parole violation in Vermont

2025In parole revocation proceedings, due process protections include “an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Id. at 484 .

2025“The revocation hearing must be tendered within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” Id. at 488 .

1995Unlike a criminal prosecution, a parole violation does not need to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. "[A]ll that is required is that the evidence and facts reasonably demonstrate that the person's conduct has not been as good as required by the terms and conditions of the release." 145 Vt. 644, 647-48 , 497 A.2d 362, 364-65 (1985) (citations omitted).

1995Unlike a criminal prosecution, a parole violation does not need to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. "[A]ll that is required is that the evidence and facts reasonably demonstrate that the person's conduct has not been as good as required by the terms and conditions of the release." 145 Vt. 644, 647-48 , 497 A.2d 362, 364-65 (1985) (citations omitted).

1995Cf. In re Muzzy, 141 Vt. at 473 , 449 A.2d at 974 (substantial evidence rule denies grievant due process because it allows board to make findings on less than preponderance of evidence).

1995Cf. In re Muzzy, 141 Vt. at 473 , 449 A.2d at 974 (substantial evidence rule denies grievant due process because it allows board to make findings on less than preponderance of evidence).

1991Id. at 648-49 , 497 A.2d at 365 ; see also State v. Schroeder, 149 Vt. 163, 163 , 540 A.2d 647, 647 (1987) (per curiam) (adopting the Baxter rule for probation revocations, stating that “[w]hile uncorroborated hearsay evidence alone will not support a revocation,” a defendant’s failure to rebut the evidence will support the conclusion that he violated a probation condition).

1991Id. at 648-49 , 497 A.2d at 365 ; see also State v. Schroeder, 149 Vt. 163, 163 , 540 A.2d 647, 647 (1987) (per curiam) (adopting the Baxter rule for probation revocations, stating that “[w]hile uncorroborated hearsay evidence alone will not support a revocation,” a defendant’s failure to rebut the evidence will support the conclusion that he violated a probation condition).

1991At least one court has explicitly taken a broader view of the law enforcement “system.” Applying the fellow-officer rule, the court in State v. Fields, 785 P.2d 611, 612-13 (Colo. 1990) (en banc), imputed to an arresting officer a parole board’s error in failing to issue a parole violation warrant and suppressed evidence gathered pursuant to the arrest.

1991At least one court has explicitly taken a broader view of the law enforcement "system." Applying the fellow-officer rule, the court in State v. Fields, 785 P.2d 611, 612-13 (Colo.1990) (en banc), imputed to an arresting officer a parole board's error in failing to issue a parole violation warrant and suppressed evidence gathered pursuant to the arrest.

1987The purpose of reconsideration under § 7042 “is to permit the trial judge to reconsider the sentencing decision absent the heat of trial pressures and in calm reflection . . . .” *15 State v. Therrien, 140 Vt. 625, 627 , 442 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1982).

1987The purpose of reconsideration under § 7042 “is to permit the trial judge to reconsider the sentencing decision absent the heat of trial pressures and in calm reflection . . . .” *15 State v. Therrien, 140 Vt. 625, 627 , 442 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1982).

1985This requires that there be “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup *648 port a conclusion.’ ” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1980) (also quoting above definition of substantial evidence).

1985This requires that there be “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup *648 port a conclusion.’ ” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1980) (also quoting above definition of substantial evidence).

1985This requires that there be “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup *648 port a conclusion.’ ” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1980) (also quoting above definition of substantial evidence).

1985Unlike a criminal prosecution, a parole violation does not need to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. “[A] 11 that is required is that the evidence and facts reasonably demonstrate that the person’s conduct has not been as good as required by the terms and conditions of the release.” Mack v. McCune, 551 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).