parole violation in Wisconsin

2010Id. ¶ 216 Rohl was convicted of the California offenses on September 15, 1987, and sentenced on January 28, 1988.

2007Id. ¶ 15 After his release from the California prison system in April 1989, Rohl was returned to Wisconsin on the parole violation warrant and his parole was revoked.

2007See Hopper v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 702 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an adjudicated parole violator warrant is not a "complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged" within the meaning of Article III); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that when a prisoner was released on parole and transferred to federal custody to serve an outstanding sentence, he was no longer covered by the IAD); Dobson, 585 F.2d at 59 (holding that a parole violator held in custody pursuant only to a parole violation does not come within the provisions of the IAD

2007Pharm argues that Snyder v. Sumner, 960 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1992), supports his assertion that the IAD applied to him after he was placed on parole by Nevada and transported to Wisconsin to begin his Wisconsin incarceration.

2007See Hopper v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 702 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an adjudicated parole violator warrant is not a "complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged" within the meaning of Article III); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that when a prisoner was released on parole and transferred to federal custody to serve an outstanding sentence, he was no longer covered by the IAD); Dobson, 585 F.2d at 59 (holding that a parole violator held in custody pursuant only to a parole violation does not come within the provisions of the IAD

2007See Hopper v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 702 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an adjudicated parole violator warrant is not a "complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged" within the meaning of Article III); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that when a prisoner was released on parole and transferred to federal custody to serve an outstanding sentence, he was no longer covered by the IAD); Dobson, 585 F.2d at 59 (holding that a parole violator held in custody pursuant only to a parole violation does not come within the provisions of the IAD

1982Moody v. Daggett , 429 U.S. 78 (1976).

1982In essence, the Moody Court held there is no loss of liberty in connection with revocation proceedings for the prisoner who is detained on an unrelated charge until the parole violation warrant is executed and the violator is taken into "custody under that warrant." 429 U.S. at 87 .

1980Id. at 58 , 261 N.W.2d at 137 ; sec. 57.06(3), Stats.

1980Id. at 58 , 261 N.W.2d at 137 ; sec. 57.06(3), Stats.

1980State v. Goulette, 65 Wis.2d 207, 216 , 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974).

1978In Goulette this court stated that “. . . a hearing with minimal due process or fair play standards should be provided at a parole hearing . . .” 65 Wis.2d at 216 .

2007In Ashford, 177 Wis. 2d at 38 , the court of appeals held that a person serving consecutive sentences was subject to parole revocation for both sentences if he committed a parole violation prior to discharge of the first sentence.

2007This court's holding in Ashford, 177 Wis. 2d at 38 , indicates that, prior to TIS, a person serving consecutive sentences was subject to parole revocation for both sentences if he committed a parole violation. ¶ 49.

2004See, e.g., State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8 , 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) (explaining that the courts view rehabilitation as information "more properly considered by the parole system"); State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 478 , 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975) (stating that whether a "defendant's change in attitude and progress or rehabilitation [affects his sentence], favorable consideration for such factors lies solely within the province of the department of health & social services"); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105-06 , 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970) (noting that under indeterminate sentencing, "[t]he place of

2004See, e.g., State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8 , 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) (explaining that the courts view rehabilitation as information "more properly considered by the parole system"); State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 478 , 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975) (stating that whether a "defendant's change in attitude and progress or rehabilitation [affects his sentence], favorable consideration for such factors lies solely within the province of the department of health & social services"); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105-06 , 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970) (noting that under indeterminate sentencing, "[t]he place of

2004A person serving a bifurcated sentence imposed under sub. (1) is not eligible for release on parole. 7 Testifying before the Assembly Criminal Justice & Corrections Committee on May 8, 1997, Representative Tom Sykora said, "When criminals are sentenced [under TIS] to 20 years they will serve 20 years — not a minute less ...." State v. Champion, 2002 WI App 267, ¶ 16 , 258 Wis. 2d 781 , 654 N.W.2d 242 (citing Truth-in-Sentencing: Testimony on A.B. 351 before the Assembly Criminal Justice & Corrections Comm., 1997 Reg. *66 Sess., May 8, 1997 (testimony of Representatives Scott Walker and Tom Syk

2004A person serving a bifurcated sentence imposed under sub. (1) is not eligible for release on parole. 7 Testifying before the Assembly Criminal Justice & Corrections Committee on May 8, 1997, Representative Tom Sykora said, "When criminals are sentenced [under TIS] to 20 years they will serve 20 years — not a minute less ...." State v. Champion, 2002 WI App 267, ¶ 16 , 258 Wis. 2d 781 , 654 N.W.2d 242 (citing Truth-in-Sentencing: Testimony on A.B. 351 before the Assembly Criminal Justice & Corrections Comm., 1997 Reg. *66 Sess., May 8, 1997 (testimony of Representatives Scott Walker and Tom Syk

2004See, e.g., State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8 , 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) (explaining that the courts view rehabilitation as information "more properly considered by the parole system"); State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 478 , 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975) (stating that whether a "defendant's change in attitude and progress or rehabilitation [affects his sentence], favorable consideration for such factors lies solely within the province of the department of health & social services"); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105-06 , 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970) (noting that under indeterminate sentencing, "[t]he place of

2004See, e.g., State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8 , 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) (explaining that the courts view rehabilitation as information "more properly considered by the parole system"); State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 478 , 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975) (stating that whether a "defendant's change in attitude and progress or rehabilitation [affects his sentence], favorable consideration for such factors lies solely within the province of the department of health & social services"); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105-06 , 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970) (noting that under indeterminate sentencing, "[t]he place of

2004See, e.g., State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8 , 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) (explaining that the courts view rehabilitation as information "more properly considered by the parole system"); State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 478 , 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975) (stating that whether a "defendant's change in attitude and progress or rehabilitation [affects his sentence], favorable consideration for such factors lies solely within the province of the department of health & social services"); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105-06 , 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970) (noting that under indeterminate sentencing, "[t]he place of

2004See, e.g., State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8 , 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) (explaining that the courts view rehabilitation as information "more properly considered by the parole system"); State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 478 , 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975) (stating that whether a "defendant's change in attitude and progress or rehabilitation [affects his sentence], favorable consideration for such factors lies solely within the province of the department of health & social services"); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105-06 , 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970) (noting that under indeterminate sentencing, "[t]he place of

1998We disagree with Schmidt that State v. Jones, 98 Wis. 2d 679 , 298 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1980), supports her position.

1998We disagree with Schmidt that State v. Jones, 98 Wis. 2d 679 , 298 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1980), supports her position.

1996Id. at 265 , 262 N.W. at 628 .

1996Id. at 265 , 262 N.W. at 628 .

1980Beougher v. Lotter, 91 Wis.2d 321 , 283 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1979), subsequently held that if the fact *63 of a parole violation is uncontested, a hearing is not statutorily required on the issue in order to toll the running of the sentence on parole.

1980Beougher v. Lotter, 91 Wis.2d 321 , 283 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1979), subsequently held that if the fact *63 of a parole violation is uncontested, a hearing is not statutorily required on the issue in order to toll the running of the sentence on parole.

1980He relies upon Locklear v. State, 87 Wis.2d 392 , 274 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1978).

1980He relies upon Locklear v. State, 87 Wis.2d 392 , 274 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1978).

1979State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis.2d 147 , 124 N.W. 2d 9 (1963).

1979State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis.2d 147 , 124 N.W. 2d 9 (1963).

1978Hernandez v. McConahey, 42 Wis.2d 468, 471 , 167 N.W.2d 412 (1969) and cases cited therein.

1978Hernandez v. McConahey, 42 Wis.2d 468, 471 , 167 N.W.2d 412 (1969) and cases cited therein.

1974Finally in Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U. S. 778 , 93 Sup. Ct. 1756, 36 L.

1974Finally in Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U. S. 778 , 93 Sup. Ct. 1756, 36 L.