26 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zullogreen2 sentences2023Id. at 877 . 18 "Service of the parole violation warrant shall be made effective forthwith upon arrest and imprisonment of the parole violator unless he is convicted of commission of a crime or found guilty of violating the conditions of federal or another state's parole or probation, then service of said parole violation warrant shall not be effective until the expiration of any additional sentences by parole or otherwise." G. 2001Further, when a parolee is convicted of a new crime, service of the parole violation warrant is not effective until “the expiration of any additional sentences by parole or otherwise.” Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 874 (1995); see also Harding v. State Board of Parole, 307 Mass. 217 (1940) (prisoner whose parole had been revoked and upon whom there had been imposed, on a new charge, a sentence to confinement, was required to remain in confinement under the first sentence upon the termination of the second sentence); Kleczka v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 74, 75 (1966) (Board committed no error | 2 | 3 |
Kleczka v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2001Further, when a parolee is convicted of a new crime, service of the parole violation warrant is not effective until “the expiration of any additional sentences by parole or otherwise.” Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 874 (1995); see also Harding v. State Board of Parole, 307 Mass. 217 (1940) (prisoner whose parole had been revoked and upon whom there had been imposed, on a new charge, a sentence to confinement, was required to remain in confinement under the first sentence upon the termination of the second sentence); Kleczka v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 74, 75 (1966) (Board committed no error 2001Further, when a parolee is convicted of a new crime, service of the parole violation warrant is not effective until “the expiration of any additional sentences by parole or otherwise.” Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 874 (1995); see also Harding v. State Board of Parole, 307 Mass. 217 (1940) (prisoner whose parole had been revoked and upon whom there had been imposed, on a new charge, a sentence to confinement, was required to remain in confinement under the first sentence upon the termination of the second sentence); Kleczka v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 74, 75 (1966) (Board committed no error | 2 | 2 |
Harding v. State Board of Parolegreen2 sentences2001Further, when a parolee is convicted of a new crime, service of the parole violation warrant is not effective until “the expiration of any additional sentences by parole or otherwise.” Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 874 (1995); see also Harding v. State Board of Parole, 307 Mass. 217 (1940) (prisoner whose parole had been revoked and upon whom there had been imposed, on a new charge, a sentence to confinement, was required to remain in confinement under the first sentence upon the termination of the second sentence); Kleczka v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 74, 75 (1966) (Board committed no error 2001Further, when a parolee is convicted of a new crime, service of the parole violation warrant is not effective until “the expiration of any additional sentences by parole or otherwise.” Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 874 (1995); see also Harding v. State Board of Parole, 307 Mass. 217 (1940) (prisoner whose parole had been revoked and upon whom there had been imposed, on a new charge, a sentence to confinement, was required to remain in confinement under the first sentence upon the termination of the second sentence); Kleczka v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 74, 75 (1966) (Board committed no error | 1 | 3 |
Zerbst v. Kidwellgreen2 sentences1995Royce, petitioner, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 397 , 402 n.3 (1990) citing Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359 (1938); Harding v. State Board of Parole, 307 Mass. 217 (1940). 1983Id. at 87 . 16 In a case like the present, the parole violation is clear, and only the predictive element is left. 17 Justice Black said: “Unless a parole violator can be required to serve some time in prison in addition to that imposed for an offense committed while on parole, he not only escapes punishment for the unexpired portion of his original sentence, but the disciplinary power of the Board will be practically nullified.” Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 363 . 18 See Thibodeau v. Commonwealth, 428 F. Supp. 542, 545 (D. | 1 | 3 |
Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Boardgreen1 sentence2024See Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 477 Mass. 106, 110-112 (2017). | 1 | 1 |
Bielawski v. Personnel Administrator of the Division of Personnel Administrationgreen1 sentence2023See Bielawski v. Personnel Adm'r of the Div. of Personnel Admin., 422 Mass. 459, 464 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Burhoegreen1 sentence2023See also Commonwealth v. Burhoe, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 590, 595 (1975) (alleged loss of opportunities for parole and concurrent sentences because of pretrial delay "too speculative and insubstantial" to warrant dismissal). 12 Id. at 875.17 This principle is not applicable in the instant case. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gomesgreen1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 511 (2009). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Public Welfare v. J. K. B.green2 sentences2015See J.K.B., 379 Mass. at 4 . 2015See J.K.B., 379 Mass. at 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Boardgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Quegan, 423 Mass. at 835 (prisoner sought declaration that board may not consider refusal to admit guilt in parole determination); Greenman, 405 Mass. at 386 (prisoner challenged basis of parole denial as beyond board’s statutory authority); Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 702 (1976) (prisoner sought declaration of right to appear personally before board in order to argue for early parole eligibility); Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 532 (2014) (prisoner pursued civil rights claim alleging violation of due process in parole revocation p | 1 | 1 |
Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Boardgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Quegan, 423 Mass. at 835 (prisoner sought declaration that board may not consider refusal to admit guilt in parole determination); Greenman, 405 Mass. at 386 (prisoner challenged basis of parole denial as beyond board’s statutory authority); Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 702 (1976) (prisoner sought declaration of right to appear personally before board in order to argue for early parole eligibility); Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 532 (2014) (prisoner pursued civil rights claim alleging violation of due process in parole revocation p | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2015See Diatchenko I, supra.8 Pursuant to the opinion's rescript, the case was remanded to the single justice with the direction to enter a judgment 8 In Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013), decided the same day as Diatchenko I, the remedy in Diatchenko I was extended to include juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison for murder in the first degree going forward, such that they also are entitled to a parole hearing. 2015In Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013), decided the same day as Diatchenko I, the remedy in Diatchenko I was extended to include juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison for murder in the first degree going forward, such that they also are entitled to a parole hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Charles R. Warren v. United States Parole Commissiongreen1 sentence2015See Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Greenman v. MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARDgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Quegan, 423 Mass. at 835 (prisoner sought declaration that board may not consider refusal to admit guilt in parole determination); Greenman, 405 Mass. at 386 (prisoner challenged basis of parole denial as beyond board’s statutory authority); Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 702 (1976) (prisoner sought declaration of right to appear personally before board in order to argue for early parole eligibility); Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 532 (2014) (prisoner pursued civil rights claim alleging violation of due process in parole revocation p | 1 | 1 |
Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Boardgreen2 sentences2015See post at . 29 declaration of right to appear personally before board in order to argue for early parole eligibility); Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 532 (2014) (prisoner pursued civil rights claim alleging violation of due process in parole revocation proceeding as well as certiorari action challenging merits of board's decision to revoke parole).30,31 As previously stated, the parole hearing acquires a constitutional dimension for a juvenile homicide offender because the availability of a meaningful opportunity for release on parole is what makes the juvenile' 2015See, e.g., Quegan, 423 Mass. at 835 (prisoner sought declaration that board may not consider refusal to admit guilt in parole determination); Greenman, 405 Mass. at 386 (prisoner challenged basis of parole denial as beyond board’s statutory authority); Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 702 (1976) (prisoner sought declaration of right to appear personally before board in order to argue for early parole eligibility); Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 532 (2014) (prisoner pursued civil rights claim alleging violation of due process in parole revocation p | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hamiltongreen1 sentence2013See Hrycenko v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 503, 508 (2011); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 435 (2011). 4 Although § 13B before the 2006 amendment protected only witnesses and jurors in a criminal investigation, or “in any stage of a trial, grand jury, or other criminal proceeding,”* *** 5 § 13B after the 2006 amendment also specifically protected, among others, probation and parole officers in “a criminal investigation, grand jury proceeding, trial or other criminal proceeding of any type,” as well as persons who are “aware of information, records, documents or objects that relate to a | 1 | 1 |
Hrycenko v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2013See Hrycenko v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 503, 508 (2011); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 435 (2011). 4 Although § 13B before the 2006 amendment protected only witnesses and jurors in a criminal investigation, or “in any stage of a trial, grand jury, or other criminal proceeding,”* *** 5 § 13B after the 2006 amendment also specifically protected, among others, probation and parole officers in “a criminal investigation, grand jury proceeding, trial or other criminal proceeding of any type,” as well as persons who are “aware of information, records, documents or objects that relate to a | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lombardogreen1 sentence2009Cf. Commonwealth v. Lombardo, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 1006 (1987) (“At the time of the plea, the defendant was . . . familiar with the criminal justice system”). | 1 | 1 |
| Costa v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Grantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Fred Anthony Hamiltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Donald A. Hillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gerniegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Strunk v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Librangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Perrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Hutchinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thibodeau v. Com. of Mass.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1984Noting that there is typically a substantial time lag between arrest and final determination and that the parolee is often arrested at a place distant from the State institution to which he may be returned before the final decision, the Court concluded “due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” Id. at 485 . 1984The first stage hearing envisaged by Morrissey is undertaken by an “independent decisionmaker” whose job is “to determine whether there is probable cause to believe [that the arrested parolee] has committed a parole violation.” Id. at 486-487 . | 3 | 1977–2000 |
Moody v. Daggett
green
2 sentences1983Id. at 87 . 16 In a case like the present, the parole violation is clear, and only the predictive element is left. 17 Justice Black said: “Unless a parole violator can be required to serve some time in prison in addition to that imposed for an offense committed while on parole, he not only escapes punishment for the unexpired portion of his original sentence, but the disciplinary power of the Board will be practically nullified.” Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 363 . 18 See Thibodeau v. Commonwealth, 428 F. Supp. 542, 545 (D. 1977Thus, at a minimum, Moody v. Daggett, supra, establishes that the preliminary parole hearing may be dispensed with in certain circumstances. | 2 | 1977–1983 |
Commonwealth v. Thurston
green
1 sentence2023This type of sentence involved "the imposition of an apparently long sentence on an individual deemed capable of rehabilitation . . ., not to the State prison at M.C.I., Walpole (now called Cedar Junction) but rather to the State 'reformatory' at M.C.I., Concord, with parole eligibility arising after a small fraction . . . of the stated sentence pursuant to parole board policies and regulations." Id. at 555 . 2 parole, and issued a parole violation warrant on March 31, 1992. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District Commonwealth v. Roberio
green
1 sentence2019In Diatchenko II , 471 Mass. at 24, 27, 32, 27 N.E.3d 349 , we extended certain due process protections to juveniles sentenced to life appearing before a parole board. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Mahar
green
1 sentence2017In 1998, the prosecutor’s office was informed by the Superior Court clerk’s office in Brockton that the court was still holding the defendant’s bail money, and the case began to proceed. 6 Prior to this trial, the defendant filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement, which the trial judge denied. 7 As we explain, infra, the court is not a party to plea negotiations, and, more importantly, the defendant never relied to his detriment on any promise related to custody. 8 This situation is different from that presented by Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442 Mass. 11 (2004). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Indeck v. Clients' Security Board
green
2 sentences2015The use of certiorari to ensure that a parole hearing provides a "meaningful opportunity" for release ignores the existence of a "reasonably adequate remedy." Indeck, 450 Mass. at 385 . 2015The use of certiorari to ensure that a parole hearing provides a “mean ingful opportunity” for release ignores the existence of a “reasonably adequate remedy.” Indeck, 450 Mass. at 385 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Graham v. Florida
green
2 sentences2015From this, the dissent concludes that these decisions stand for the propositions that 14 We turn, then, to the question of what is procedurally required in order to protect a juvenile homicide offender's expectation of "a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 .15 "The extent of procedural due process which must be the existing parole procedures already afford a meaningful opportunity for release and that juvenile homicide offenders are "entitled only to the same parole hearing process as other inmates." See post at . 2015The Supreme Court specifically identified traditional parole hearings as capable of providing that “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Cole
green
2 sentences2015Cole, supra. Today we are dealing with the opposite scenario, in which the court subsumes the executive power to regulate the conduct of a parole hearing into part of the sentencing process. 6 If the court's decision should be considered not to have rendered the conduct of the initial parole hearing of a juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree part of the sentencing process, then the court's justification for "additional procedural protections" in such a hearing fails because "children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing" (emphasis added). 2015Cole, supra. Today we are dealing with the opposite scenario, in which the court subsumes the executive power to regulate the conduct of a parole hearing into part of the sentencing process. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
green
2 sentences2015Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674 . 2015Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 670 , quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2015Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 670, quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 . 2015Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 670 , quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Pagan
green
1 sentence2010After his release from that sentence, he was found in violation of his parole for the fourth time, and in October, 2005, he was returned to the house of correction and ordered to serve one year for the parole violation. 4 On September 14, 2005, we decided Commonwealth v. Pagan, supra, determining that the sentencing procedures for imposing lifetime parole under G. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Watts v. Commissioner of Correction
green
1 sentence2008Watts v. Commissioner of Correction, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 951 , 952-953 & n.2 (1997), citing G. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Manning v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Chalifoux v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Royce green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Robert E. Greene v. Michigan Department of Corporations green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Trimmer green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Thibodeau v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Del Grosso v. Board of Appeal of Revere green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.