parole violation in Illinois

2011Fletcher, 179 Ill. 2d at 237 -38 (citing Morales, 514 U.S. at 511-13 ).

2011Fletcher, 179 Ill. 2d at 237 -38 (citing Morales, 514 U.S. at 511-13 ).

1975Given these factors, due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” 408 U.S. 471, 485 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 496 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602 .

1975Given these factors, due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” 408 U.S. 471, 485 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 496 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602 .

1981The constitutional right to a speedy trial does not depend upon such technicalities.” ( 27 Ill. 2d 269, 271 , 189 N.E.2d 309, 310 .) The court did not, however, base its decision upon this rationale, but held that “[e]ven if the [period defendant was incarcerated for the parole violation] is excluded from consideration, he was still held by the authorities of Coles County, without a trial, for a period just short of five months.” ( 27 Ill. 2d 269, 262-73 , 189 N.E.2d 309, 311 .) Patheal was followed in People v. Burchfield (1978), 62 Ill.

1981App. 3d 754 , 379 N.E.2d 375 , which held that where a defendant is in custody for a parole violation based upon the charge for which he is later to be tried, he is within the jurisdiction of the court and must be brought to trial within the 120-day period.

1993For example, a court may not order a sentence "to run consecutive with any now pending sentence or any such further sentence received by virtue of a parole violation.” People v. George (1979), 75 Ill.

1986App. 3d 140 , 393 N.E.2d 1182 , where the court imposed a sentence of 364 days “to run consecutive with any now pending sentence or any such further sentence received by virtue of a parole violation.” The State in George conceded that the sentence was improper under People v. Walton (1969), 118 Ill.

1986App. 3d 140 , 393 N.E.2d 1182 , where the court imposed a sentence of 364 days “to run consecutive with any now pending sentence or any such further sentence received by virtue of a parole violation.” The State in George conceded that the sentence was improper under People v. Walton (1969), 118 Ill.

1986App.3d 140 , 393 N.E.2d 1182 , where the court imposed a sentence of 364 days "to run consecutive with any now pending sentence or any such further sentence received by virtue of a parole violation." The State in George conceded that the sentence was improper under People v. Walton (1969), 118 Ill.

2024The court also found it “very important” that defendant was “eligible for parole almost immediately, because defendant had served approximately 20 years, and accordingly, he had “the opportunity to apply for a parole hearing” at which “the parole board will be able to ascertain his rehabilitation.” ¶ 96 Defense counsel moved to reconsider the sentence, arguing that because the sentence was “over 41 years it’d be our position that *** this is a life sentence in violation of Buffer.” ¶ 97 The court responded, “Respectfully I don’t believe *** it’s de facto life anymore.” The court believed that

2022Defendant argues that he “has not sat idle during his incarceration.” In essence, defendant is arguing for a parole hearing where he can present evidence of his accomplishments subsequent to sentencing. ¶ 48 As our supreme court similarly observed in Dorsey, defendant offers “nothing to explain why” he “wait[ed] to raise” the proportionate penalties clause “for the first time before this court.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 .

2007This case is easily distinguished from People v. Hillsman, 329 Ill.

2007This case is easily distinguished from People v. Hillsman, 329 Ill.

2002People v. Patheal, 27 Ill. 2d 269, 271-73 , 189 N.E.2d 309, 310-11 (1963); People v. Manna, 96 Ill.

2002People v. Patheal , 27 Ill. 2d 269, 271-73 , 189 N.E.2d 309, 310-11 (1963); People v. Manna , 96 Ill.

1996Abner v. Kinney, 30 Ill. 2d 201 (1964) (mandamus used to compel Board to provide parole-eligible inmate with a parole hearing).

1996Abner v. Kinney, 30 Ill. 2d 201 (1964) (mandamus used to compel Board to provide parole-eligible inmate with a parole hearing).

1991App. 3d 604 , 464 N.E.2d 849 ) because defendant was incarcerated for a parole violation based on the activity which formed the basis for the criminal charges pending against him in this case.

1987(People v. Lykes (1984), 124 Ill.

1986Based on Moody v. Daggett (1976), 429 U.S. 78 , 50 L.

1986Based on Moody v. Daggett (1976), 429 U.S. 78 , 50 L.

1981Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88 .) Defendant does not actually dispute this, but simply reiterates the appellate court’s suggestion that since the parole violation and criminal charges are “identical” prompt dismissal of the latter “would most likely have had a similar effect on the parole violation proceedings.” It is probable that in cases in which the criminal charges and the parole-violation charges are identical, a hearing on either which resulted in a finding of no probable cause could dispose of both.

1980Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill.2d 88 , 368 N.E.2d 903 .) But this argument is without merit.

2025In response, the State contends there was no violation of the Code’s timing provision because section 110-6.1(c)(1) “does not contemplate the situation - 10 - 2025 IL App (2d) 250370 here where defendant was indicted on these current charges while in the custody of IDOC on a parole violation in a separate case.” See id. § 110-6.1(c)(1).

2025In response, the State contends there was no violation of the Code’s timing provision because section 110-6.1(c)(1) “does not contemplate the situation - 10 - 2025 IL App (2d) 250370 here where defendant was indicted on these current charges while in the custody of IDOC on a parole violation in a separate case.” See id. § 110-6.1(c)(1).

2025Further, the State analogized the timing requirement to file a petition to detain to the 48-hour requirement for the trial court to hold a detention hearing and noted that in People v. Cooper, 2025 IL 130946 , ¶¶ 40- 41, the supreme court held that the 48-hour hearing requirement was directory and thus automatic dismissal was not the appropriate consequence for failure to abide by the rule.

2023The court noted that, even aside from the new law, the Parole -9- 2023 IL App (2d) 220324 Review Board reviews thousands of matters yearly (id. ¶ 48) and that “preparing for the parole hearing is resource intensive” (id. ¶ 49). ¶ 24 We agree with the reasoning of all the foregoing cases.

2021The Court stated, “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 .

2021Nor has this question: If, in fact, defendant is eligible for a parole hearing after 20 years, does that parole hearing constitute a meaningful opportunity for release and thus comply with Miller, 567 U.S. 460 , even if the sentence is otherwise a de facto life sentence?

2021Kane, 31 Ill.

2017In Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 444-45 , four minors were removed from their mother’s care after it was determined that the mother failed to provide one of the minors with necessary medical care and the other minors were found wearing clothes that smelled of urine and drinking curdled milk.