32 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lombardi v. Massogreen2 sentences2026The law of the case doctrine "is a discretionary rule that calls on one court 'to balance the value of judicial deference for the rulings of a coordinate [court] against those factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly, the search for truth.'" State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 276 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting A-2885-24 15 Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538-39 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he law of the case doctrine 'is only triggered when one court is faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical issue.'" La 2026The law of the case doctrine "is a discretionary rule that calls on one court 'to balance the value of judicial deference for the rulings of a coordinate [court] against those factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly, the search for truth.'" Id. at 276 (alteration in original) (quoting Lombardi v. Masso, A-1341-24 11 207 N.J. 517, 538-39 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he law of the case doctrine 'is only triggered when one court is faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical issue.'" Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Reldangreen2 sentences2021Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 538-39 ; State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 205-07 (1985). 2021The motion judge then cited to State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 203-05 (1985), and explained the law of the case doctrine as "a discretionary principle that when applied . . . requires that a decision of law made in [a] particular case 1 He explained that between 5:30 and 7:00 a.m. on January 1, 1981, defendant entered the victim's home, and sexually assaulted through vaginal, oral, and anal penetration, "using the knife to force [the victim] into performing these acts." A-1819-19 7 be respected . . . by all other lower or equal courts during pendency of the litigation." He added that the doctri | 2 | 3 |
Slowinski v. Valley Nat. Bankgreen2 sentences2003However, "the law of the case doctrine, unlike the doctrine of res judicata, operates as a discretionary rule of practice and not one of law." Brown v. Tp. of Old Bridge, 319 N.J.Super. 476, 494 , 725 A. 2d 1154, 1163 (App.Div.) (citing Slowinski v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 179 , 624 A. 2d 85, 88 (App.Div.1993)), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 131 , 741 A. 2d 99 (1999). 2003However, "the law of the case doctrine, unlike the doctrine of res judicata, operates as a discretionary rule of practice and not one of law." Brown v. Tp. of Old Bridge, 319 N.J.Super. 476, 494 , 725 A. 2d 1154, 1163 (App.Div.) (citing Slowinski v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 179 , 624 A. 2d 85, 88 (App.Div.1993)), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 131 , 741 A. 2d 99 (1999). | 2 | 3 |
Dolson v. Anastasiagreen2 sentences1991In each case, "the court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord him the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom, and if reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied." S. Pressler, supra, R. 4:40-2 comment (1991); see Dolson v. Anastasia, supra, 55 N.J. at 5-6 , 258 A. 2d 706 (distinguishing this "rather mechanical" standard from the more discretionary standard that the reviewing court may apply in connection with a new trial motion). *175 That standard for resolving issue 1991In each case, "the court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord him the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom, and if reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied." S. Pressler, supra, R. 4:40-2 comment (1991); see Dolson v. Anastasia, supra, 55 N.J. at 5-6 , 258 A. 2d 706 (distinguishing this "rather mechanical" standard from the more discretionary standard that the reviewing court may apply in connection with a new trial motion). *175 That standard for resolving issue | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Township of Old Bridgegreen2 sentences2003However, "the law of the case doctrine, unlike the doctrine of res judicata, operates as a discretionary rule of practice and not one of law." Brown v. Tp. of Old Bridge, 319 N.J.Super. 476, 494 , 725 A. 2d 1154, 1163 (App.Div.) (citing Slowinski v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 179 , 624 A. 2d 85, 88 (App.Div.1993)), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 131 , 741 A. 2d 99 (1999). 2003However, "the law of the case doctrine, unlike the doctrine of res judicata, operates as a discretionary rule of practice and not one of law." Brown v. Tp. of Old Bridge, 319 N.J.Super. 476, 494 , 725 A. 2d 1154, 1163 (App.Div.) (citing Slowinski v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 264 N.J.Super. 172, 179 , 624 A. 2d 85, 88 (App.Div.1993)), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 131 , 741 A. 2d 99 (1999). | 1 | 3 |
State v. K.P.S. and State v. Carmini Laloogreen1 sentence2026The law of the case doctrine "is a discretionary rule that calls on one court 'to balance the value of judicial deference for the rulings of a coordinate [court] against those factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly, the search for truth.'" State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 276 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting A-2885-24 15 Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538-39 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he law of the case doctrine 'is only triggered when one court is faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical issue.'" La | 1 | 1 |
State v. Priestergreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 85 (1975) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial judge's decision on the defendant's request for transfer to a substance abuse program pursuant to subsection (b)(1)); State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245 , 260 (2021) (considering modification under subsection (b)(2) based on the defendant's medical condition, stating, "As with sentencing, the scope of appellate review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion is whether the trial court abused its discretion." (quoting State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 137 (1985))). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 85 (1975) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial judge's decision on the defendant's request for transfer to a substance abuse program pursuant to subsection (b)(1)); State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245 , 260 (2021) (considering modification under subsection (b)(2) based on the defendant's medical condition, stating, "As with sentencing, the scope of appellate review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion is whether the trial court abused its discretion." (quoting State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 137 (1985))). | 1 | 1 |
S.P. v. Newark Police Departmentgreen1 sentence2021Ministerial acts, in contrast, are those “which a person performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done.” S.P. v. Newark Police Dep’t, 428 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Berrygreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) ("The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." (citing State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280, 293 (1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Deborah Townsend v. Noah Pierre (072357)green1 sentence2021See, e.g., Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) ("The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." (citing State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280, 293 (1995)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munozgreen1 sentence2019A-1084-17T1 23 "The 'law of the case' doctrine is a discretionary rule . . . [that] is 'restricted to preventing relitigation of the same issue in the same suit.'" State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Hart v. City of Jersey Citygreen2 sentences2003Moreover, "a denial of summary judgment is always interlocutory, and never precludes the entry of judgment for the moving party later in the case." Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J.Super. 487, 498 , 706 A. 2d 256, 261 (App.Div.1998); see also Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J.Super. 250, 257 , 531 A. 2d 1078, 1081 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 , 540 A. 2d 189 (1988). 2003Moreover, "a denial of summary judgment is always interlocutory, and never precludes the entry of judgment for the moving party later in the case." Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J.Super. 487, 498 , 706 A. 2d 256, 261 (App.Div.1998); see also Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J.Super. 250, 257 , 531 A. 2d 1078, 1081 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 , 540 A. 2d 189 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lamargreen1 sentence2003Moreover, "a denial of summary judgment is always interlocutory, and never precludes the entry of judgment for the moving party later in the case." Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J.Super. 487, 498 , 706 A. 2d 256, 261 (App.Div.1998); see also Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J.Super. 250, 257 , 531 A. 2d 1078, 1081 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 , 540 A. 2d 189 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp.green1 sentence2003Moreover, "a denial of summary judgment is always interlocutory, and never precludes the entry of judgment for the moving party later in the case." Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J.Super. 487, 498 , 706 A. 2d 256, 261 (App.Div.1998); see also Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J.Super. 250, 257 , 531 A. 2d 1078, 1081 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 , 540 A. 2d 189 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp.green2 sentences2003Moreover, "a denial of summary judgment is always interlocutory, and never precludes the entry of judgment for the moving party later in the case." Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J.Super. 487, 498 , 706 A. 2d 256, 261 (App.Div.1998); see also Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J.Super. 250, 257 , 531 A. 2d 1078, 1081 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 , 540 A. 2d 189 (1988). 2003Moreover, "a denial of summary judgment is always interlocutory, and never precludes the entry of judgment for the moving party later in the case." Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J.Super. 487, 498 , 706 A. 2d 256, 261 (App.Div.1998); see also Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J.Super. 250, 257 , 531 A. 2d 1078, 1081 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 , 540 A. 2d 189 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Lanzet v. Greenberggreen2 sentences1997See Lanzet v. Greenberg, supra, 126 N.J. at 174 , 594 A.2d 1309 , citing Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6-7 , 258 A.2d 706 (1969). 1997See Lanzet v. Greenberg, supra, 126 N.J. at 174 , 594 A.2d 1309 , citing Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6-7 , 258 A.2d 706 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Steiner v. Steingreen2 sentences1996Under the Court's discretionary standard, Family Part judges would be required to permit jury trials in relatively few marital tort cases joined with divorce actions. *309 Article I, Paragraph 9 of the 1947 Constitution preserves the common law right of trial by jury: "The right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Our Court has interpreted that provision, consistent with its plain meaning, as ensuring that "[w]here the right to a trial by jury existed under the Constitution of 1844, the right continues unimpaired under the new Constitution." Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 378-79 , 66 A. 1996Under the Court's discretionary standard, Family Part judges would be required to permit jury trials in relatively few marital tort cases joined with divorce actions. *309 Article I, Paragraph 9 of the 1947 Constitution preserves the common law right of trial by jury: "The right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Our Court has interpreted that provision, consistent with its plain meaning, as ensuring that "[w]here the right to a trial by jury existed under the Constitution of 1844, the right continues unimpaired under the new Constitution." Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 378-79 , 66 A. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wilkinsgreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 34 N.C.App. 392 , 238 S.E.2d 659 (1977) (within trial court’s discretion to allow cross-examination regarding violations of the terms of probation since these matters tend to cast light on the character of the witness). 1992See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 34 N.C.App. 392 , 238 S.E.2d 659 (1977) (within trial court’s discretion to allow cross-examination regarding violations of the terms of probation since these matters tend to cast light on the character of the witness). | 1 | 1 |
Harvey v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF WABASH COUNTYgreen2 sentences1985It has been recognized that "where the government's *515 activity is affirmative, specific, and in violation of a statute, regulation or constitutional provision imposing a duty upon government, courts are often willing to say that there is no room for discretion." Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 1041-42 & nn. 99 & 1 (collecting federal cases); see also, e.g., Harvey v. Board of Commissioners of Wabash, 416 N.E. 2d 1296 (Ind. App. 1981) (county must post traffic control signs in precise conformance with applicable state law); Elson v. P.U.C., 51 Cal. App. 3d 577 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1975) (statut 1985It has been recognized that “where the government’s activity is affirmative, specific, and in violation of a statute, regulation or constitutional provision imposing a duty upon government, courts are often willing to say that there is no room for discretion.” Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 1041-42 & nn. 99 & 1 (collecting federal cases); see also, e.g., Harvey v. Board of Commissioners of Wabash, 416 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. App.1981) (county must post traffic control signs in precise conformance with applicable state law); Elson v. P.U.C., 51 Cal.App.3d 577 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 305 (1975) (statutory duty t | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences1985Accord Rogers v. State, 51 Hawaii 293, 296-298 , 459 P.2d 378, 381-82 (1969) (decision where to place a sign is ministerial). 9 The record also suggests an additional theory that may bar the application of the discretionary immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a). 1985Accord Rogers v. State, 51 Hawaii 293, 296-298 , 459 P.2d 378, 381-82 (1969) (decision where to place a sign is ministerial). 9 The record also suggests an additional theory that may bar the application of the discretionary immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hale
green
2 sentences1999Slowinski, supra, 264 N.J.Super. at 179 , 624 A. 2d 85 (citing State v. Hale, supra, 127 N.J.Super. at 410-11 , 317 A. 2d 731 ). 1974In such a case, the decision rendered at the pretrial hearing may be said to be the law of the case during the subsequent trial." State v. Hale, supra at 411 ; emphasis added. *591 However, it is correctly stated in Hale that the "law of the case" doctrine "operates only as a discretionary rule of practice and not one of law." 127 N.J. | 3 | 1974–1999 |
Costa v. Josey
green
2 sentences1993Concerning the PBA's contention that the discretionary immunity provided to employees by section 3-2a applies, we note first our decision in Costa, supra, 83 N.J. at 54-55 , 415 A. 2d 337 , limiting such immunity to discretion exercised at the highest levels of government in matters of policy or planning. 1993Concerning the PBA's contention that the discretionary immunity provided to employees by section 3-2a applies, we note first our decision in Costa, supra, 83 N.J. at 54-55 , 415 A. 2d 337 , limiting such immunity to discretion exercised at the highest levels of government in matters of policy or planning. | 2 | 1984–1993 |
In the Matter of John Restrepo, Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2022Therefore, the CSC's final administrative action was timely whether the extension is considered valid pursuant to the good cause standard of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) and N.J.A.C. 1:1- 18.8(e), or the discretionary standard of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-204 and Restrepo, 449 N.J. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Corvelli v. Board of Trustees
green
1 sentence2019Sys., 130 N.J. 539 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (holding that pension benefits may be forfeited under a discretionary analysis for "a crime involving moral turpitude which is unrelated to . . . public office"). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Tice v. Cramer
green
2 sentences2012We are cognizant that in Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 366 , 627 A.2d 1090 (1993), the Supreme Court held the discretionary immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a) did not apply to police conduct during a high-speed chase of a fleeing motorist, although finding immunity for injuries resulting from the pursuit under the TCA on other grounds. 5 The Court reasoned: The officer’s conduct, comprised of the decision whether to pursue, how to pursue, and whether to continue to pursue, is also infinitely distant from high-level policy or planning decisions____ fTlo label this kind of determination by a public 2012We are cognizant that in Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 366 , 627 A.2d 1090 (1993), the Supreme Court held the discretionary immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a) did not apply to police conduct during a high-speed chase of a fleeing motorist, although finding immunity for injuries resulting from the pursuit under the TCA on other grounds. 5 The Court reasoned: The officer’s conduct, comprised of the decision whether to pursue, how to pursue, and whether to continue to pursue, is also infinitely distant from high-level policy or planning decisions____ fTlo label this kind of determination by a public | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Higgins v. Swiecicki
green
2 sentences2010Citing Higgins v. Swiecicki, 315 N.J.Super. 488 , 719 A. 2d 166 (App.Div.1998), the trial judge applied the "law of the case doctrine," concluding he must continue "operating under orders of another judge" so that "once [the case] starts you operate within that case until it's reversed." The court continued: [I]t's a discretionary doctrine, but I think it's a good doctrine because there's so many things that could have happened. .... 2010Citing Higgins v. Swiecicki, 315 N.J.Super. 488 , 719 A. 2d 166 (App.Div.1998), the trial judge applied the "law of the case doctrine," concluding he must continue "operating under orders of another judge" so that "once [the case] starts you operate within that case until it's reversed." The court continued: [I]t's a discretionary doctrine, but I think it's a good doctrine because there's so many things that could have happened. .... | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Dept. of Health v. Concrete Specialties, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995The Appellate Division refused to exercise original jurisdiction because this ease does not fall into either of the two categories in which original jurisdiction has been exercised in the past: 1) to complete the determination of issues raised but not decided in a trial court, Department of Health v. Concrete Specialties, Inc., 112 N.J.Super. 407, 411 , 271 A.2d 595 (App.Div.1970) (exercising original jurisdiction to impose statutory penalty for complete determination of matter where trial court had improperly dismissed penalty complaint), and 2) to provide emergent relief in a matter implicat 1995The Appellate Division refused to exercise original jurisdiction because this ease does not fall into either of the two categories in which original jurisdiction has been exercised in the past: 1) to complete the determination of issues raised but not decided in a trial court, Department of Health v. Concrete Specialties, Inc., 112 N.J.Super. 407, 411 , 271 A.2d 595 (App.Div.1970) (exercising original jurisdiction to impose statutory penalty for complete determination of matter where trial court had improperly dismissed penalty complaint), and 2) to provide emergent relief in a matter implicat | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Civic Southern Factors Corp. v. Bonat
green
1 sentence1989It must be reviewed under standards applicable to the exercise of such discretion, set forth by our Supreme Court in Civic Southern Factors v. Bonat, 65 N.J. 329 (1974). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Elson v. Public Utilities Commission
green
2 sentences1985It has been recognized that “where the government’s activity is affirmative, specific, and in violation of a statute, regulation or constitutional provision imposing a duty upon government, courts are often willing to say that there is no room for discretion.” Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 1041-42 & nn. 99 & 1 (collecting federal cases); see also, e.g., Harvey v. Board of Commissioners of Wabash, 416 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. App.1981) (county must post traffic control signs in precise conformance with applicable state law); Elson v. P.U.C., 51 Cal.App.3d 577 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 305 (1975) (statutory duty t 1985It has been recognized that “where the government’s activity is affirmative, specific, and in violation of a statute, regulation or constitutional provision imposing a duty upon government, courts are often willing to say that there is no room for discretion.” Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 1041-42 & nn. 99 & 1 (collecting federal cases); see also, e.g., Harvey v. Board of Commissioners of Wabash, 416 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. App.1981) (county must post traffic control signs in precise conformance with applicable state law); Elson v. P.U.C., 51 Cal.App.3d 577 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 305 (1975) (statutory duty t | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| De La Rosa v. City of San Bernardino green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Eyers v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'RETIREM. SYS. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Johnson v. State of California green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Southern Railway Co. v. Clift green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Hoy v. Capelli green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.