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443 California opinions name it 5 courts 1964–2026 201 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Franklingreen2 sentences2026(Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144, citing Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279, 281.) “Such a sentence is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.” (Franklin, at p. 280.) And because defendants eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051 are not serving an LWOP term or its functional equivalent, they are ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). 2026(Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144, citing Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279, 281.) “Such a sentence is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.” (Franklin, at p. 280.) And because defendants eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051 are not serving an LWOP term or its functional equivalent, they are ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). | 12 | 60 |
People v. Hardingreen2 sentences2026(In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 447, 449 ; id. at p. 452 [“In cases with final judgments, section 1203.01 gives the trial court authority to conduct an evidence preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin”]; accord, Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 840.) “Under the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration. [Citation.] But not all youthful offenders are eligible for parole hearings. 2026Nowden’s Section 3051 Argument Is Not Properly Before Us in this Appeal Under section 3051, “most persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 , 838 (Hardin).) But “[t]he statute excludes . . . offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18.” (Id. at pp. 838–839.) In Hardin, the California Supreme Court found section 3051 did not violate equal protection on it | 9 | 26 |
People v. Mylesgreen2 sentences2026“It is well settled that a defendant’s statements in a parole risk assessment report and testimony at a parole hearing fall within the ambit of ‘ “new or additional evidence.” ’ ” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; see Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 466; Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 927; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575 , 586 (Mitchell); People v. Anderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81 , 93; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688 , 703 (Myles).) Whiteside argues that using statements she made at her parole hearing against her at the evidentiary hearing under se 2025People v. Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 692–694 [affirming denial of resentencing where the defendant admitted at a parole hearing to being the actual killer and was therefore “directly liable,” not “vicariously liable”]; People v. Gallo (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 594 , 599–600 [holding that a defendant who was the actual killer was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6].) Following our independent review of the record, we find no arguable issues. | 9 | 24 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2026(See Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 .) At stake here, by contrast, is when Thai is entitled to a parole hearing. 2025At the first hearing, the court must conduct “some minimal inquiry” to establish that probable cause exists to believe a parole violation occurred. ( Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 485-487.) At the second hearing, the parolee receives notice of the claimed violations, and an evidentiary hearing is conducted. | 8 | 26 |
In re Cookgreen2 sentences2026(In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 447, 449 ; id. at p. 452 [“In cases with final judgments, section 1203.01 gives the trial court authority to conduct an evidence preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin”]; accord, Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 840.) “Under the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration. [Citation.] But not all youthful offenders are eligible for parole hearings. 2025Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 “provide a parole hearing during the 25th year of incarceration for certain juveniles sentenced as adults.” (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446 (Cook).) The Supreme Court held in Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 283 , that these statutory provisions “also contemplate that information regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a 11 youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the Board’s consideration.” As Franklin was a direct appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to provide def | 8 | 25 |
People v. Zavalagreen2 sentences2026The court said, “[Defendant] doesn’t qualify for any of the possible reasons listed in 1172 for resentencing,” and it specifically pointed out that defendant “admitted at the parole hearing that he was one of the shooters.” {RT 5} The court was referring to the parole hearing transcripts that the prosecution had submitted, which the court had reviewed. {RT 4} In the context of a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, “[i]t is well settled that a defendant’s statements in a parole risk assessment report and testimony at a parole hearing fall within the ambit of ‘“new or additional evidence.”’” (Za 2026(Id. at pp. 705–706.) Because defendant chose to participate in the risk assessment interview and testify at the parole hearing, “it is not fundamentally unfair to admit that information during a resentencing proceeding voluntarily initiated by defendant bearing on some of the same issues.” (Id. at p. 706; see also People v. Zavala (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 366 , 374 [“use immunity should not be extended to bar the use of a defendant’s statements in a comprehensive risk assessment and testimony at a parole hearing in a later evidentiary hearing held under section 1172.6”].) Finally, defendant com | 8 | 13 |
People v. DeLeongreen2 sentences2026(Armas, at pp. 354-357.) The court in DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th 640 , specifically adopted the Spencer decision in holding that a parole violation “does not involve the same collateral 5 consequences that attach to a criminal conviction” for the purposes of assessing mootness. 2026(Armas, at pp. 354-357.) The court in DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th 640 , specifically adopted the Spencer decision in holding that a parole violation “does not involve the same collateral 5 consequences that attach to a criminal conviction” for the purposes of assessing mootness. | 7 | 19 |
People v. Durangreen2 sentences2026“It is well settled that a defendant’s statements in a parole risk assessment report and testimony at a parole hearing fall within the ambit of ‘ “new or additional evidence.” ’ ” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; see Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 466; Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 927; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575 , 586 (Mitchell); People v. Anderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81 , 93; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688 , 703 (Myles).) Whiteside argues that using statements she made at her parole hearing against her at the evidentiary hearing under se 2026“It is well settled that a defendant’s statements in a parole risk assessment report and testimony at a parole hearing fall within the ambit of ‘ “new or additional evidence.” ’ ” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; see Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 466; Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 927; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575 , 586 (Mitchell); People v. Anderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81 , 93; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688 , 703 (Myles).) Whiteside argues that using statements she made at her parole hearing against her at the evidentiary hearing under se | 5 | 10 |
People v. Contrerasgreen2 sentences2026He likewise acknowledges that defendant was eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051, but citing our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369 (Contreras), maintains that defendant’s 50-year determinate sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP. 2026He likewise acknowledges that defendant was eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051, but citing our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369 (Contreras), maintains that defendant’s 50-year determinate sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP. | 4 | 9 |
People v. Osorio CA4/3red2 sentences2021But it does not suggest that a demurrer would lie in a DA-initiated proceeding where the parole agency disagreed with the district attorney’s choice to seek revocation. “ ‘ “[A] demurrer raises an issue of law as to the sufficiency of the accusatory pleading, and it tests only those defects appearing on the face of that pleading.” ’ ” (Osorio, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412 .) Since a district attorney initiates a revocation proceeding only when the parolee has allegedly committed a crime, the parole violation at issue will never be de minimis like the one of concern in Osorio. 2021A parole agent enters all violations into the parole violation decision making instrument (PVDMI), which “ ‘assesses the parolee’s risk level using the [California Static Risk Assessment (CRSA)] and the severity of the violation . . . to determine the appropriate response level.’ ” (Osorio, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414 .) Parole agents “may recommend overriding the [PVDMI] based on stabilizing or destabilizing factors, including the lack of an appropriate program alternative in the community.” (Ibid.) According to the evaluation attached to the revocation petition, defendant’s CRSA score | 4 | 8 |
In Re Shaputisgreen2 sentences2021DISCUSSION The Attorney General contends the superior court erred in three ways when it granted Freeman habeas corpus relief: (1) “the court granted relief on an unraised claim in contravention of habeas jurisprudence;” (2) “even if the superior court could consider an unraised claim, the court violated In re Shaputis II (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 220-221 (Shaputis II) by applying the wrong standard of judicial review and misconstruing the Board’s core function to assess inmates’ current dangerousness;” and (3) even assuming the superior court properly concluded that Freeman should be given a new 2012Absent the requisite “nexus between the evidence and the ultimate determination of current dangerousness” (In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 221 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 , 265 P.3d 253 ] (Shaputis II)), we grant Sanchez’s petition to vacate the Board’s 2010 parole denial and order a new parole hearing. | 4 | 8 |
People v. Butchergreen2 sentences2025(People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 [probation revocation].) “The substantial evidence standard ‘gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a 6 judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge [in a court trial] . . . to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the fac 2020(People v. Hubbart (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1227 [decision to revoke parole involves exercise of “broad” power]; see People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 [decision to revoke probation reviewed for an abuse of discretion]; People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746 [trial court abuses its discretion when its “decision rests on an error of law”].) This case therefore presents the question: Does a defendant who expressly waives his right to all further revocation hearings in order to admit a parole violation and thereby obtains the benefit of a specific disp | 4 | 6 |
In re Lawrencegreen2 sentences2018(Maj. opn., ante , at 229 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 263-264, 411 P.3d at pp. 457-477.) To the contrary, in observing that defendants' sentences in fact afford them an opportunity for reintegration into society, this dissent merely explains how the majority's analysis is flawed even when taken on its own terms. 9 If parole is not granted, the Board of Parole Hearings shall set the time for a subsequent elderly parole hearing in accordance with general statutory provisions regarding the setting of next parole hearings. (§ 3041.5, subd. (b)(3).) 10 This court has explained that "changes in a prisoner's 2018(Maj. opn., ante , at 229 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 263-264, 411 P.3d at pp. 457-477.) To the contrary, in observing that defendants' sentences in fact afford them an opportunity for reintegration into society, this dissent merely explains how the majority's analysis is flawed even when taken on its own terms. 9 If parole is not granted, the Board of Parole Hearings shall set the time for a subsequent elderly parole hearing in accordance with general statutory provisions regarding the setting of next parole hearings. (§ 3041.5, subd. (b)(3).) 10 This court has explained that "changes in a prisoner's | 4 | 5 |
People v. Isayevgreen2 sentences2026Thus, at latest, defendant would be entitled to a parole hearing in 2034, when he would be 43 years old.6 “A life sentence with parole eligibility at the age of [43] is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.” (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144.) We note that at sentencing on October 16, 2009, the trial 5 We recognize that Franklin concerned a determination of whether a sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, rather than whether the sentence violated equal protection as here. 2026Nevertheless, for purposes of whether a defendant seeking resentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), is serving the functional equivalent of LWOP, we find that a distinction without a difference. 9 “If parole is not granted, the board shall set the time for a subsequent youth offender parole hearing in accordance with paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 3041.5” (§ 3051, subd. (g).) Defendant would thereafter potentially be entitled to a parole hearing as early as three years thereafter, but as late as 15 years thereafter depending on the findings of the parole board. (§ | 4 | 4 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2021(See id. at pp. 477-480; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388-1389 .) With regard to the Miller factors, Montelongo described his upbringing and home environment as chaotic, abusive, and neglectful, and he argued the crimes he committed demonstrated impetuous acts of a teenager, not “extreme viciousness or incurable depravity.” Montelongo also contended sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because section 3051 denied him a parole hearing after his 25th year of 5 imprisonment, while giving that 2020(See id. at pp. 477-480; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388-1389 .) With regard to the Miller factors, Montelongo described his upbringing and home environment as chaotic, abusive, and neglectful, and he argued the crimes he committed demonstrated impetuous acts of a teenager, not “extreme viciousness or incurable depravity.” Montelongo also contended sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because section 3051 denied him a parole hearing after his 25th year of 5 imprisonment, while giving that | 3 | 9 |
In re Trejogreen2 sentences2021Youth offender parole hearings Section 3051 was enacted in 2013 to “‘establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity. . . .’” (In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980 .) Under section 3051, youth offenders who committed their “controlling offense” when they were 25 years old or younger are entitled to a parole hearing after serving a designated period in custody. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) A “contr 2021Section 3051, enacted in 2013, “ ‘establish[es] a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity . . . .’ ” (In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972 , 980–981; see People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 , 279–280 [§ 3051 provides for youth offender parole hearings that give youth offenders “a meaningful opportunity” for release on parole subject to delineated exceptions].) To that end, subject to the excep | 3 | 9 |
People v. Hardinred2 sentences2024Agreeing with Hardin, the Court of Appeal raised for comparison two hypothetical offenders who would be eligible for a section 3051 parole hearing: (1) “a 20 year old who shot and killed his victim one day, committed a robbery the next, and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life”; and (2) an individual “who committed multiple violent crimes . . . and received a parole-eligible indeterminate life term that far exceeded his or her life expectancy.” (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 289.) In the court’s view, these crimes “cannot rationally” be considered less severe than “ 2023In part, Alvez relies upon People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273 , review granted January 11, 2023, S277487 (Hardin) and sympathetic statements by reviewing courts inviting the Legislature to reconsider the parole hearing exclusion of section 3051, subdivision (h). | 3 | 5 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 3 | 4 |
| People v. Nucklesgreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Mathewsgreen | 3 | 3 |
Graham v. Floridagreen2 sentences2026Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842-843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th 2025DISCUSSION The United States Supreme Court has recognized juvenile offenders are generally less culpable than adult offenders and, except in the rarest of cases, the federal Constitution requires states to afford juvenile offenders a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 75 .) To 3 that end, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 3051, which requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a parole hearing no later than the 25th year of a youthful offender’s incarceration, regardless o | 2 | 25 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2026Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842-843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th 2026So we don’t look at whether or not she is actually paroled; we look at whether or not she actually has a parole hearing date, and she actually does have a parole hearing date next year.” The court observed that, “in Franklin, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life, and the California Supreme Court held that because Section 3051 entitles Franklin to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, his sentence, quote, ‘is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent,’ thus gives no rise to any, quote, ‘Miller[6] claim.’” “Under the Heard analysis, what Heard address | 2 | 22 |
People v. Caballeroyellow2 sentences2026Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842-843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th 2025Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842-843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th | 2 | 16 |
People v. Brunergreen2 sentences2018(Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1194 .) Both Bruner and Atiles considered the dual-credit issue in the context of a defendant’s parole violation: “how section 2900.5 [is] applied when a defendant sentenced to a new criminal term seeks credit for presentence custody attributable to a parole revocation caused in part, but not exclusively, by the conduct that led to the new sentence.” (Bruner, at pp. 1182-1183.) In Atiles, the court held that a trial court “is not required to eliminate all other possible bases for the defendant’s presentence incarceration” before granting section 2900.5 credits. 2015Likewise, he still would have been held for consuming alcohol, which is not necessarily a crime in and of itself but may be, and was here, a parole violation. [¶] Penal Code ‘section 2900.5 did not intend to allow credit for a period of presentence restraint unless the conduct leading to the sentence was the true and only unavoidable basis for the earlier custody.’ (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) Here, the conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol, for which defendant was sentenced in the underlying action, was not the ‘only unavoidable basis’ for the custody. | 2 | 10 |
People v. Vickersgreen2 sentences1975It must be conducted “at or reasonably near” the place of arrest or the alleged parole violation, and, as we have seen, “as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” The ultimate function of the hearing officer at this initial stage is “to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions.” Determination of that issue adverse to the parolee warrants his continued detention and return to the state correctional institution pe 1975It must be conducted “at or reasonably near” the place of arrest or the alleged parole violation, and, as we have seen, “as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” The ultimate function of the hearing officer at this initial stage is “to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions.” Determination of that issue adverse to the parolee warrants his continued detention and return to the state correctional institution pe | 2 | 7 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2026(See Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 .) At stake here, by contrast, is when Thai is entitled to a parole hearing. 2025(See Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 .) At stake here, by contrast, is when Thai is entitled to a parole hearing. | 2 | 6 |
| Roper v. Simmonsgreen | 2 | 4 |
| Spencer v. Kemnagreen | 2 | 4 |
| People v. Acostagreen | 2 | 4 |
| In Re Prathergreen | 2 | 4 |
| In Re Kellyyellow | 2 | 4 |
| People v. Ortegagreen | 2 | 3 |
| People v. Perlasgreen | 2 | 3 |
| People v. Martinezgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Daker v. Raygreen | 2 | 3 |
| People v. Rodriguezgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Buellgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardinogreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Sandsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Galvangreen | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Coleman
green
2 sentences2026Citing People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), he argued that an inmate’s parole hearing testimony should be protected by use immunity and therefore inadmissible at a later criminal proceeding. 2025“It is well settled that a defendant’s statements in a parole risk assessment report and testimony at a parole hearing fall within the ambit of ‘“new or additional evidence.”’” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; see Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 466; Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 927; Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 586; People v. Anderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81 , 93; Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.) Wesson argues that using statements he made at his parole hearing against him at the evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), “implicate | 12 | 2017–2026 |
| People v. Bejasa green | 4 | 2013–2019 |
| In re Swanigan green | 3 | 2024–2026 |
| People v. McWhorter green | 3 | 2024–2025 |
| Chapman v. California yellow | 3 | 1995–2022 |
| Williams v. Superior Court yellow | 3 | 2016–2021 |
| In re Butler green | 3 | 2018–2019 |
| Gillan v. City of San Marino green | 3 | 2017–2017 |
| Mathews v. Eldridge green | 2 | 2014–2026 |
| People v. Montanez green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Austin green | 2 | 2022–2025 |
| People v. Rodriguez green | 2 | 2021–2025 |
| People v. Williams green | 2 | 2022–2024 |
| People v. Zamudio green | 2 | 2021–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.