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49 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2024 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Elliottgreen2 sentences2017Thus, “any compulsion [defendant] might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.” Minnesota, 465 US at 433 ; see also Elliott, 494 Mich at 308 - 316 (finding a parolee detained on a parole violation was not in custody for purposes of Miranda). 2017Thus, “any compulsion [defendant] might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.” Minnesota, 465 US at 433 ; see also Elliott, 494 Mich at 308 - 316 (finding a parolee detained on a parole violation was not in custody for purposes of Miranda). | 5 | 5 |
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2021The question here is whether the arrestee is entitled to this credit when he or she had been on parole at the time of the arrest but the parole officials have not yet sought to detain on the basis that the 7 People v Allen, 505 Mich 1045 , 1045 (2020). 8 See People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 224 ; 888 NW2d 309 (2016) (“[D]efendant’s sentence-credit argument is unpreserved because he did not request credit for time served at sentencing or object to the trial court order that denied him sentence credit.”). 9 People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). 10 See People v Kowalski, 4 2021The question here is whether the arrestee is entitled to this credit when he or she had been on parole at the time of the arrest but the parole officials have not yet sought to detain on the basis that the 7 People v Allen, 505 Mich 1045 , 1045 (2020). 8 See People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 224 ; 888 NW2d 309 (2016) (“[D]efendant’s sentence-credit argument is unpreserved because he did not request credit for time served at sentencing or object to the trial court order that denied him sentence credit.”). 9 People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). 10 See People v Kowalski, 4 | 2 | 3 |
People v. Prieskorngreen2 sentences2021And once the individual is not being held because he or she was denied or unable to furnish bond in that proceeding, he or she is no longer entitled to jail credit under MCL 769.11b toward any sentence imposed in the new proceeding. 14 MCL 769.11b. 15 See also Prieskorn, 424 Mich at 341 (clarifying that the Legislature has limited a defendant’s entitlement to credit to time served “for the offense of which he is convicted” and not for any other conviction). 7 Entitlement to jail credit thus ends when detention for the parole violation begins. 2021And once the individual is not being held because he or she was denied or unable to furnish bond in that proceeding, he or she is no longer entitled to jail credit under MCL 769.11b toward any sentence imposed in the new proceeding. 14 MCL 769.11b. 15 See also Prieskorn, 424 Mich at 341 (clarifying that the Legislature has limited a defendant’s entitlement to credit to time served “for the offense of which he is convicted” and not for any other conviction). 7 Entitlement to jail credit thus ends when detention for the parole violation begins. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2021In any event, because the plain language of the WICA clearly provides no compensation for time served under a consecutive sentence for another conviction, I need not determine whether the record in this case also demonstrates that independent reasons existed to support plaintiff’s parole violation. 41 See People v Harris, 495 Mich 120, 131 ; 845 NW2d 477 (2014) (“ ‘Any’ is defined as: 1. one, a, an, or some; one or more without specification or identification. 2. whatever or whichever it may be. 3. in whatever quantity or number, great or small; some. 4. every; all[.]”) (citation omitted). 2021In any event, because the plain language of the WICA clearly provides no compensation for time served under a consecutive sentence for another conviction, I need not determine whether the record in this case also demonstrates that independent reasons existed to support plaintiff’s parole violation. 41 See People v Harris, 495 Mich 120, 131 ; 845 NW2d 477 (2014) (“ ‘Any’ is defined as: 1. one, a, an, or some; one or more without specification or identification. 2. whatever or whichever it may be. 3. in whatever quantity or number, great or small; some. 4. every; all[.]”) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Maryland v. Shatzergreen2 sentences2015See Shatzer, 559 US at 112 - 114; Elliott, 494 Mich at 308-316 (holding that a parolee detained on a parole violation was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda). 2013Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that “imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda.” Howes v Fields, 565 US __ , __; 132 S Ct 1181, 1190 ; 182 L Ed 2d 17 (2012); see also Shatzer, 559 US at 112-113 . | 2 | 2 |
Douglas v. Californiagreen2 sentences1998See Douglas v California, 372 US 353, 358 ; 83 S Ct 814 ; 9 L Ed 2d 811 (1963). 1998See Douglas v California, 372 US 353, 358 ; 83 S Ct 814 ; 9 L Ed 2d 811 (1963). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Holdergreen2 sentences2009Indeed, the Parole Board is not required to revoke parole even if the evidence supports the parole violation allegation by a preponderance of the evidence. 28 We find no statutory support for Justice MARKMAN’s underlying conclusion that a parole violation alone may change the parole eligibility date previously calculated under MCL 791.234(1) by making it a matter of the Parole Board’s discretion. 29 “An agency such as the DOC has no inherent authority, and the limitations of its power and authority ‘must be measured by the statutory enactments from which it is created.’ ” People v Holder, 483 2009Indeed, the Parole Board is not required to revoke parole even if the evidence supports the parole violation allegation by a preponderance of the evidence. 28 We find no statutory support for Justice MARKMAN’s underlying conclusion that a parole violation alone may change the parole eligibility date previously calculated under MCL 791.234(1) by making it a matter of the Parole Board’s discretion. 29 “An agency such as the DOC has no inherent authority, and the limitations of its power and authority ‘must be measured by the statutory enactments from which it is created.’ ” People v Holder, 483 | 1 | 2 |
Ward v. PAROLE BOARD, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONSgreen2 sentences1986In Ward v Parole Board, Dep’t of Corrections, 35 Mich App 456 ; 192 NW2d 537 (1971), lv den 386 Mich 767 (1971), the concept of "availability” in connection with the unamended version of § 791.240a(1) was directly addressed for the first time. 1986In Ward v Parole Board, Dep’t of Corrections, 35 Mich App 456 ; 192 NW2d 537 (1971), lv den 386 Mich 767 (1971), the concept of "availability” in connection with the unamended version of § 791.240a(1) was directly addressed for the first time. | 1 | 2 |
Michigan Public Service Co. v. City of Cheboygangreen2 sentences2024The attempted robbery unarmed statute is disjunctive; the offense can be accomplished either by force and violence, or by assaulting, or putting in fear”), and Mich Pub Serv Co v Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309, 341 ; 37 NW2d 116 (1949) (“ ‘And’ is a conjunctive, used to denote a joinder, a union. ‘Or’ is the opposite, a disjunctive, used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.”), with People v Allen, 507 Mich 597 , 607 n 16; 968 NW2d 532 (2021) (holding that the “and” in MCL 791.239 is disjunctive because “the statute specifically states that the warrantless arrest and detention is perm 2024The attempted robbery unarmed statute is disjunctive; the offense can be accomplished either by force and violence, or by assaulting, or putting in fear”), and Mich Pub Serv Co v Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309, 341 ; 37 NW2d 116 (1949) (“ ‘And’ is a conjunctive, used to denote a joinder, a union. ‘Or’ is the opposite, a disjunctive, used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.”), with People v Allen, 507 Mich 597 , 607 n 16; 968 NW2d 532 (2021) (holding that the “and” in MCL 791.239 is disjunctive because “the statute specifically states that the warrantless arrest and detention is perm | 1 | 1 |
Elliott Grocer Co. v. Field's Pure Food Market, Inc.green2 sentences2024The attempted robbery unarmed statute is disjunctive; the offense can be accomplished either by force and violence, or by assaulting, or putting in fear”), and Mich Pub Serv Co v Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309, 341 ; 37 NW2d 116 (1949) (“ ‘And’ is a conjunctive, used to denote a joinder, a union. ‘Or’ is the opposite, a disjunctive, used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.”), with People v Allen, 507 Mich 597 , 607 n 16; 968 NW2d 532 (2021) (holding that the “and” in MCL 791.239 is disjunctive because “the statute specifically states that the warrantless arrest and detention is perm 2024The attempted robbery unarmed statute is disjunctive; the offense can be accomplished either by force and violence, or by assaulting, or putting in fear”), and Mich Pub Serv Co v Cheboygan, 324 Mich 309, 341 ; 37 NW2d 116 (1949) (“ ‘And’ is a conjunctive, used to denote a joinder, a union. ‘Or’ is the opposite, a disjunctive, used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.”), with People v Allen, 507 Mich 597 , 607 n 16; 968 NW2d 532 (2021) (holding that the “and” in MCL 791.239 is disjunctive because “the statute specifically states that the warrantless arrest and detention is perm | 1 | 1 |
People v. Raisbeckgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., People v Raisbeck, 312 Mich App 759, 765-767 ; 882 NW2d 161 (2015) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to jail credit for racketeering conviction because she was incarcerated on false pretenses convictions during period before racketeering sentencing); People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 688 ; 780 NW2d 321 (2009) (“While defendant characterizes his time spent in the Illinois jail as time awaiting extradition on the Michigan charges, he ignores the fact that he was actually serving time in Illinois because he was convicted of a felony in Illinois and was serving his term o 2023See, e.g., People v Raisbeck, 312 Mich App 759, 765-767 ; 882 NW2d 161 (2015) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to jail credit for racketeering conviction because she was incarcerated on false pretenses convictions during period before racketeering sentencing); People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 688 ; 780 NW2d 321 (2009) (“While defendant characterizes his time spent in the Illinois jail as time awaiting extradition on the Michigan charges, he ignores the fact that he was actually serving time in Illinois because he was convicted of a felony in Illinois and was serving his term o | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scottgreen2 sentences2022As cogently pointed out by the dissenting Justices, “a revocation proceeding often serves the same function as a criminal trial, and the revocation hearing may very well present the only forum in which the State will seek to use evidence of a parole violation, even when that evidence would support an independent criminal charge.” Id. at 370 (Souter, J., dissenting). 2022The dissent further argued that in the parole revocation context, “[t]he deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is . . . implicated as much by a revocation proceeding as by a conventional trial, and the exclusionary rule should be applied accordingly.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nashgreen2 sentences2021See People v Nash, 244 Mich App 93, 99-100 ; 625 NW2d 87 (2000); People v Parkmallory, 328 Mich App 289 , 293-294; 936 NW2d 877 (2019), vacated on other grounds and implicitly aff’d in relevant part 505 Mich 866 (2019). -12- 2021See People v Nash, 244 Mich App 93, 99-100 ; 625 NW2d 87 (2000); People v Parkmallory, 328 Mich App 289 , 293-294; 936 NW2d 877 (2019), vacated on other grounds and implicitly aff’d in relevant part 505 Mich 866 (2019). -12- | 1 | 1 |
| Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complexgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Warda v. CITY COUNCIL OF CITY OF FLUSHINGgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Wadegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Ginivalligreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Howes v. Fields
green
2 sentences2013Thus, our order granting the prosecutor’s application stated as follows: The parties shall address whether, and, in light of Howes v Fields, 565 US _ ; 132 S Ct 1181 ; 182 L Ed 2d 17 (2012), under what custodial circumstances, a parole officer not acting in concert with police is required to provide the warnings prescribed by Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), before questioning an in-custody parolee who, during police questioning, has previously invoked his right to counsel under Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), about an 2013Thus, our order granting the prosecutor’s application stated as follows: The parties shall address whether, and, in light of Howes v Fields, 565 US _ ; 132 S Ct 1181 ; 182 L Ed 2d 17 (2012), under what custodial circumstances, a parole officer not acting in concert with police is required to provide the warnings prescribed by Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), before questioning an in-custody parolee who, during police questioning, has previously invoked his right to counsel under Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), about an | 4 | 2012–2017 |
People v. Ginther
green
2 sentences2019Indeed, defendant Anderson indicated at his circuit court arraignment that he wished to be transferred to prison so that he could address the parole violation. 8 See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -9- on remand to support his claims, remand is not warranted.9 See People v McMillan, 213 Mich App 134, 141-142 ; 539 NW2d 553 (1995). 2019Indeed, defendant Anderson indicated at his circuit court arraignment that he wished to be transferred to prison so that he could address the parole violation. 8 See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -9- on remand to support his claims, remand is not warranted.9 See People v McMillan, 213 Mich App 134, 141-142 ; 539 NW2d 553 (1995). | 3 | 2017–2019 |
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2017Thus, “any compulsion [defendant] might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.” Minnesota, 465 US at 433 ; see also Elliott, 494 Mich at 308 - 316 (finding a parolee detained on a parole violation was not in custody for purposes of Miranda). 2017Thus, “any compulsion [defendant] might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.” Minnesota, 465 US at 433 ; see also Elliott, 494 Mich at 308 - 316 (finding a parolee detained on a parole violation was not in custody for purposes of Miranda). | 3 | 2013–2017 |
People v. Kowalski
green
2 sentences2021The question here is whether the arrestee is entitled to this credit when he or she had been on parole at the time of the arrest but the parole officials have not yet sought to detain on the basis that the 7 People v Allen, 505 Mich 1045 , 1045 (2020). 8 See People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 224 ; 888 NW2d 309 (2016) (“[D]efendant’s sentence-credit argument is unpreserved because he did not request credit for time served at sentencing or object to the trial court order that denied him sentence credit.”). 9 People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). 10 See People v Kowalski, 4 2021The question here is whether the arrestee is entitled to this credit when he or she had been on parole at the time of the arrest but the parole officials have not yet sought to detain on the basis that the 7 People v Allen, 505 Mich 1045 , 1045 (2020). 8 See People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 224 ; 888 NW2d 309 (2016) (“[D]efendant’s sentence-credit argument is unpreserved because he did not request credit for time served at sentencing or object to the trial court order that denied him sentence credit.”). 9 People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). 10 See People v Kowalski, 4 | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Idziak
green
2 sentences2021A parolee who is incarcerated on a parole violation is not incarcerated “ ‘because of being denied or unable to furnish bond . . . .’ ” People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549, 562-563 ; 773 NW2d 616 (2009), quoting MCL 769.11b. 2021A parolee who is incarcerated on a parole violation is not incarcerated “ ‘because of being denied or unable to furnish bond . . . .’ ” People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549, 562-563 ; 773 NW2d 616 (2009), quoting MCL 769.11b. | 2 | 2011–2021 |
People v. Grant
green
2 sentences2021The question here is whether the arrestee is entitled to this credit when he or she had been on parole at the time of the arrest but the parole officials have not yet sought to detain on the basis that the 7 People v Allen, 505 Mich 1045 , 1045 (2020). 8 See People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 224 ; 888 NW2d 309 (2016) (“[D]efendant’s sentence-credit argument is unpreserved because he did not request credit for time served at sentencing or object to the trial court order that denied him sentence credit.”). 9 People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). 10 See People v Kowalski, 4 2021The question here is whether the arrestee is entitled to this credit when he or she had been on parole at the time of the arrest but the parole officials have not yet sought to detain on the basis that the 7 People v Allen, 505 Mich 1045 , 1045 (2020). 8 See People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 224 ; 888 NW2d 309 (2016) (“[D]efendant’s sentence-credit argument is unpreserved because he did not request credit for time served at sentencing or object to the trial court order that denied him sentence credit.”). 9 People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). 10 See People v Kowalski, 4 | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Riley
green
2 sentences2017“Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be predicated on the failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion.” Riley, 468 Mich at 142 . 2017“Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be predicated on the failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion.” Riley, 468 Mich at 142 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013The right to S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), before questioning an in-custody parolee who, during police questioning, has previously invoked his right to counsel under Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), about an offense giving rise to an alleged parole violation, if the parole officer’s testimony concerning the parolee’s responses to such questioning is to be admissible at the trial for that offense. [Elliott, 491 Mich 938 .] 4 The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution both prohibit “compelled” self-incrimination. 2013The right to S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), before questioning an in-custody parolee who, during police questioning, has previously invoked his right to counsel under Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), about an offense giving rise to an alleged parole violation, if the parole officer’s testimony concerning the parolee’s responses to such questioning is to be admissible at the trial for that offense. [Elliott, 491 Mich 938 .] 4 The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution both prohibit “compelled” self-incrimination. | 2 | 2012–2013 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013The right to S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), before questioning an in-custody parolee who, during police questioning, has previously invoked his right to counsel under Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), about an offense giving rise to an alleged parole violation, if the parole officer’s testimony concerning the parolee’s responses to such questioning is to be admissible at the trial for that offense. [Elliott, 491 Mich 938 .] 4 The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution both prohibit “compelled” self-incrimination. 2013Thus, our order granting the prosecutor’s application stated as follows: The parties shall address whether, and, in light of Howes v Fields, 565 US _ ; 132 S Ct 1181 ; 182 L Ed 2d 17 (2012), under what custodial circumstances, a parole officer not acting in concert with police is required to provide the warnings prescribed by Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), before questioning an in-custody parolee who, during police questioning, has previously invoked his right to counsel under Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 ; 101 S Ct 1880 ; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), about an | 2 | 2012–2013 |
Browning v. Michigan Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2009The arrest of a parolee, irrespective of the location of the arrest, coupled with issuance of a parole violation warrant and good faith effort to retake the parolee constitutes constructive availability." Id. [16] Under Justice Markman's interpretation of MCL 791.238(2), one does not know whether the time served in jail is to be considered time served against the parolee's original maximum sentence until the parolee is convicted or acquitted of the new criminal charges. 2009The arrest of a parolee, irrespective of the location of the arrest, coupled with issuance of a parole violation warrant and good faith effort to retake the parolee constitutes constructive availability.” Id. | 2 | 1971–2009 |
Feazel v. Department of Corrections
neutral
2 sentences1998Feazel v Dep’t of Corrections, 31 Mich App 425, 428 ; 188 NW2d 59 (1971). 1998Feazel v Dep’t of Corrections, 31 Mich App 425, 428 ; 188 NW2d 59 (1971). | 2 | 1977–1998 |
People v. Hershey
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 345 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Waclawski
green
2 sentences2023See, e.g., People v Raisbeck, 312 Mich App 759, 765-767 ; 882 NW2d 161 (2015) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to jail credit for racketeering conviction because she was incarcerated on false pretenses convictions during period before racketeering sentencing); People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 688 ; 780 NW2d 321 (2009) (“While defendant characterizes his time spent in the Illinois jail as time awaiting extradition on the Michigan charges, he ignores the fact that he was actually serving time in Illinois because he was convicted of a felony in Illinois and was serving his term o 2023See, e.g., People v Raisbeck, 312 Mich App 759, 765-767 ; 882 NW2d 161 (2015) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to jail credit for racketeering conviction because she was incarcerated on false pretenses convictions during period before racketeering sentencing); People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 688 ; 780 NW2d 321 (2009) (“While defendant characterizes his time spent in the Illinois jail as time awaiting extradition on the Michigan charges, he ignores the fact that he was actually serving time in Illinois because he was convicted of a felony in Illinois and was serving his term o | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re Ellis
green
1 sentence2022The charges included two separate, alcohol-involved offenses—one for trespassing and one for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI)—as well as a parole violation for failure to comply with required drug screenings. -2- be clearly erroneous, a decision must be more than maybe or probably wrong.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33 ; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Stewart
neutral
2 sentences2021In People v Stewart, 203 Mich App 432, 433 ; 513 NW2d 147 (1994), the defendant was on parole at the time he committed an armed robbery. 2021In People v Stewart, 203 Mich App 432, 433 ; 513 NW2d 147 (1994), the defendant was on parole at the time he committed an armed robbery. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Estelle v. Gamble
green
1 sentence2021Rick 7 Because of defendant’s in propria persona status as to his Standard 4 brief and the greater leeway he is therefore permitted, Estelle, 429 US at 106-108 , we have chosen to exercise our discretionary power under MCL 7.216(A)(4) to consider the transcript of the parole hearing for the limited purpose of reviewing this issue in the interests of justice. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. McMillan green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Malach green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Reeves
green
2 sentences2019Further, defendant’s conduct during the November 20, 2016 incident, including grabbing the hand of a CVS employee and attempting to take her cellular telephone while defendant was attempting to steal items from the store, satisfies the elements of assault with intent to commit unarmed robbery2 and attempted larceny from the person,3 both of 2 The elements of assault with intent to commit unarmed robbery are “(1) an assault with force and violence, (2) an intent to rob and steal, and (3) defendant being unarmed.” People v Reeves, 458 Mich 236, 242 ; 580 NW2d 433 (1998) (citation omitted); MCL 7 2019Further, defendant’s conduct during the November 20, 2016 incident, including grabbing the hand of a CVS employee and attempting to take her cellular telephone while defendant was attempting to steal items from the store, satisfies the elements of assault with intent to commit unarmed robbery2 and attempted larceny from the person,3 both of 2 The elements of assault with intent to commit unarmed robbery are “(1) an assault with force and violence, (2) an intent to rob and steal, and (3) defendant being unarmed.” People v Reeves, 458 Mich 236, 242 ; 580 NW2d 433 (1998) (citation omitted); MCL 7 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Fields green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Lockridge green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Diamond green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Sitz v. Department of State Police green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Jackson green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Wayne County Prosecutor v. Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Filip green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Wright green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Sloan green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance v. Bronson Plating Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Jones v. Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Stewart v. Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Koester v. City of Novi green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| COOLSAET v. Mans neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Conway neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| United States v. Jose De Jesus Flores Martinez green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Kelly green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Gilbert v. California green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Drummer Development Corp. v. Township of Avon neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| In Re Evans green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Lane v. Department of Corrections, Parole Board green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.