parole violation in New Jersey

2007In considering the procedural rights that were constitutionally mandated in parole revocation matters in Morrissey , the Court held that upon threat of parole revocation, the federal due process clause required that a parolee be given at least "an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee's behavior." 408 U.S. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. at 2602 , 33 L.Ed. 2d at 496 .

2007In considering the procedural rights that were constitutionally mandated in parole revocation matters in Morrissey , the Court held that upon threat of parole revocation, the federal due process clause required that a parolee be given at least "an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee's behavior." 408 U.S. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. at 2602 , 33 L.Ed. 2d at 496 .

2022See State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 , 272 (2021) (requiring an “explanation for the overall fairness of a sentence”); State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70-74 (2014) (calling for “a qualitative analysis of the relevant sentencing factors on the record”); N.J.S.A. 6 By the time of the hearing, juvenile offenders will be 35 to 38 years old.

2022See State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 , 272 (2021) (requiring an “explanation for the overall fairness of a sentence”); State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70-74 (2014) (calling for “a qualitative analysis of the relevant sentencing factors on the record”); N.J.S.A. 6 By the time of the hearing, juvenile offenders will be 35 to 38 years old.

2020Ibid.

2014Consequently, confinement pursuant to the revocation of parole, even if revocation resulted from commission of a new offense, is time served "only against the original sentence" because imprisonment was "attributable only to the parole violation." Id. at 456 .

1998While the Parole Board did not disregard recidivism as the criterion of the parole-fitness standard, the Board’s several decisions indicate that it applied a parole standard that concentrated on whether Trantino had made sufficient progress toward “reintegration into society,” was “fully rehabilitated,” had realized “his real rehabilitative potential,” had reached his “true and full rehabilitative potential,” and had achieved “real and not superficial rehabilitation” and “complete[ ] and totalf ] rehabilitation].” The Board also found a “substantial likelihood” that Trantino would “commit a cr

1998While the Parole Board did not disregard recidivism as the criterion of the parole-fitness standard, the Board’s several decisions indicate that it applied a parole standard that concentrated on whether Trantino had made sufficient progress toward “reintegration into society,” was “fully rehabilitated,” had realized “his real rehabilitative potential,” had reached his “true and full rehabilitative potential,” and had achieved “real and not superficial rehabilitation” and “complete[ ] and totalf ] rehabilitation].” The Board also found a “substantial likelihood” that Trantino would “commit a cr

1984The first such holding is that a prosecutor, the Attorney General, or any other administrator of a criminal justice agency who has properly received notice of a parole hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45(b)(5) and who has participated in the hearing by performing an informational role for the benefit of the Parole Board, see In re Trantino, 89 N.J. 347, 375-76 (1982), "has standing to appeal * * * release decisions." 192 N.J.

1984The first such holding is that a prosecutor, the Attorney General, or any other administrator of a criminal justice agency who has properly received notice of a parole hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4—123.45(b)(5) and who has participated in the hearing by performing an informational role for the benefit of the Parole Board, see In re Trantino, 89 N.J. 347, 375-76 (1982), “has standing to appeal * * * release decisions.” 192 N.J.Super. at 90 .

2026"A violation of a PSL condition may be prosecuted as a third-degree crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(d), or treated as a parole violation, N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 6.4(b)." K.G. v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 458 N.J.

2026The Court concluded it was a question of fact whether the accused did, because of such prolonged oppression and the prospect of its continuance, experience a sudden episode of emotional distress which overwhelmed her reason, and whether, if she did, she killed because of it and before there had passed time reasonably sufficient for her emotions to yield to reason. [Id. at 211.] In Erazo, 126 N.J. at 117-20, the defendant fatally stabbed his wife after she threatened to report him for a parole violation.

2025We concluded, "the mere filing of the parole warrant . . . did not trigger [the parolee]'s right to a revocation hearing," reasoning "a parolee's right to such a hearing accrues only after the parole violation warrant is executed and the parolee is taken into custody under the warrant." Id. at 7, 9 .

2025Moreover, we noted, the parolee "never asked for an immediate parole revocation hearing while in the custody" of the other jurisdiction, and he "c[ould ]not be permitted to 'sleep on his administrative remedies . . . and then claim prejudice by reason of the passage of time.'" Id. at 8 (quoting Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669, 678 (4th Cir. 1975)).

2025But the court also stated that “[t]he critical inquiry is whether the statute realistically produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment.” Ibid. (quoting Loftwich v. Fauver, 284 N.J.

2025Moreover, we noted, the parolee "never asked for an immediate parole revocation hearing while in the custody" of the other jurisdiction, and he "c[ould ]not be permitted to 'sleep on his administrative remedies . . . and then claim prejudice by reason of the passage of time.'" Id. at 8 (quoting Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669, 678 (4th Cir. 1975)).

2024State v. Joe, 228 N.J. 125, 135 (2017).

2024State Parole Bd., in which we held applying the 1997 Parole Act amendment—which deleted the new information mandate—to the parole hearing of an inmate whose offense occurred prior to 1997 "did not violate the ex post facto clause," because the change in the law was simply "a procedural modification that does not constitute a substantive change in the parole release criteria." 331 N.J.

2021We agree with the State that in accordance with State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 151 (2011), the judge has the discretion to impose a sentence within our sentencing guidelines and is not bound by the State's recommendation.

2020State v. Scales, 231 N.J.

2020See State v. Young, 379 N.J.

2020See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(b); see also State v. Pennington, 154 N.J. 344, 360 (1998) (recognizing that "[a]lthough the decision whether to impose a parole bar on a life sentence is discretionary, once the court decides to impose a parole bar on an extended term of life, that bar must be twenty-five years").

2019We are convinced the Parole Board's findings are supported by "'sufficient credible evidence present in the record' considering 'the proofs as a whole,'" In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999) (quoting Close, 44 N.J. at 599 ), and Weaver otherwise fails to sustain his "burden of showing" the Parole's Board's decision is "arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious," McGowan, 347 N.J.