong , 958 P.2d at 1128 . 10.

2003See People v. Luther, supra (when defendant is reincarcerated on mandatory parole revocation, he is serving a revocation of parole period); Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846 (Colo.2001)(offender who has completed his sentence of incarceration has not discharged his sentence in its entirety); People v. Lucero, 772 P.2d 58 (Colo.1989)(defendant's release on parole in no way alters the fact that he is still under sentence); People v. Perea, supra, (offender is no longer serving a period of parole, but instead is serving a penalty period of confinement).

2002See Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 858 (Colo.2001) (an offender’s reincarceration period for a parole violation is limited only by the parole board’s statutory authority); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 958 (Colo.1999) (recognizing that the state board of parole has the authority to discharge an offender from parole, but the trial court lacks discretion to waive or suspend the mandatory period of parole).

2003See People v. Luther, supra (when defendant is reincarcerated on mandatory parole revocation, he is serving a revocation of parole period); Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846 (Colo.2001)(offender who has completed his sentence of incarceration has not discharged his sentence in its entirety); People v. Lucero, 772 P.2d 58 (Colo.1989)(defendant's release on parole in no way alters the fact that he is still under sentence); People v. Perea, supra, (offender is no longer serving a period of parole, but instead is serving a penalty period of confinement).

2002See People v. Lucero, 772 P.2d 58 (Colo.1989).

2002See, eg., § 17-2108, C.R.S. 2001; Rather v. Suthers, 973 P.2d 1264 (Colo.1999); People v. Williams, supra; see also People v. Luther, supra, 43 P.3d at 662 ; Black's Law Dictionary 1321 (Tth ed.1999) (defining "revocation".

2002See, e.g., § 17-2-103, C.R.S.2001; Rather v. Suthers, 973 P.2d 1264 (Colo.1999); People v. Williams, supra ; see also People v. Luther, supra, 43 P.3d at 662 ; Black's Law Dictionary 1321 (7th ed.1999) (defining "revocation").

2000This requires a parole officer who is investigating a parole violation to have reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred." Id.

2000Applying our holding to the facts in that case, we determined that the search was lawful because the parole officer had "reasonable grounds to enter the apartment to determine whether it was Anderson's established residence." Id. at 38 , 536 P.2d at 305 .

2025See People v. Seaney, 36 P.3d 81, 83 (Colo. App. 2000). ¶ 10 That the advisement also used the phrase “this includes” after stating the length of the prison sentence does not alter our conclusion.

2019See People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734, 736 (Colo. App. 2010); Slusher, 43 P.3d at 648-50 .

2006See People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339, 347 (Colo. 2003) (stating that “a felony offender’s penalty or sentence consists of both an incarceration component and a mandatory parole component.”).

2003See People v. Taylor, 74 P.3d 396 , 2002 WL 31834448 (Colo.App.

2003See People v. Taylor, 74 P.3d 396 , 2002 WL 31834448 (Colo.App.

2002See Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 858 (Colo.2001) (an offender’s reincarceration period for a parole violation is limited only by the parole board’s statutory authority); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 958 (Colo.1999) (recognizing that the state board of parole has the authority to discharge an offender from parole, but the trial court lacks discretion to waive or suspend the mandatory period of parole).

2002See People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774 (Colo.2000).

2002See, eg., § 17-2108, C.R.S. 2001; Rather v. Suthers, 973 P.2d 1264 (Colo.1999); People v. Williams, supra; see also People v. Luther, supra, 43 P.3d at 662 ; Black's Law Dictionary 1321 (Tth ed.1999) (defining "revocation".

2002See, e.g., § 17-2-103, C.R.S.2001; Rather v. Suthers, 973 P.2d 1264 (Colo.1999); People v. Williams, supra ; see also People v. Luther, supra, 43 P.3d at 662 ; Black's Law Dictionary 1321 (7th ed.1999) (defining "revocation").

2000See People v. Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019, 1027 (1999) (holding that objective standard applies to parole searches to discourage disparate results resulting from validity of searches turning on officer's subjective intent). [15] As we stated in Anderson , evidence seized within the scope of a reasonable parole search, even though unrelated to the parole violation, is admissible in the prosecution of another crime.

2000See People v. Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 981 P.2d 1019, 1027 (1999) (holding that objective standard applies to parole searches to discourage disparate results resulting from validity of searches turning on officer's subjective intent). [15] As we stated in Anderson , evidence seized within the scope of a reasonable parole search, even though unrelated to the parole violation, is admissible in the prosecution of another crime.

2000See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870-71 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (analyzing Wisconsin probation statute that required reasonable grounds for searches and made it a probation violation to refuse consent to a home search). [3] Whether the Anderson "reasonable grounds" requirement or another, lesser standard governs parole searches, if there are in fact reasonable grounds for the search, then the search is constitutionally sound.

2000See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870-71 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (analyzing Wisconsin probation statute that required reasonable grounds for searches and made it a probation violation to refuse consent to a home search). [3] Whether the Anderson "reasonable grounds" requirement or another, lesser standard governs parole searches, if there are in fact reasonable grounds for the search, then the search is constitutionally sound.

1999See People v. Eiland, 217 Ill.App.3d 250 , 160 Ill.Dec. 231 , 576 N.E.2d 1185 (1991); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789 , 525 N.E.2d 379 (1988); Allan v. State, 103 Nev. 512 , 746 P.2d 138 (1987); Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352 (Wyo.1990); State v. Velasquez, supra; cf. People v. Slusher, 844 P.2d 1222 (Colo.App.1992).

1999See People v. Eiland, 217 Ill.App.3d 250 , 160 Ill.Dec. 231 , 576 N.E.2d 1185 (1991); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789 , 525 N.E.2d 379 (1988); Allan v. State, 103 Nev. 512 , 746 P.2d 138 (1987); Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352 (Wyo.1990); State v. Velasquez, supra; cf. People v. Slusher, 844 P.2d 1222 (Colo.App.1992).