parole hearing in Connecticut

2001Since the Act is invalid being ex post facto, these petitioners are entitled to a parole hearing after serving 50% of their sentence no matter how unlikely their prospects of release, and the Board of Parole should not be prohibited from granting them a hearing and release after serving 50% of their sentence which prohibition is part of the Act. ". . . the detriment requirement is met even if the defendant before us cannot show definitively that he would have gotten a lesser sentence." Nulph v. Faatz , 27 F. 3rd 451, 455, 456 (9th Circuit, 1994) citing Miller v. Florida , 482 U.S. 423 , 432 ;

2001Since the Act is invalid being ex post facto, these petitioners are entitled to a parole hearing after serving 50% of their sentence no matter how unlikely their prospects of release, and the Board of Parole should not be prohibited from granting them a hearing and release after serving 50% of their sentence which prohibition is part of the Act. ". . . the detriment requirement is met even if the defendant before us cannot show definitively that he would have gotten a lesser sentence." Nulph v. Faatz, 27 F.3d 451 , 455 , 456 (9th Circuit, 1994) citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 , 432 ; 10

2001Since the Act is invalid being ex post facto, these petitioners are entitled to a parole hearing after serving 50% of their sentence no matter how unlikely their prospects of release, and the Board of Parole should not be prohibited from granting them a hearing and release after serving 50% of their sentence which prohibition is part of the Act. ". . . the detriment requirement is met even if the defendant before us cannot show definitively that he would have gotten a lesser sentence." Nulph v. Faatz, 27 F.3d 451 , 455 , 456 (9th Circuit, 1994) citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 , 432 ; 10

2001Since the Act is invalid being ex post facto, these petitioners are entitled to a parole hearing after serving 50% of their sentence no matter how unlikely their prospects of release, and the Board of Parole should not be prohibited from granting them a hearing and release after serving 50% of their sentence which prohibition is part of the Act. ". . . the detriment requirement is met even if the defendant before us cannot show definitively that he would have gotten a lesser sentence." Nulph v. Faatz, 27 F.3d 451 , 455 , 456 (9th Circuit, 1994) citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 , 432 ; 10

2019Resentencing in such cases would be cumbersome and would in reality be more akin to a parole hearing.’’ State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn. App. 744 , 778–79, 144 A.3d 467 (2016), modified in part on other grounds, 173 Conn. App. 64 , 164 A.3d 31 (2017), aff’d, 333 Conn. 468 , A.3d (2019).

2019Resentencing in such cases would be cumbersome and would in reality be more akin to a parole hearing.’’ State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn. App. 744 , 778–79, 144 A.3d 467 (2016), modified in part on other grounds, 173 Conn. App. 64 , 164 A.3d 31 (2017), aff’d, 333 Conn. 468 , A.3d (2019).

2019If the board determines that continued confinement is necessary, the board may reassess such person’s suitability for a new parole hearing at a later date to be determined at the discretion of the board, but not earlier than two years after the date of its decision. . . .’’ Section 2 of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts, codified at General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 54-91g, provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) If the case of a child . . . is transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court . . . and the child is convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant to such transfer, at the tim

2019If the board determines that continued confinement is necessary, the board may reassess such person’s suitability for a new parole hearing at a later date to be determined at the discretion of the board, but not earlier than two years after the date of its decision. . . .’’ Section 2 of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts, codified at General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 54-91g, provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) If the case of a child . . . is transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court . . . and the child is convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant to such transfer, at the tim

2019Resentencing in such cases would be cumbersome and would in reality be more akin to a parole hearing.’’ State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn. App. 744 , 778–79, 144 A.3d 467 (2016), modified in part on other grounds, 173 Conn. App. 64 , 164 A.3d 31 (2017), aff’d, 333 Conn. 468 , A.3d (2019).

2019Resentencing in such cases would be cumbersome and would in reality be more akin to a parole hearing.’’ State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn. App. 744 , 778–79, 144 A.3d 467 (2016), modified in part on other grounds, 173 Conn. App. 64 , 164 A.3d 31 (2017), aff’d, 333 Conn. 468 , A.3d (2019).

2019The United States Supreme Court relied on similar reasoning to decide Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 , 130 S. Ct. 2011 , 176 L.

2019The United States Supreme Court relied on similar reasoning to decide Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 , 130 S. Ct. 2011 , 176 L.

2019Resentencing in such cases would be cumbersome and would in reality be more akin to a parole hearing.’’ State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn. App. 744 , 778–79, 144 A.3d 467 (2016), modified in part on other grounds, 173 Conn. App. 64 , 164 A.3d 31 (2017), aff’d, 333 Conn. 468 , A.3d (2019).

2019Resentencing in such cases would be cumbersome and would in reality be more akin to a parole hearing.’’ State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn. App. 744 , 778–79, 144 A.3d 467 (2016), modified in part on other grounds, 173 Conn. App. 64 , 164 A.3d 31 (2017), aff’d, 333 Conn. 468 , A.3d (2019).

2006As we have noted, “Mor-rissey . . . makes it clear that the benefits that inure as a result of that liberty interest cannot be taken away without the parolee’s being informed of the alleged parole violation and being given a hearing at which he can rebut the allegations.” Vincenzo v. Chairman, Board of Parole, 64 Conn. App. 258, 262 , 779 A.2d 843 (2001). 14 It is undisputed that the petitioner possessed a liberty interest in his status as a parolee protected by the fourteenth Amendment. 15 The petitioner, however, contends that the action of the board in revoking his liberty on the basis of h

2006As we have noted, “Mor-rissey . . . makes it clear that the benefits that inure as a result of that liberty interest cannot be taken away without the parolee’s being informed of the alleged parole violation and being given a hearing at which he can rebut the allegations.” Vincenzo v. Chairman, Board of Parole, 64 Conn. App. 258, 262 , 779 A.2d 843 (2001). 14 It is undisputed that the petitioner possessed a liberty interest in his status as a parolee protected by the fourteenth Amendment. 15 The petitioner, however, contends that the action of the board in revoking his liberty on the basis of h

2020Id. 7 We further note that our Supreme Court has held that parole eligibility for juvenile offenders under § 54-125a (f) negates a claim of an illegal sentence of life imprisonment, or its equivalent, without parole under Miller v. Ala- bama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.

2020Id. 7 We further note that our Supreme Court has held that parole eligibility for juvenile offenders under § 54-125a (f) negates a claim of an illegal sentence of life imprisonment, or its equivalent, without parole under Miller v. Ala- bama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.

2019Next, it observed that ‘‘[t]he provisions relating to alter- natives to incarceration, special parole and probation, must be read in harmony.’’ The court further stated that ‘‘[i]n State v. Santos T., 146 Conn. App. 532 , 535–36, 77 A.3d 931 , [cert. denied, 310 Conn. 965 , 83 A.3d 345 ] (2013), the Connecticut Appellate Court implicitly rec- ognized a trial court’s authority to impose a term of special parole after a parole violation hearing and sen- tencing.’’7 Finally, it reasoned that the dispositional phase of a probation revocation proceeding, in sub- stance, generally is indistinguishab

2019Next, it observed that ‘‘[t]he provisions relating to alter- natives to incarceration, special parole and probation, must be read in harmony.’’ The court further stated that ‘‘[i]n State v. Santos T., 146 Conn. App. 532 , 535–36, 77 A.3d 931 , [cert. denied, 310 Conn. 965 , 83 A.3d 345 ] (2013), the Connecticut Appellate Court implicitly rec- ognized a trial court’s authority to impose a term of special parole after a parole violation hearing and sen- tencing.’’7 Finally, it reasoned that the dispositional phase of a probation revocation proceeding, in sub- stance, generally is indistinguishab

2018We concluded that, "[b]ecause the parole hearing provision [did] not alter the **478 calculation of when an inmate is eligible for parole, and because the board ... still [was required to] consider the inmate's parole suitability at that time, the elimination of a mandatory hearing in the 2013 parole hearing provision [did] not increase the punishment imposed for the petitioner's offense." Id.

2018In the present case, it cannot reasonably be argued that the 2013 amendment to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a (b) (2) does not "alter the calculation of when [the petitioner] is eligible for parole ...." Id., at 377 , 163 A.3d 597 .

2017Earlier, in Wheway v. Warden , supra, 215 Conn. at 423 , 576 A.2d 494 , this court addressed the question of whether an inmate's classification as a maximum security prisoner solely on the basis of a parole violation detainer implicated a protected liberty interest.

2017Earlier, in Wheway v. Warden , supra, 215 Conn. at 423 , 576 A.2d 494 , this court addressed the question of whether an inmate's classification as a maximum security prisoner solely on the basis of a parole violation detainer implicated a protected liberty interest.

2017Id., at 503 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 .

2017Id., at 503 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 .

2017If the board determines that continued confinement is necessary, the board may reassess such person's suitability for a new parole hearing at a later date to be determined at the discretion of the board, but not earlier than two years after the date of its decision. "(6) The decision of the board under this subsection shall not be subject to appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delgado , supra, 323 Conn. at 803 n.1, 151 A.3d 345 . 9 In Ellis , this court, following Delgado , concluded that despite the defendant's originally having faced "the possibility of eighty-one and one-h

2017If the board determines that continued confinement is necessary, the board may reassess such person's suitability for a new parole hearing at a later date to be determined at the discretion of the board, but not earlier than two years after the date of its decision. "(6) The decision of the board under this subsection shall not be subject to appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delgado , supra, 323 Conn. at 803 n.1, 151 A.3d 345 . 9 In Ellis , this court, following Delgado , concluded that despite the defendant's originally having faced "the possibility of eighty-one and one-h

2016State v. Delgado , supra, 247 Conn. at 633 , 725 A.2d 306 .

2016State v. Delgado , supra, 247 Conn. at 633 , 725 A.2d 306 .

2016Id.

2006State v. Boyd, 57 Conn. App. 176 , 749 A.2d 637 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 912 , 754 A.2d 162 (2000). 3 In its October 13,2004 return, the respondent commissioner of correction raised two affirmative defenses: First, that the petition is barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata as a result of a previous petition; and second, that an inmate serving an indeterminate life sentence has no right to a new parole hearing date.

2006State v. Boyd, 57 Conn. App. 176 , 749 A.2d 637 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 912 , 754 A.2d 162 (2000). 3 In its October 13,2004 return, the respondent commissioner of correction raised two affirmative defenses: First, that the petition is barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata as a result of a previous petition; and second, that an inmate serving an indeterminate life sentence has no right to a new parole hearing date.

2006Id., 829 . 5 Our Supreme Court distinguished Johnson , premised on an ex post facto violation, from Vincenzo v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 132 , 599 A.2d 31 (1991), in which this court addressed the liberty interests of prisoners under the due process clause.

2006State v. Boyd, 57 Conn. App. 176 , 749 A.2d 637 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 912 , 754 A.2d 162 (2000). 3 In its October 13,2004 return, the respondent commissioner of correction raised two affirmative defenses: First, that the petition is barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata as a result of a previous petition; and second, that an inmate serving an indeterminate life sentence has no right to a new parole hearing date.

2006State v. Boyd, 57 Conn. App. 176 , 749 A.2d 637 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 912 , 754 A.2d 162 (2000). 3 In its October 13,2004 return, the respondent commissioner of correction raised two affirmative defenses: First, that the petition is barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata as a result of a previous petition; and second, that an inmate serving an indeterminate life sentence has no right to a new parole hearing date.

2001“The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Id., 488 .

1989Id., 87 . “[I]n cases such as this, in which the parolee [or probationer] admits or has been convicted of an offense plainly constituting a parole violation, the only remaining inquiry is whether continued release is justified, notwithstanding the violation.” Id., 89 ; see also Nelson v. United States, 479 A.2d 340 (D.C.

1989Id., 87 . “[I]n cases such as this, in which the parolee [or probationer] admits or has been convicted of an offense plainly constituting a parole violation, the only remaining inquiry is whether continued release is justified, notwithstanding the violation.” Id., 89 ; see also Nelson v. United States, 479 A.2d 340 (D.C.

1989App. 1984); Smith v. United States, 474 A.2d 1271 (D.C.