discretionary immunity in Ohio

2026Such an argument has previously been addressed by the 10th District Court of Appeals, The doctrine of discretionary immunity “provides that ‘the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.’” Hughes at ¶ 16 , quoting Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 , 14 Ohio B. 506 , 471 N.E.2d 776 (1984). “[W]ith respect to penal institutions, prison administrators must be accorded deference in

2026Such an argument has previously been addressed by the 10th District Court of Appeals, The doctrine of discretionary immunity “provides that ‘the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.’” Hughes at ¶ 16 , quoting Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 , 14 Ohio B. 506 , 471 N.E.2d 776 (1984). “[W]ith respect to penal institutions, prison administrators must be accorded deference in

2026Such an argument has previously been addressed by the 10th District Court of Appeals, The doctrine of discretionary immunity “provides that ‘the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.’” Hughes at ¶ 16 , quoting Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 , 14 Ohio B. 506 , 471 N.E.2d 776 (1984). “[W]ith respect to penal institutions, prison administrators must be accorded deference in

2026Such an argument has previously been addressed by the 10th District Court of Appeals, The doctrine of discretionary immunity “provides that ‘the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.’” Hughes at ¶ 16 , quoting Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 , 14 Ohio B. 506 , 471 N.E.2d 776 (1984). “[W]ith respect to penal institutions, prison administrators must be accorded deference in

2025Under this doctrine of discretionary immunity, the state “is immune from any liability arising from the decisions made pursuant to its discretionary function.” Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2015-Ohio-4443, ¶ 24 . {¶ 16} This court has repeatedly held that appellee is “generally immune from liability arising from decisions regarding inmate transfer and placement under the discretionary immunity doctrine expressed in Reynolds . . .” Troutman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2005-Ohio-334, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); see also Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-1521, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); Deavo

2025Under this doctrine of discretionary immunity, the state “is immune from any liability arising from the decisions made pursuant to its discretionary function.” Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2015-Ohio-4443, ¶ 24 . {¶ 16} This court has repeatedly held that appellee is “generally immune from liability arising from decisions regarding inmate transfer and placement under the discretionary immunity doctrine expressed in Reynolds . . .” Troutman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2005-Ohio-334, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); see also Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-1521, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); Deavo

2025State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44 , 2002-Ohio-7044 , 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 62 , applying Crim.R. 52(B).

2025State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44 , 2002-Ohio-7044 , 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 62 , applying Crim.R. 52(B).

2025Under this doctrine of discretionary immunity, the state “is immune from any liability arising from the decisions made pursuant to its discretionary function.” Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2015-Ohio-4443, ¶ 24 . {¶ 16} This court has repeatedly held that appellee is “generally immune from liability arising from decisions regarding inmate transfer and placement under the discretionary immunity doctrine expressed in Reynolds . . .” Troutman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2005-Ohio-334, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); see also Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-1521, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); Deavo

2025Under this doctrine of discretionary immunity, the state “is immune from any liability arising from the decisions made pursuant to its discretionary function.” Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2015-Ohio-4443, ¶ 24 . {¶ 16} This court has repeatedly held that appellee is “generally immune from liability arising from decisions regarding inmate transfer and placement under the discretionary immunity doctrine expressed in Reynolds . . .” Troutman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2005-Ohio-334, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); see also Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-1521, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); Deavo

2025This court recently rejected the argument “that the doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply to contract claims that seek to impose liability for the state’s exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Smith, 2024-Ohio-5887, at ¶ 45 .

2025This court recently rejected the argument “that the doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply to contract claims that seek to impose liability for the state’s exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Smith, 2024-Ohio-5887, at ¶ 45 .

2025See also Al-Jahmi v. Ohio Athletic Comm., 2022-Ohio-2296, ¶ 83-85 (10th Dist.) (applying Reynolds and Foster to conclude that the state athletic commission’s decisions regarding referee and ringside physician training requirements and educational materials was protected by discretionary immunity, but the decisions to license and appoint a specific referee and physician were not because the agency failed to demonstrate the decisions concerned an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision); Miller v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2014-Ohio-3738, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.) (co

2016No. 13AP-849, 2014-Ohio-3738, ¶ 32 ], quoting Foster v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist.

2025See McDermott v. Ohio State Univ., 2025-Ohio-396, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.); see also Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 2024- Ohio-5887, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.).

2025See also Al-Jahmi v. Ohio Athletic Comm., 2022-Ohio-2296, ¶ 83-85 (10th Dist.) (applying Reynolds and Foster to conclude that the state athletic commission’s decisions regarding referee and ringside physician training requirements and educational materials was protected by discretionary immunity, but the decisions to license and appoint a specific referee and physician were not because the agency failed to demonstrate the decisions concerned an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision); Miller v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2014-Ohio-3738, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.) (co

2025State v. Noling, 2002-Ohio-7044, ¶ 62 . {¶72} “The prosecution is not prevented from commenting upon the failure of the defense to offer evidence in support of its case.” State v. Williams, 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 20 (1986).

2025Under this doctrine of discretionary immunity, the state “is immune from any liability arising from the decisions made pursuant to its discretionary function.” Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2015-Ohio-4443, ¶ 24 . {¶ 16} This court has repeatedly held that appellee is “generally immune from liability arising from decisions regarding inmate transfer and placement under the discretionary immunity doctrine expressed in Reynolds . . .” Troutman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2005-Ohio-334, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); see also Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-1521, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); Deavo

2025Under this doctrine of discretionary immunity, the state “is immune from any liability arising from the decisions made pursuant to its discretionary function.” Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2015-Ohio-4443, ¶ 24 . {¶ 16} This court has repeatedly held that appellee is “generally immune from liability arising from decisions regarding inmate transfer and placement under the discretionary immunity doctrine expressed in Reynolds . . .” Troutman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2005-Ohio-334, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); see also Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-1521, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); Deavo

2020One acts recklessly when “he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that the conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.” Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St. 3d 102, 104-105 (1990), abrogated on other grounds.

2019See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). {¶16} “‘There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.

2014No. 04CA37, 2005-Ohio-37, ¶38 (finding no plain error because there was no evidence in the record that the prosecutor agreed to recommend a certain sentence); United States v. Barnes, 278 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.2002) (finding plain error where government agreed to recommend the low end of the guidelines, but at sentencing the government did not mention the recommendation) {¶24} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” -7- Plain error is a discretionary doctrine to be used with the u