parole violation in California

2026(Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144, citing Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279, 281.) “Such a sentence is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.” (Franklin, at p. 280.) And because defendants eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051 are not serving an LWOP term or its functional equivalent, they are ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).

2025(See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 619.) Section 3051 now provides for a youth offender parole hearing to be held for juvenile offenders during their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on their offense and original sentence. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(1)–(4).) “Apart from the categories of offenders expressly excluded by the statute, section 3051 provides all juvenile offenders with a parole hearing during or before their 25th year of incarceration.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278 .) The Franklin court concluded the youthful offender parole hearing process moots any cons

2026(See Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 .) At stake here, by contrast, is when Thai is entitled to a parole hearing.

2025At the first hearing, the court must conduct “some minimal inquiry” to establish that probable cause exists to believe a parole violation occurred. ( Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 485-487.) At the second hearing, the parolee receives notice of the claimed violations, and an evidentiary hearing is conducted.

2026(In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 447, 449 ; id. at p. 452 [“In cases with final judgments, section 1203.01 gives the trial court authority to conduct an evidence preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin”]; accord, Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 840.) “Under the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration. [Citation.] But not all youthful offenders are eligible for parole hearings.

2025In that case, the defendant introduced youth-related evidence at 7 Although Washington in his motion did not state the anticipated date of his youth offender parole hearing or whether he had a prior parole hearing (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 458 ), this is not a mandatory pleading requirement to initiate a Franklin proceeding.

2025Under these circumstances, DeLeon’s parole violation does not constitute a disadvantageous collateral consequence for purposes of assessing mootness.” (DeLeon, 6. supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646 .) The court acknowledged that “under other circumstances, a defendant could demonstrate sufficiently concrete consequences to avoid a finding of mootness, even if the term of imprisonment has already concluded,” but found “that the consequences DeLeon has identified here are simply too speculative to support the conclusion that a legally sufficient controversy exists.” (Id. at p. 646, fn. 2.) Although DeLe

2025As the parties agree, a parole violation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1203.2, subd. (a) [court may revoke parole “if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe . . . that the person has violated any of the conditions of their supervision”]; People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437 , 442–443 [language of previous version of § 1203.2, subd. (a), when it applied only to probation revocation, permitted proof by preponderance of the evidence]; People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 647 [Legislature amended § 1203.2 to create un

2021But it does not suggest that a demurrer would lie in a DA-initiated proceeding where the parole agency disagreed with the district attorney’s choice to seek revocation. “ ‘ “[A] demurrer raises an issue of law as to the sufficiency of the accusatory pleading, and it tests only those defects appearing on the face of that pleading.” ’ ” (Osorio, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412 .) Since a district attorney initiates a revocation proceeding only when the parolee has allegedly committed a crime, the parole violation at issue will never be de minimis like the one of concern in Osorio.

2021The court ultimately found the evidence was insufficient to sustain that allegation. 3 the court.” (Perlas, at p. 833; § 3000.08 subd. (f); Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636, 652 .) California Rules of Court, rule 4.541 requires the supervising agency to include in the report “the reasons for that agency’s determination that intermediate sanctions without court intervention . . . are inappropriate responses to the alleged [parole] violations.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.541(e); Perlas, at p. 833.) The specific reasons need “to be ‘individualized to the particular parolee,

2021DISCUSSION The Attorney General contends the superior court erred in three ways when it granted Freeman habeas corpus relief: (1) “the court granted relief on an unraised claim in contravention of habeas jurisprudence;” (2) “even if the superior court could consider an unraised claim, the court violated In re Shaputis II (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 220-221 (Shaputis II) by applying the wrong standard of judicial review and misconstruing the Board’s core function to assess inmates’ current dangerousness;” and (3) even assuming the superior court properly concluded that Freeman should be given a new

2012Absent the requisite “nexus between the evidence and the ultimate determination of current dangerousness” (In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 221 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 , 265 P.3d 253 ] (Shaputis II)), we grant Sanchez’s petition to vacate the Board’s 2010 parole denial and order a new parole hearing.

2025(In re Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1228 , 1234– 1235.) We review an order revoking parole for abuse of discretion and review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. 4 (People v. Butcher, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 318 [probation revocation]; In re Miller, at p. 1235 [probation revocation and parole revocation “constitutionally indistinguishable”].) “[W]e do not reweigh conflicting evidence or determine credibility on appeal.” (Butcher, at p. 318.) The trial court here weighed the conflicting evidence on this issue and found Puckett absconded.

2020(People v. Hubbart (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1227 [decision to revoke parole involves exercise of “broad” power]; see People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 [decision to revoke probation reviewed for an abuse of discretion]; People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746 [trial court abuses its discretion when its “decision rests on an error of law”].) This case therefore presents the question: Does a defendant who expressly waives his right to all further revocation hearings in order to admit a parole violation and thereby obtains the benefit of a specific disp

2018(Maj. opn., ante , at 229 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 263-264, 411 P.3d at pp. 457-477.) To the contrary, in observing that defendants' sentences in fact afford them an opportunity for reintegration into society, this dissent merely explains how the majority's analysis is flawed even when taken on its own terms. 9 If parole is not granted, the Board of Parole Hearings shall set the time for a subsequent elderly parole hearing in accordance with general statutory provisions regarding the setting of next parole hearings. (§ 3041.5, subd. (b)(3).) 10 This court has explained that "changes in a prisoner's

2018(Maj. opn., ante , at 229 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 263-264, 411 P.3d at pp. 457-477.) To the contrary, in observing that defendants' sentences in fact afford them an opportunity for reintegration into society, this dissent merely explains how the majority's analysis is flawed even when taken on its own terms. 9 If parole is not granted, the Board of Parole Hearings shall set the time for a subsequent elderly parole hearing in accordance with general statutory provisions regarding the setting of next parole hearings. (§ 3041.5, subd. (b)(3).) 10 This court has explained that "changes in a prisoner's

2021DISCUSSION A. Youth Offender Parole Hearings Enacted in 2013, the Legislature intended in section 3051 et seq. to “ ‘establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity . . . .’ ” (In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980 (Trejo).) Section 3051 therefore provides for youth offender parole hearings that guarantee youth offenders a meaningful opportunity for release on parole. (§ 3051, subd. (e).) Y

2021Youth offender parole hearings Section 3051 was enacted in 2013 to “‘establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity. . . .’” (In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980 .) Under section 3051, youth offenders who committed their “controlling offense” when they were 25 years old or younger are entitled to a parole hearing after serving a designated period in custody. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) A “contr

2021(See id. at pp. 477-480; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388-1389 .) With regard to the Miller factors, Montelongo described his upbringing and home environment as chaotic, abusive, and neglectful, and he argued the crimes he committed demonstrated impetuous acts of a teenager, not “extreme viciousness or incurable depravity.” Montelongo also contended sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because section 3051 denied him a parole hearing after his 25th year of 5 imprisonment, while giving that

2020(See id. at pp. 477-480; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1388-1389 .) With regard to the Miller factors, Montelongo described his upbringing and home environment as chaotic, abusive, and neglectful, and he argued the crimes he committed demonstrated impetuous acts of a teenager, not “extreme viciousness or incurable depravity.” Montelongo also contended sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because section 3051 denied him a parole hearing after his 25th year of 5 imprisonment, while giving that

2026He likewise acknowledges that defendant was eligible for a parole hearing under section 3051, but citing our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369 (Contreras), maintains that defendant’s 50-year determinate sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP.

2021(Stats. 2017, ch. 676, § 3.) Under the program, suitable prisoners 60 years old or older and who have served at least 25 years in prison may be entitled to a parole hearing. (§ 3055.) Our high court in Contreras requested supplemental briefing on what effect the program and related regulations had on the matter. ( Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 373-374.) Ultimately, the majority in Contreras “decline[d] to resolve whether the newly enacted legislation and regulations affect the validity of defendants’ sentences and instead le[ft] these novel issues for the lower courts to address in the fi

2019Such a sentence is neither [life without parole] nor its functional equivalent." ( Id. at pp. 279-280, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) Accordingly, Franklin was "not subject to a sentence that presumes his incorrigibility; by operation of law, he is entitled to a parole hearing and possible release after 25 years of incarceration." ( Id . at p. 281, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) Under our interpretation of the statutes, "Franklin's two consecutive 25-year-to-life sentences remain valid , even though section 3051, subdivision (b)(3) has altered his parole eligibility date by ope

2019Such a sentence is neither [life without parole] nor its functional equivalent." ( Id. at pp. 279-280, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) Accordingly, Franklin was "not subject to a sentence that presumes his incorrigibility; by operation of law, he is entitled to a parole hearing and possible release after 25 years of incarceration." ( Id . at p. 281, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) Under our interpretation of the statutes, "Franklin's two consecutive 25-year-to-life sentences remain valid , even though section 3051, subdivision (b)(3) has altered his parole eligibility date by ope

2026Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842–843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th

2025DISCUSSION The United States Supreme Court has recognized juvenile offenders are generally less culpable than adult offenders and, except in the rarest of cases, the federal Constitution requires states to afford juvenile offenders a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 75 .) To 3 that end, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 3051, which requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a parole hearing no later than the 25th year of a youthful offender’s incarceration, regardless o

2026Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842–843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th

2026So we don’t look at whether or not she is actually paroled; we look at whether or not she actually has a parole hearing date, and she actually does have a parole hearing date next year.” The court observed that, “in Franklin, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life, and the California Supreme Court held that because Section 3051 entitles Franklin to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, his sentence, quote, ‘is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent,’ thus gives no rise to any, quote, ‘Miller[6] claim.’” “Under the Heard analysis, what Heard address

2026Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842–843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th

2025Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842–843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th

2026J. a parole violation (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1193 ; see id. at p. 1194).7 We also have clarified that the requirement of “ ‘strict causation’ . . . is applicable in cases involving the possibility of duplicative credit that might create a windfall for the defendant.” (Marquez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 23 .) Thus, in Marquez, we concluded that a defendant serving a sentence should receive credit for time in custody that, at the time it was served, owed both to a sentence imposed in one matter and to a custodial hold arising out of a different case filed in another county, in a circumsta

2018(Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1194 .) Both Bruner and Atiles considered the dual-credit issue in the context of a defendant’s parole violation: “how section 2900.5 [is] applied when a defendant sentenced to a new criminal term seeks credit for presentence custody attributable to a parole revocation caused in part, but not exclusively, by the conduct that led to the new sentence.” (Bruner, at pp. 1182-1183.) In Atiles, the court held that a trial court “is not required to eliminate all other possible bases for the defendant’s presentence incarceration” before granting section 2900.5 credits.

1975It must be conducted “at or reasonably near” the place of arrest or the alleged parole violation, and, as we have seen, “as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” The ultimate function of the hearing officer at this initial stage is “to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions.” Determination of that issue adverse to the parolee warrants his continued detention and return to the state correctional institution pe

1975It must be conducted “at or reasonably near” the place of arrest or the alleged parole violation, and, as we have seen, “as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” The ultimate function of the hearing officer at this initial stage is “to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions.” Determination of that issue adverse to the parolee warrants his continued detention and return to the state correctional institution pe

2026(See Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 .) At stake here, by contrast, is when Thai is entitled to a parole hearing.

2025(See Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 .) At stake here, by contrast, is when Thai is entitled to a parole hearing.

2026Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842–843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th

2025Section 3051, subdivision (a) “provides that, at a time designated in the statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing ‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 842–843.) The timing of the “initial youth offender parole hearing” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(C)) 4 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 . 5 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ; see People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 . 4 under th

2022(Id. at pp. 645−646.) Relying primarily on Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1 , in which the United States Supreme Court addressed a similar contention, the Court in DeLeon concluded the fact that the parole violation could be used as an aggravating circumstance in future criminal proceedings did not “constitute a disadvantageous collateral consequence.” (DeLeon, at p. 646.) It reasoned the potential would arise only if DeLeon committed a new crime and “[e]ven then, [the prior] parole violation [would be] just one of many factors a court may consider in deciding whether to grant probation, or

2020(Spencer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 3 ; DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 644 .) We rely on parole-revocation cases in analyzing mandatory supervision issues because a split sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h) that imposes a commitment to county jail followed by mandatory supervision is “ ‘akin to a state prison commitment.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 763 , quoting People v. Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422 ; see People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 688 (Buell) [relying on parole revocation cases].) 3 Relying on Spencer, our Supreme Court in

2021DISCUSSION The Attorney General contends the superior court erred in three ways when it granted Freeman habeas corpus relief: (1) “the court granted relief on an unraised claim in contravention of habeas jurisprudence;” (2) “even if the superior court could consider an unraised claim, the court violated In re Shaputis II (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 220-221 (Shaputis II) by applying the wrong standard of judicial review and misconstruing the Board’s core function to assess inmates’ current dangerousness;” and (3) even assuming the superior court properly concluded that Freeman should be given a new

2013In that case, the state Supreme Court explained “that a decision granting habeas corpus relief in these circumstances generally should direct the Board to conduct a new parole-suitability hearing in accordance with due process of law and consistent with the decision of the court, and should not place improper limitations on the type of evidence the Board is statutorily obligated to consider.” (In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238, 244 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 291 , 234 P.3d 541 ].) The current case involves a different type of determination than a parole hearing, which is held periodically to determin

2016The court rejected this argument, explaining that under section 667.5, subdivision (g), a prior prison term is only considered continuous where a defendant has violated his or her parole and is sent back to prison solely for the parole violation. ( In re Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 270-271, 188 Cal.Rptr. 447 , 655 P.2d 1282 .) Under such circumstances, the defendant is still serving time for the prior offense, and the defendant's sentence cannot be enhanced based on the prior offense. ( Ibid. ) However, if a defendant is sentenced concurrently for a new offense and for a parole violation, t

2016The court rejected this argument, explaining that under section 667.5, subdivision (g), a prior prison term is only considered continuous where a defendant has violated his or her parole and is sent back to prison solely for the parole violation. ( In re Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 270-271, 188 Cal.Rptr. 447 , 655 P.2d 1282 .) Under such circumstances, the defendant is still serving time for the prior offense, and the defendant's sentence cannot be enhanced based on the prior offense. ( Ibid. ) However, if a defendant is sentenced concurrently for a new offense and for a parole violation, t

2017(Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1096 ) Nevertheless, as a result of the settlement and stipulated judgment described in Butler, which requires that the base and adjusted base terms be set prior to the parole hearing so they may be considered by the Board at the time it determines suitability for release, the base term now serves much the same three purposes intended by the Rodriguez court.

2009The commitment offense will justify a finding of unsuitability only if it is particularly egregious by these standards. [The First District concluded that t]he Board erred by failing to conduct such a comparative analysis before finding Dannenberg unsuitable.” (Dan nenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1076 .) It ordered a new parole hearing at which such a comparison would be made.

1976(See 9 Cal.3d at p. 347, fn. 1.) Moreover, even if the language of Underwood could be construed to raise doubts as to the continued validity of the entire line of decisions attacked by defendant, such doubts should properly have been put to rest by this court’s subsequent decision in In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ], In rejecting a parolee’s contention that he enjoyed a constitutional right to release on bail after being detained for an alleged parole violation, we carefully reviewed the language of article I, section 12 (then art.

1976(See 9 Cal.3d at p. 347, fn. 1.) Moreover, even if the language of Underwood could be construed to raise doubts as to the continued validity of the entire line of decisions attacked by defendant, such doubts should properly have been put to rest by this court’s subsequent decision in In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ], In rejecting a parolee’s contention that he enjoyed a constitutional right to release on bail after being detained for an alleged parole violation, we carefully reviewed the language of article I, section 12 (then art.

2020The appellate court held that allowing the petitioner the credits he sought under the newly enacted statutes “would permit the Legislature to amend the provisions of Proposition 7 by reducing the amount of time a second degree murderer must serve before being eligible for a parole hearing without submitting that matter to the voters.” (Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 446 .) The court specifically noted that in passing Proposition 7, the electorate intended that a person sentenced to 15 years to life would have to serve a minimum of 10 years before becoming eligible for parole. ( Oluwa, supr

2020The appellate court held that allowing the petitioner the credits he sought under the newly enacted statutes “would permit the Legislature to amend the provisions of Proposition 7 by reducing the amount of time a second degree murderer must serve before being eligible for a parole hearing without submitting that matter to the voters.” (Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 446 .) The court specifically noted that in passing Proposition 7, the electorate intended that a person sentenced to 15 years to life would have to serve a minimum of 10 years before becoming eligible for parole. ( Oluwa, supr

2017(Cook, supra, G050907.) But we were compelled by Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, 577 U.S._[ 136 S.Ct. 718 ], to conclude that Penal Code section 3051 cured the constitutional error in sentencing by giving Petitioner the right to a parole hearing after serving 25 years of his sentence.

2016Based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. __ [ 136 S.Ct. 718 ] (Montgomery), which was decided while this appeal was pending, we conclude that Penal Code section 3051,1 which will provide defendant a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, remedies any Miller violation.

2017There, the plaintiff was arrested on outstanding bench warrants for two minor offenses, one based on a theft by someone posing as him, and upon a subsequent court appearance he was ordered released. ( Id . at pp. 950-951, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839 .) Due to a computer error, however, he remained in Los Angeles County jail on a parole violation hold order meant for someone else. ( Id . at pp. 951-953, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839 .) Kafkaesque is an overused term, but it fairly describes plaintiff Shoyoye's 16-day incarceration. 25 After the mistake *380 was finally discovered *796 and he was released, plaint

2017There, the plaintiff was arrested on outstanding bench warrants for two minor offenses, one based on a theft by someone posing as him, and upon a subsequent court appearance he was ordered released. ( Id . at pp. 950-951, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839 .) Due to a computer error, however, he remained in Los Angeles County jail on a parole violation hold order meant for someone else. ( Id . at pp. 951-953, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839 .) Kafkaesque is an overused term, but it fairly describes plaintiff Shoyoye's 16-day incarceration. 25 After the mistake *380 was finally discovered *796 and he was released, plaint

2026We review a court’s decision not to dismiss a prior strike conviction under section 1385 for an abuse of discretion. (§ 1385, subd. (a); Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374 .) Here, the court cited to controlling authority, the nature and circumstance of defendant’s crimes of conviction, as well as a victim’s statement at a parole hearing and declined to exercise its discretion to strike either of defendant’s prior strike convictions.

2022This criminal record demonstrates defendant “had been taught, through the application of formal sanction, that [such] criminal conduct was unacceptable—but had failed or refused to learn his lesson,” making him “ ‘an exemplar of the ‘revolving door’ career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed.’ ” ( Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 378-379; People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 .) 6 Defendant further contends his substance abuse problem should be a mitigating factor.