parole violation in Idaho

2025Accordingly, the termination of a parolee’s liberty interest requires “an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Id. at 484 .

2025First, the parolee is entitled to “some minimal inquiry . . . at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation . . . as promptly as convenient . . . while information is fresh and sources are available.” Id.

2021See Maxim, 165 Idaho at 907 , 454 P.3d at 549 .

2021See Maxim, 165 Idaho at 907 , 454 P.3d at 549 .

2014To address Dotts’ first argument, it is well settled that I.C. § 20-228 permits the Commission to forfeit time spent on parole following a parole violation, thus allowing the Department to retain an offender in custody beyond the term that was imposed by the sentencing judge. 2 E.g., Gibson, 141 Idaho at 274 , 108 P.3d at 421 (“This provision permits the executive branch to retain an offender after his or her judicially imposed term has expired.”); Winter, 117 Idaho at 106 , 785 P.2d at 670 (“[T]he statute allows the Board of Correction, an agency of the executive branch of government, to reta

2014To address Dotts’ first argument, it is well settled that I.C. § 20-228 permits the Commission to forfeit time spent on parole following a parole violation, thus allowing the Department to retain an offender in custody beyond the term that was imposed by the sentencing judge. 2 E.g., Gibson, 141 Idaho at 274 , 108 P.3d at 421 (“This provision permits the executive branch to retain an offender after his or her judicially imposed term has expired.”); Winter, 117 Idaho at 106 , 785 P.2d at 670 (“[T]he statute allows the Board of Correction, an agency of the executive branch of government, to reta

2014To address Dotts’ first argument, it is well settled that I.C. § 20-228 permits the Commission to forfeit time spent on parole following a parole violation, thus allowing the Department to retain an offender in custody beyond the term that was imposed by the sentencing judge. 2 E.g., Gibson, 141 Idaho at 274 , 108 P.3d at 421 (“This provision permits the executive branch to retain an offender after his or her judicially imposed term has expired.”); Winter, 117 Idaho at 106 , 785 P.2d at 670 (“[T]he statute allows the Board of Correction, an agency of the executive branch of government, to reta

2014To address Dotts’ first argument, it is well settled that I.C. § 20-228 permits the Commission to forfeit time spent on parole following a parole violation, thus allowing the Department to retain an offender in custody beyond the term that was imposed by the sentencing judge. 2 E.g., Gibson, 141 Idaho at 274 , 108 P.3d at 421 (“This provision permits the executive branch to retain an offender after his or her judicially imposed term has expired.”); Winter, 117 Idaho at 106 , 785 P.2d at 670 (“[T]he statute allows the Board of Correction, an agency of the executive branch of government, to reta

2012See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984); Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624 , 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). 9 .

2012See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984); Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624 , 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). 9 .

2012See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984); Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624 , 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). 9 .

2012See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984); Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624 , 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). 9 .

2011However, in State v. Prelwitz, 132 Idaho 191, 193 , 968 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Ct. App. 1998), this Court specifically applied the fundamental error doctrine to a probation revocation proceeding. 6 What is needed is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.

2011However, in State v. Prelwitz, 132 Idaho 191, 193 , 968 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Ct. App. 1998), this Court specifically applied the fundamental error doctrine to a probation revocation proceeding. 6 What is needed is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.

2010Duvalt v. Sonnen, 137 Idaho 548, 554 , 50 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Ct. App. 2002) (“If there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in receiving parole, it follows that there can be no constitutionally protected liberty interest in having a parole hearing immediately upon becoming parole-eligible.”).

2010Duvalt v. Sonnen, 137 Idaho 548, 554 , 50 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Ct. App. 2002) (“If there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in receiving parole, it follows that there can be no constitutionally protected liberty interest in having a parole hearing immediately upon becoming parole-eligible.”).

2004Although the alleged act of the Commission, conducting a parole hearing in the arson case within days after his conviction for that offense and years before he would become parole eligible, may have been unlawful (see Acheson v. Klauser, 139 Idaho 156, 158-59 , 75 P.3d 210, 212-13 (Ct.App.2003)), it is not a factor that would eompel the trial court to reduce Thomas’s sentence.

2004Although the alleged act of the Commission, conducting a parole hearing in the arson case within days after his conviction for that offense and years before he would become parole eligible, may have been unlawful (see Acheson v. Klauser, 139 Idaho 156, 158-59 , 75 P.3d 210, 212-13 (Ct.App.2003)), it is not a factor that would eompel the trial court to reduce Thomas’s sentence.

1983People v. Anderson, 189 Colo. 34 , 536 P.2d 302, 305 (1975).

1983People v. Anderson, 189 Colo. 34 , 536 P.2d 302, 305 (1975).

1983See Downing v. Jacobs, 99 Idaho 127 , 578 P.2d 243 (1978); Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 36, 36 , 415 P.2d 679, 679 (1966).

1983See Downing v. Jacobs, 99 Idaho 127 , 578 P.2d 243 (1978); Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 36, 36 , 415 P.2d 679, 679 (1966).

1983See Downing v. Jacobs, 99 Idaho 127 , 578 P.2d 243 (1978); Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 36, 36 , 415 P.2d 679, 679 (1966).

1983See Downing v. Jacobs, 99 Idaho 127 , 578 P.2d 243 (1978); Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 36, 36 , 415 P.2d 679, 679 (1966).

1983Also announcing that it would embrace the middle ground, the court in State v. Simms, 10 Wash.App. 75 , 516 P.2d 1088, 1096 (1973), held that for a search of a parolee’s residence by a parole officer to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, “the officer must have at least a well-founded suspicion that a parole violation has occurred.” One court has even constructed a hybrid standard by distinguishing between searches of a probationer’s home and searches of his person or vehicle.

1983Also announcing that it would embrace the middle ground, the court in State v. Simms, 10 Wash.App. 75 , 516 P.2d 1088, 1096 (1973), held that for a search of a parolee’s residence by a parole officer to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, “the officer must have at least a well-founded suspicion that a parole violation has occurred.” One court has even constructed a hybrid standard by distinguishing between searches of a probationer’s home and searches of his person or vehicle.

1971See Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949) aff’d., Per Curiam, 340 U.S. 880 , 71 S.Ct. 192 , 95 L.Ed. 639 (1950); Petition of Osier, Mont., 477 P.2d 344, 345 (1970); Hyser v. Reed, supra. In response to appellants’ contention that the parole violation hearings afforded to them were not meaningful because of remoteness in both time and place, this Court directs attention to its conclusion that all the incidents of due process are not required to be observed at parole revocation hearings.

1971See Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949) aff’d., Per Curiam, 340 U.S. 880 , 71 S.Ct. 192 , 95 L.Ed. 639 (1950); Petition of Osier, Mont., 477 P.2d 344, 345 (1970); Hyser v. Reed, supra. In response to appellants’ contention that the parole violation hearings afforded to them were not meaningful because of remoteness in both time and place, this Court directs attention to its conclusion that all the incidents of due process are not required to be observed at parole revocation hearings.

1971See Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949) aff’d., Per Curiam, 340 U.S. 880 , 71 S.Ct. 192 , 95 L.Ed. 639 (1950); Petition of Osier, Mont., 477 P.2d 344, 345 (1970); Hyser v. Reed, supra. In response to appellants’ contention that the parole violation hearings afforded to them were not meaningful because of remoteness in both time and place, this Court directs attention to its conclusion that all the incidents of due process are not required to be observed at parole revocation hearings.

1971See Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949) aff’d., Per Curiam, 340 U.S. 880 , 71 S.Ct. 192 , 95 L.Ed. 639 (1950); Petition of Osier, Mont., 477 P.2d 344, 345 (1970); Hyser v. Reed, supra. In response to appellants’ contention that the parole violation hearings afforded to them were not meaningful because of remoteness in both time and place, this Court directs attention to its conclusion that all the incidents of due process are not required to be observed at parole revocation hearings.

1971See Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949) aff’d., Per Curiam, 340 U.S. 880 , 71 S.Ct. 192 , 95 L.Ed. 639 (1950); Petition of Osier, Mont., 477 P.2d 344, 345 (1970); Hyser v. Reed, supra. In response to appellants’ contention that the parole violation hearings afforded to them were not meaningful because of remoteness in both time and place, this Court directs attention to its conclusion that all the incidents of due process are not required to be observed at parole revocation hearings.