parole hearing in South Carolina

2023The memo reported Buchanan had "more than demonstrated his rehabilitation and reformation through his positive institutional record and participation in numerous counseling, rehabilitative[,] and religious programs." The memo argued the Board should consider the factors enumerated in Aiken v. Byars. 2 1 At the time of the hearing, the death penalty had been abolished, yet a jury still determined whether to recommend mercy. 2 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014).

2023The memo reported Buchanan had "more than demonstrated his rehabilitation and reformation through his positive institutional record and participation in numerous counseling, rehabilitative[,] and religious programs." The memo argued the Board should consider the factors enumerated in Aiken v. Byars. 2 1 At the time of the hearing, the death penalty had been abolished, yet a jury still determined whether to recommend mercy. 2 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014).

2006Gant, supra; Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.1984); Ortega, supra; see also Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1986) (denying absolute immunity of probation officer for charging appellant and presenting evidence against him at a parole hearing, because those were his duties as a parole officer).

2002Gant, supra; Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.1984); Ortega, supra; see also Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1986) (denying absolute immunity of probation officer for charging appellant and presenting evidence against him at a parole hearing, because those were his duties as a parole officer). *326 If the individual is acting pursuant to a direct comb order, courts are more likely to grant quasi-judicial immunity for that action.

2006Gant, supra; Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.1984); Ortega, supra; see also Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1986) (denying absolute immunity of probation officer for charging appellant and presenting evidence against him at a parole hearing, because those were his duties as a parole officer).

2002Gant, supra; Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.1984); Ortega, supra; see also Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1986) (denying absolute immunity of probation officer for charging appellant and presenting evidence against him at a parole hearing, because those were his duties as a parole officer). *326 If the individual is acting pursuant to a direct comb order, courts are more likely to grant quasi-judicial immunity for that action.

2006Gant, supra; Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.1984); Ortega, supra; see also Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1986) (denying absolute immunity of probation officer for charging appellant and presenting evidence against him at a parole hearing, because those were his duties as a parole officer).

2002Gant, supra; Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.1984); Ortega, supra; see also Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1986) (denying absolute immunity of probation officer for charging appellant and presenting evidence against him at a parole hearing, because those were his duties as a parole officer). *326 If the individual is acting pursuant to a direct comb order, courts are more likely to grant quasi-judicial immunity for that action.

1951In State v. White, 218 S. C. 130, 61 S. E. (2d) 754, 756 , it is stated: “The general principles of the law relating to the revocation of paroles, and hearings thereon, are established by our own decisions, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, and are accurately and admirably stated in the case of State v. Miller, 122 S. C. 468, 115 S. E. 742, 745 , wherein the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Marion, and although this case related to the revocation of a suspended sentence, rather than a suspended sentence accompanied by a parole the rule is practically identical; and we quote the fo

1950The general principles of the law relating to the revocation of paroles, and hearings thereon, are established by our own decisions, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, and are accurately and admirably stated in the case of State v. Miller, 122 S. C. 468, 115 S. E. 742, 745 , wherein the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Marion, and although this case related to the revocation of a suspended sentence, rather than a suspended sentence accompanied by a parole the rule is practically identical; and we quote the following extended and informative excerpt from this opinion: “The nature of

2013The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that because, “a prisoner cannot be paroled without first having a parole hearing ... any retrospective law making parole hearings less accessible would effectively increase the [prisoner’s] sentence and violate the ex post facto clause.” Id.

2009See Hair v. State, 305 S.C. 77, 79 , 406 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1991) (discussing parole eligibility of certain offenses established by the General Assembly's enactments); State v. De La Cruz, 302 S.C. 13, 16 , 393 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1990) (noting that the penalty established for a particular crime is purely a matter of legislative prerogative, and that "[i]f the legislature so chooses, parole may not be made available to those who commit certain offenses").

2009See Hair v. State, 305 S.C. 77, 79 , 406 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1991) (discussing parole eligibility of certain offenses established by the General Assembly’s enactments); State v. De La Cruz, 302 S.C. 13, 16 , 393 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1990) (noting that the penalty established for a particular crime is purely a matter of legislative prerogative, and that “[i]f the legislature so chooses, parole may not be made available to those who commit certain offenses”).

2008The circuit court determined James failed to state a cause of action for relief because inmates have no protected right to parole, only the right to a parole hearing, citing Furtick v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, 352 S.C. 594 , 576 S.E.2d 146 (2003).

2008The circuit court determined James failed to state a cause of action for relief because inmates have no protected right to parole, only the right to a parole hearing, citing Furtick v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, 352 S.C. 594 , 576 S.E.2d 146 (2003).

2008The Court held that minimum due process requirements afford a parolee the right to “an informal hearing structured to assure the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of [the court’s] discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Id. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 .

2008The Court held that minimum due process requirements afford a parolee the right to “an informal hearing structured to assure the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of [the court’s] discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Id. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 .

2002In Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir.1989), a father sued the state for the actions of two social workers who placed his daughters in a home where they were sexually abused.

1980Thus, his custodial status invokes the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

1980Thus, his custodial status invokes the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

1951In State v. White, 218 S. C. 130, 61 S. E. (2d) 754, 756 , it is stated: “The general principles of the law relating to the revocation of paroles, and hearings thereon, are established by our own decisions, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, and are accurately and admirably stated in the case of State v. Miller, 122 S. C. 468, 115 S. E. 742, 745 , wherein the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Marion, and although this case related to the revocation of a suspended sentence, rather than a suspended sentence accompanied by a parole the rule is practically identical; and we quote the fo