parole hearing in Utah

2025In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. 407 U.S. at 533 . ¶90 Strict reliance on the limited considerations described in Barker is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that “these factors have no talismanic qualities.” Id.

2025In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. 407 U.S. at 533 . ¶90 Strict reliance on the limited considerations described in Barker is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that “these factors have no talismanic qualities.” Id.

2025Relying on Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985), the court explained that “[a]n alleged parole violation is not an ‘untried indictment, information or complaint’” under the IAD.

2025The court offered its view that “a 10- year-old’s coming on to” Rynhart was “not only at odds with her own statement, but . . . at odds with common sense.” The court further explained that a “10-year-old isn’t capable of making that type of a decision and [Rynhart], as an adult, and frankly a highly 20230262-CA 6 2025 UT App 148 State v. Rynhart educated adult, knows that.” “[F]or that reason,” the court continued, “and for the length of time that these events occurred over, and the number of incidents, . . . consecutive sentencing is appropriate.” At the time, Rynhart did not appeal the court

2025The court later sentenced Barriga to prison. 20210818-CA 4 2025 UT App 162 State v. Barriga ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11 Barriga now appeals his conviction, but he does not challenge the merits of the jury’s verdict.

2024A third child, JE, was initially a part of these proceedings but has since turned eighteen and is no longer included. 20230162-CA 2 2024 UT App 34 In re J.E. ¶4 In January 2020, Father returned to prison because of a parole violation, and he remained there until December of that same year.

2022Here, though AP&P initially took Samples to jail after he failed the drug test, Samples was taken to prison while awaiting trial because of a parole violation. 20200537-CA 13 2022 UT App 125 State v. Samples to do.

2020Indeed, the investigator noted that, at one point, Gallegos had a parole hearing scheduled for a date ten months after the shank was discovered, and that his parole status could “depend in part on 20190029-CA 5 2020 UT App 162 State v. Gallegos his conduct while in prison.” In connection with this evidence, the jury heard Gallegos (on a recorded phone call) mention that he was facing “five-to-life” in this case.

2017It tells convicted defendants that they may well have to serve the full extent of their imposed sentence, see UTAH CODE § 77-18-4(2) & (3), that the decision to release them early is a matter within the discretion of the Parole Board, see id. § 77-18-4(3), that that discretion can take into account a range of considerations affecting the inmate's risk to the public, see Alvillar , 2014 UT App 61 , ¶ 6, 322 P.3d 1204 , and that the inmate has no right to call witnesses at a parole hearing, see UTAH ADMIN.

2017It tells convicted defendants that they may well have to serve the full extent of their imposed sentence, see UTAH CODE § 77-18-4(2) & (3), that the decision to release them early is a matter within the discretion of the Parole Board, see id. § 77-18-4(3), that that discretion can take into account a range of considerations affecting the inmate's risk to the public, see Alvillar , 2014 UT App 61 , ¶ 6, 322 P.3d 1204 , and that the inmate has no right to call witnesses at a parole hearing, see UTAH ADMIN.

2017Because I find the originalist questions I address here properly presented but not adequately briefed I would have preferred requesting supplemental briefing. 30 “Our cases,” after all, “have not said that an original parole hearing is identical for all purposes to a sentencing hearing before the trial court.” Monson, 928 P.2d at 1029 . 62 Cite as: 2017 UT 89 LEE, A.C.J., dissenting does not end the inquiry.

2016Rather, the defendants faced “[a]t most, certain non-statutory consequences,” such as potential negative effects on future “discretionary decisions” related to “employment prospects” or a “sentence imposed in a future criminal proceeding,” that “are more directly influenced by[ ] the underlying conduct that formed the basis for the parole violation” than the fact of the parole violation itself, id. at 632-33 , 102 S.Ct. 1322 . ¶21 However, while we ordinarily will not presume the existence of collateral consequences where the direct consequences of a judicial decision have already played thems

2016Rather, the defendants faced “[a]t most, certain non-statutory consequences,” such as potential negative effects on future “discretionary decisions” related to “employment prospects” or a “sentence imposed in a future criminal proceeding,” that “are more directly influenced by[ ] the underlying conduct that formed the basis for the parole violation” than the fact of the parole violation itself, id. at 632-33 , 102 S.Ct. 1322 . ¶21 However, while we ordinarily will not presume the existence of collateral consequences where the direct consequences of a judicial decision have already played thems

1998The court explained: “To adequately deter misconduct and protect the public, parole agents must be permitted to act expeditiously upon reasonable suspicion of a parole violation.” Id.

1998The court explained: "To adequately deter misconduct and protect the public, parole agents must be permitted to act expeditiously upon reasonable suspicion of a parole violation." Id.

1997Thus, our focus should be whether Peterson’s due process rights were violated and, if so, whether he waived them in light of the colloquy between Peterson and the hearing officer concerning the Felton materials. 1 In State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App.1995), this court noted: “a defendant may waive his or her constitutional right to due process.

1997Thus, our focus should be whether Peterson's due process rights were violated and, if so, whether he waived them in light of the colloquy between Peterson and the hearing officer concerning the Felton materials. [1] In State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App.1995), this court noted: "a defendant may waive his or her constitutional right to due process.

1995We stated, "An arrest may not be used solely as a pretext to search for evidence of another crime." Id. at 1237-38 (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 , 52 S.Ct. 420, 424 , 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932)).

1995We stated, "An arrest may not be used solely as a pretext to search for evidence of another crime." Id. at 1237-38 (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 , 52 S.Ct. 420, 424 , 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932)).

1995Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1986).

1989According to Utah Code Ann. § 78 -2a-3(2)(g) (Supp.1989), this court has original appellate jurisdiction over “appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony.” (Emphasis added.) In Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct.App.1988), a panel of this court, one judge dissenting, concluded that this court had jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of an extraordinary writ involving extra dition to Idaho for a parole violation.

1989The court reasoned that it had jurisdiction under section 78-2a-3 because the statutory language “is deliberately and sufficiently broad to include those cases where a criminal conviction is involved in a habeas corpus proceeding to challenge extradition.” Id. at 995 .

1985Cf. State v. Dudley, Me., 433 A.2d 711 (1981) (time served for probation violation not counted in speedy trial analysis); Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307 , 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983) and State v. Ogden, 21 Wash.App. 44 , 584 P.2d 957 (1978) (time served for parole violation not counted for purposes of speedy trial statute); United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.1976) and United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.1976) (administrative segregation within prison does not amount to arrest for Sixth Amendment purposes).

1985Cf. State v. Dudley, Me., 433 A.2d 711 (1981) (time served for probation violation not counted in speedy trial analysis); Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307 , 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983) and State v. Ogden, 21 Wash.App. 44 , 584 P.2d 957 (1978) (time served for parole violation not counted for purposes of speedy trial statute); United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.1976) and United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.1976) (administrative segregation within prison does not amount to arrest for Sixth Amendment purposes).