parole violation in Oregon

2017But that distinction appears to be immaterial 28 Haynes v. Board of Parole given our discussion of the applicable parole framework in Janowski/Fleming v. Board of Parole, 349 Or 432 , 245 P3d 1270 (2010).

2017But that distinction appears to be immaterial 28 Haynes v. Board of Parole given our discussion of the applicable parole framework in Janowski/Fleming v. Board of Parole, 349 Or 432 , 245 P3d 1270 (2010).

2025First, she contends that the board “failed to conduct parole consideration hearings every two years as mandated by ORS 144.228.” Second, she contends that the board “failed to conduct a parole consideration hear- ing after Petitioner provided reasonable cause to believe she is suffering from no severe personality disorder.” And, third, she contends that the board “failed to address Petitioner’s claim her Court Ordered Sentence expires on 5-9-2024.” Reviewing for “legal error and substantial evi- dence[ ] (including substantial reason),” Morrison v. Board of Parole, 277 Or App 861, 863 , 374 P3

2025First, she contends that the board “failed to conduct parole consideration hearings every two years as mandated by ORS 144.228.” Second, she contends that the board “failed to conduct a parole consideration hear- ing after Petitioner provided reasonable cause to believe she is suffering from no severe personality disorder.” And, third, she contends that the board “failed to address Petitioner’s claim her Court Ordered Sentence expires on 5-9-2024.” Reviewing for “legal error and substantial evi- dence[ ] (including substantial reason),” Morrison v. Board of Parole, 277 Or App 861, 863 , 374 P3

2024Trent v. Connor Enterprises, Inc., 300 Or App 165, 170 , 452 P3d 1072 (2019) (declining to “develop arguments * * * that have not been briefed sufficiently to persuade us of their merit, and that raise potentially complicated issues”). 716 Thomsen v. Board of Parole issue that does not appear to be in dispute, which is that the board’s charge under ORS 163A.100 is to classify sex offenders into one of three notification levels based on their risk of reoffending at the time of the assessment.”); see also Engweiler v. Persson, 354 Or 549, 558 , 316 P3d 264 (2013) (“In judicial opinions, [dictum]

2024Trent v. Connor Enterprises, Inc., 300 Or App 165, 170 , 452 P3d 1072 (2019) (declining to “develop arguments * * * that have not been briefed sufficiently to persuade us of their merit, and that raise potentially complicated issues”). 716 Thomsen v. Board of Parole issue that does not appear to be in dispute, which is that the board’s charge under ORS 163A.100 is to classify sex offenders into one of three notification levels based on their risk of reoffending at the time of the assessment.”); see also Engweiler v. Persson, 354 Or 549, 558 , 316 P3d 264 (2013) (“In judicial opinions, [dictum]

2021The JAM-II rules provide: “Inmates, who were juveniles and waived to adult court pursuant to ORS 419C.340 through 419C.364, and were under the age of 17 years at the time of their crime(s), and were convicted of Aggravated Murder, per ORS 163.095, and whose crimes were committed after October 31, 1989 and prior to April 1, 1995, shall receive a prison term 1 Because petitioner proceeds solely under the Eighth Amendment and does not raise a state constitutional challenge under Article I, section 16, we do not address the JAM-II rules’ validity under that provision. 2 These rules applied to “a t

2021The JAM-II rules provide: “Inmates, who were juveniles and waived to adult court pursuant to ORS 419C.340 through 419C.364, and were under the age of 17 years at the time of their crime(s), and were convicted of Aggravated Murder, per ORS 163.095, and whose crimes were committed after October 31, 1989 and prior to April 1, 1995, shall receive a prison term 1 Because petitioner proceeds solely under the Eighth Amendment and does not raise a state constitutional challenge under Article I, section 16, we do not address the JAM-II rules’ validity under that provision. 2 These rules applied to “a t

2014Defendant cited a Court of Appeals case, State v. Pierce, 226 Or App 224, 229 , 203 P3d 290 , rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009), for the proposition that “arrest,” as used in ORS 162.315 and defined in ORS 133.005, requires that a person be restrained or placed in custody “for the purpose of charging that person with an offense.” Defendant argued that, because a parole violation is not an “offense” as defined in ORS 161.505 and because he was restrained for a parole violation, the officers had not placed him under restraint “for the purpose of charging him with an offense” and therefore had not “arre

2013Prior to 1997, ORS 162.315 did not contain a definition of “arrest.” ORS 162.315(2)(a) was added to the statute by Oregon Laws 1997, chapter 749, section 3. 1 We construed the incorporated definition of “arrest” in ORS 162.315(2)(a) in State v. Pierce, 226 Or App 224, 229 , 203 P3d 290 , rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009), holding that the phrase “for the purpose of charging that person with an offense” modifies the phrase “placing] a person under actual or constructive restraint” and the phrase “takfing] a person into custody.” In 2005, the statute was amended again by House Bill (HB) 3379 (2005).

2014Defendant cited a Court of Appeals case, State v. Pierce, 226 Or App 224, 229 , 203 P3d 290 , rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009), for the proposition that “arrest,” as used in ORS 162.315 and defined in ORS 133.005, requires that a person be restrained or placed in custody “for the purpose of charging that person with an offense.” Defendant argued that, because a parole violation is not an “offense” as defined in ORS 161.505 and because he was restrained for a parole violation, the officers had not placed him under restraint “for the purpose of charging him with an offense” and therefore had not “arre

2014Defendant cited a Court of Appeals case, State v. Pierce, 226 Or App 224, 229 , 203 P3d 290 , rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009), for the proposition that “arrest,” as used in ORS 162.315 and defined in ORS 133.005, requires that a person be restrained or placed in custody “for the purpose of charging that person with an offense.” Defendant argued that, because a parole violation is not an “offense” as defined in ORS 161.505 and because he was restrained for a parole violation, the officers had not placed him under restraint “for the purpose of charging him with an offense” and therefore had not “arre

2011Juvenile aggravated murderers also serve indeterminate life sentences and, as we discuss in more detail below, they, too, are eligible for a parole hearing and parole consideration under ORS 144.120. [13] The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion, determining that the references to converting the terms of the prisoners' confinement were "redundant," and concluding that accepting a measure of redundancy is preferable to "hold[ing] that some portion of a statute simply does not mean what it says." Engweiler VI, 232 Or.App. at 228 , 221 P.3d 818 .

2011Juvenile aggravated murderers also serve indeterminate life sentences and, as we discuss in more detail below, they, too, are eligible for a parole hearing and parole consideration under ORS 144.120. [13] The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion, determining that the references to converting the terms of the prisoners' confinement were "redundant," and concluding that accepting a measure of redundancy is preferable to "hold[ing] that some portion of a statute simply does not mean what it says." Engweiler VI, 232 Or.App. at 228 , 221 P.3d 818 .

2010Third, defendant, as respondent, contends that "[t]he nature of cell phones is such that a search of all the data on the device is too intrusive a privacy violation, and too intensive a search, to be permitted absent a warrant." (Boldface omitted.) Defendant elaborates: "Despite [ State v. ] Owens [, 302 Or. 196 , 729 P.2d 524 (1986),] rejecting an Article I, section 9, analysis that was dependent upon the nature of the personal effect, the Owens court could not contemplate the sophisticated nature of today's cell phones.

2010Third, defendant, as respondent, contends that "[t]he nature of cell phones is such that a search of all the data on the device is too intrusive a privacy violation, and too intensive a search, to be permitted absent a warrant." (Boldface omitted.) Defendant elaborates: "Despite [ State v. ] Owens [, 302 Or. 196 , 729 P.2d 524 (1986),] rejecting an Article I, section 9, analysis that was dependent upon the nature of the personal effect, the Owens court could not contemplate the sophisticated nature of today's cell phones.

2009To hold otherwise and "allow[ ] the police to use defendant's assertion of a privacy right as the basis for depriving him of that right would render the promise of Article I, section 9, illusory." State v. Brown, 110 Or.App. 604, 611-12 , 825 P.2d 282 (1992) (the defendant's belligerent demeanor and action of grabbing car keys was an assertion of the right to the privacy of the defendant's cars and not reasonable grounds to believe that the cars contained evidence of a parole violation).

2009To hold otherwise and "allow[ ] the police to use defendant's assertion of a privacy right as the basis for depriving him of that right would render the promise of Article I, section 9, illusory." State v. Brown, 110 Or.App. 604, 611-12 , 825 P.2d 282 (1992) (the defendant's belligerent demeanor and action of grabbing car keys was an assertion of the right to the privacy of the defendant's cars and not reasonable grounds to believe that the cars contained evidence of a parole violation).

2008The Board may consider it an aggravating factor if a new sentence is imposed consecutively to a parole violation commitment; “(b) If more than one sentence is imposed consecutively, the provisions of this rule shall be followed as to all new sentences.” We then noted that the petitioner in that case had received consecutive sentences for his criminal conduct while on parole, and we held that the “rule requires that the range for that sentence be converted to the ‘time served prior to revocation,’ which, as the state concedes, ‘wipes out the underlying sentence obligation when a person on parol

2000We write to address appellant’s argument that the Board erroneously failed to follow the rule of law announced in Roof v. Board of Parole, 85 Or App 188 , 736 P2d 193 (1987).

2022Id. at 254 .

2022Cite as 322 Or App 751 (2022) 759 In Engweiler, the relators argued that they were entitled to initial parole hearings and release determina- tions, and the board responded that the legislature’s inser- tion of “with the exception of those sentenced to aggravated murder” indicated an intention to exclude those sentenced for aggravated murder from the provisions of ORS 144.120. 350 Or at 595, 602, 622 .

2022Id. at 484 (“What is needed is an informal hearing structured Cite as 370 Or 653 (2022) 667 to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” (Emphasis added.)); see also id. at 488 (“[The hearing] must lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined war- rant revocation.

2021See Morrissey, 408 US at 484 (Due process requires “an informal hearing struc- tured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts”); Heller v. Doe, 509 US 312, 332 , 3 “[W]e are not bound by decisions of the Ninth Circuit—or any other federal circuit—even on questions of federal law.” State v. Ward, 367 Or 188, 197 , 475 P3d 420 (2020).

2021The exception does not mean that aggravated murderers are not entitled to a parole hearing at all.” Cite as 309 Or App 296 (2021) 307 (1985).

2021See Morrissey, 408 US at 484 (Due process requires “an informal hearing struc- tured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts”); Heller v. Doe, 509 US 312, 332 , 3 “[W]e are not bound by decisions of the Ninth Circuit—or any other federal circuit—even on questions of federal law.” State v. Ward, 367 Or 188, 197 , 475 P3d 420 (2020).

2021See Morrissey, 408 US at 484 (Due process requires “an informal hearing struc- tured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts”); Heller v. Doe, 509 US 312, 332 , 3 “[W]e are not bound by decisions of the Ninth Circuit—or any other federal circuit—even on questions of federal law.” State v. Ward, 367 Or 188, 197 , 475 P3d 420 (2020).

2017As petitioner set out in his petition for post-conviction relief, the board “set a prison term of 288 months on the conviction for Aggravated Murder.” 3 Also in 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller , in which it held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” 567 US at 479 , 132 S Ct at 2469 .

2017As petitioner set out in his petition for post-conviction relief, the board “set a prison term of 288 months on the conviction for Aggravated Murder.” 3 Also in 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller , in which it held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” 567 US at 479 , 132 S Ct at 2469 .

2017The state argued that, because states are under no constitutional imperative to provide a right to appeal criminal convictions,10 “whatever a state does or does not do on appeal—whether or not to have an appeal and if so, how to operate it—is of no due process con- cern to the Constitution.” Id. at 400 .

2016Furthermore, for purposes of ORS 183.400(4)(b), a rule is deemed to exceed its statutory authority not only if it exceeds the express or implied authority of the statutes that the rule purports to implement, but also if the rule “contravene [s] some other applicable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565 , 687 P2d 785 (1984); see State ex rel Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or 592, 627 , 260 P3d 448 (2011) (finding that rules pertaining to parole consideration for juveniles convicted of aggravated murder, which required such juveniles to undergo an intermediate hea

2016Furthermore, for purposes of ORS 183.400(4)(b), a rule is deemed to exceed its statutory authority not only if it exceeds the express or implied authority of the statutes that the rule purports to implement, but also if the rule “contravene [s] some other applicable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565 , 687 P2d 785 (1984); see State ex rel Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or 592, 627 , 260 P3d 448 (2011) (finding that rules pertaining to parole consideration for juveniles convicted of aggravated murder, which required such juveniles to undergo an intermediate hea

2016Even assuming that argument is an appropriate alternative basis for affirmance under Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60 , 20 P3d 180 (2001), the argument is unavailing based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Avila-Nava .

2016Even assuming that argument is an appropriate alternative basis for affirmance under Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60 , 20 P3d 180 (2001), the argument is unavailing based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Avila-Nava .

2014State v. McClure, 256 Or App 200 , 300 P3d 210 (2013).

2014State v. McClure, 256 Or App 200 , 300 P3d 210 (2013).

2011That court agreed that ORS 144.120(1)(a) (1991) did not require a hearing or parole release date for any person who had been convicted of aggravated murder, and it noted that, in any event, in Engweiler VI , it held that juvenile aggravated murderers were subject to the aggravated murder review hearing process set out in ORS 144.110(2)(a) and ORS 163.105, and not the initial parole hearing process set out in ORS 144.120(1)(a). [11] Sopher III, 233 Or.App. at 236, 225 P.3d 142 .