22 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604 , 33 L. 2013Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972)), trans. denied. | 3 | 3 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2018Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604 , 33 L. 1991In bal ancing the competing interests, the Court concluded that "[what is needed is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee's behavior." Id. at 2602. | 2 | 5 |
Randolph v. Bussgreen1 sentence2017To the contrary, this court observed that Rodgers’s- “entitlement to the education credit time accrued immediately upon his completion of the degree.” Rodgers, 705 N.E.2d at 1042 ; see Ind. Code § 35-50-6-1 (c) (providing that "[a] person whose parole is revoked shall be imprisoned for all or part of the remainder of the person’s fixed term ,.. less the credit time the person has earned since the revocation”); see also Randolph v. Buss, 956 N.E.2d 38, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that petitioner was not entitled to unused educational credit time upon revocation of parole), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See also Parker v. State, 822 N.E.2d 285, 287-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (petitioner presented no evidence that Parole Board discharged or “turned over” the sentence). [21] Driver’s situation is also similar to that in Mills v. State, 840 N.E.2d 354, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), where the defendant, like Driver, claimed his parole was unlawfully revoked because he was not on parole at the time he committed a parole violation. | 1 | 1 |
Rodgers v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Pollard bases his argument on Rodgers v. State, 705 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), and the proposition that an inmate’s entitlement to educational credit time accrues immediately upon his or her completion of the degree, regardless of subsequent parole violations or parole status. 2017To the contrary, this court observed that Rodgers’s- “entitlement to the education credit time accrued immediately upon his completion of the degree.” Rodgers, 705 N.E.2d at 1042 ; see Ind. Code § 35-50-6-1 (c) (providing that "[a] person whose parole is revoked shall be imprisoned for all or part of the remainder of the person’s fixed term ,.. less the credit time the person has earned since the revocation”); see also Randolph v. Buss, 956 N.E.2d 38, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that petitioner was not entitled to unused educational credit time upon revocation of parole), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See also Parker v. State, 822 N.E.2d 285, 287-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (petitioner presented no evidence that Parole Board discharged or “turned over” the sentence). [21] Driver’s situation is also similar to that in Mills v. State, 840 N.E.2d 354, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), where the defendant, like Driver, claimed his parole was unlawfully revoked because he was not on parole at the time he committed a parole violation. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence2017If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002) (internal citation omitted). 2 The trial court stated that the sentence took into account the fact Wright was on federal parole at the time of this offense and therefore was likely to be serving some time for the parole violation before serving this sentence. | 1 | 1 |
State of Indiana v. Adrian Lotakigreen2 sentences2014During the instant sentencing hearing, the trial court did not ‘save’ Neal’s credit time for use in a future, undecided case; rather, the trial court effectively held that Neal’s incarceration on the parole violation during this pre-trial jail-time on the instant charges precluded the accumulation of credit time under the instant cause. 5 Instead, we find Neal’s situation similar to Lotaki v. State, 4 N.E.3d 656, 657 (Ind. 2014), where our supreme court explained that when a defendant is being held on two different cases, and the sentence in one case is ordered to run consecutively to the sent 2014In line with previous precedent, the Lotaki court held that “when consecutive sentences are involved, credit time is deducted from the aggregate total of the consecutive sentences, not from an individual sentence.” Id. (citing Corn v. State, 659 N.E.2d 554 -55-59 (Ind. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Barnett v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Barnett v. State, 834 N.E.2d 169, 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Christmas v. State, 812 N.E.2d 174, 176-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Christmas v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Barnett v. State, 834 N.E.2d 169, 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Christmas v. State, 812 N.E.2d 174, 176-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Greer v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Because Pierce's petition was decided upon summary disposition, we do not have a transcript of the parole violation hearing, and it is unclear whether Officer Strange testified at the hearing. 7 .The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that "[f]or purposes of due process analysis, the United States Supreme Court has equated probation revocation proceedings with parole proceedings.” Greer v. State, 685 N.E.2d 700, 704 (Ind.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Cooley v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Johnson v. Kohimeyer, 261 Ind. 244, 245 , 301 N.E.2d 518, 519 (1973); Cooley v. State, 172 Ind.App. 199, 203 , 360 N.E.2d 29, 32 (1977)). 2 Specifically, the trial court stated, "like [Criminal Rule] 4, for the 60-day time to apply, there is a requirement that the person be held because of the parole violation allegation|.]" Id. (emphasis in original). 2006Johnson v. Kohimeyer, 261 Ind. 244, 245 , 301 N.E.2d 518, 519 (1973); Cooley v. State, 172 Ind.App. 199, 203 , 360 N.E.2d 29, 32 (1977)). 2 Specifically, the trial court stated, "like [Criminal Rule] 4, for the 60-day time to apply, there is a requirement that the person be held because of the parole violation allegation|.]" Id. (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Johnson v. Kohlmeyergreen2 sentences2006Johnson v. Kohimeyer, 261 Ind. 244, 245 , 301 N.E.2d 518, 519 (1973); Cooley v. State, 172 Ind.App. 199, 203 , 360 N.E.2d 29, 32 (1977)). 2 Specifically, the trial court stated, "like [Criminal Rule] 4, for the 60-day time to apply, there is a requirement that the person be held because of the parole violation allegation|.]" Id. (emphasis in original). 2006Johnson v. Kohimeyer, 261 Ind. 244, 245 , 301 N.E.2d 518, 519 (1973); Cooley v. State, 172 Ind.App. 199, 203 , 360 N.E.2d 29, 32 (1977)). 2 Specifically, the trial court stated, "like [Criminal Rule] 4, for the 60-day time to apply, there is a requirement that the person be held because of the parole violation allegation|.]" Id. (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Douthittgreen2 sentences1978See also Russell v. Douthitt, (1974) 261 Ind. 428 , 304 N.E.2d 793 . *145 In the case at bar Hawkins was given written notice on October 10, 1974, that he was to appear at the November Parole Board meeting for his parole revocation hearing, and that the allegation against him was that he had committed another crime. 1978See also Russell v. Douthitt, (1974) 261 Ind. 428 , 304 N.E.2d 793 . *145 In the case at bar Hawkins was given written notice on October 10, 1974, that he was to appear at the November Parole Board meeting for his parole revocation hearing, and that the allegation against him was that he had committed another crime. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Charles Stephenson v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2026White’s repeated and consistent disregard for the law does not portray his character in “a positive light.” See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122 . [35] Finally, while White contends that his sentence is inappropriate because he provided care for Diane and, therefore, possessed a positive character trait, the record shows that whatever assistance he might have provided to her was minimal at best because he had only been staying with the Suggses for a few days before he killed Marcus. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hardley v. State
green
1 sentence2019Hardley v. State , 893 N.E.2d 740 , 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). [8] Indiana Code Section 11-13-3-9 requires that, upon the arrest and confinement of a parolee for an alleged parole violation, the parolee is entitled to a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a violation of a condition has occurred. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Chandler v. State
green
1 sentence2018Further, Taylor concedes that “[t]he sentencing court was not required to inform [Taylor] of the collateral consequences of the parole violation and subsequent revocation.” Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Weiss v. Indiana Parole Board
green
1 sentence2017Id. [7] Cormack claims that the parole requirement that he participate in the Sex Offender Management and Monitoring (SOMM) program violates the constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws. [8] Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ringo v. State
green
1 sentence2017Nevertheless, “[w]hen challenged, the State may need to show additional evidence tending to prove that Defendant’s waiver and decision to speak were voluntary.” Id. [29] Gholston points to the following as evidence that the officers used deception and trickery to convince him to waive his Miranda rights: the officers did not tell him at the beginning of the interview that his DNA had been found on Dominique’s body and sandal; the officers repeatedly told him that the only reason he was being interviewed was because he had been arrested for a parole violation; the officers “repeatedly minimized | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Palmer v. State
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Charles Moore v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2016However, this does not meet the standard of the incredible dubiosity rule which requires “inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” See Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 755 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Komyatti v. State
green
1 sentence2015Komyatti, 931 N.E.2d at 419 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Corn v. State
green
1 sentence2014In line with previous precedent, the Lotaki court held that “when consecutive sentences are involved, credit time is deducted from the aggregate total of the consecutive sentences, not from an individual sentence.” Id. (citing Corn v. State, 659 N.E.2d 554 -55-59 (Ind. 1995)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Duncan v. State
green
1 sentence1986In Duncan v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 957 , 412 N.E.2d 770 , this court concluded that where a defendant is held as a result of two separate charges, he is entitled to one credit for the time so held but not two. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences1978However the Court stated that counsel should be provided where the parolee makes a request for counsel based on a timely and colorable claim: (1) that he has not committed the alleged parole violation or (2) that there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation. 411 U.S. at 790 , 93 S.Ct. at 1763-64 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 666 . 1978However the Court stated that counsel should be provided where the parolee makes a request for counsel based on a timely and colorable claim: (1) that he has not committed the alleged parole violation or (2) that there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation. 411 U.S. at 790 , 93 S.Ct. at 1763-64 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 666 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.