discretionary immunity in Nevada

2018Id. at 241-42 , 984 P.2d at 175 .

2018Id. at 241-42 , 984 P.2d at 175 .

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

1972The purpose of that act was stated in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955), to be “to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in circumstances like unto those in which a private person would be liable and not to leave just treatment to the caprice and legislative burden of individual private laws.” In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 (1951), the High Court stated that, in view of the clearly defined purpose of the act as a whole, “it is inconsistent to whittle it down by refinements.” The State’s position in conn

2007While the scope of this opinion is confined to the liability of Dr. Martinez, we note that the estate does not appear to allege that MedAssociates was negligent in performance of these functions or that the actions of MedAssociates as an administrative entity otherwise contributed to Mr. Maruszczak’s death. 25 Arnesano v. State, Dep’t Transp., 113 Nev. 815, 823-24 , 942 P.2d 139, 144-45 (1997) (“[Discretionary immunity applies to the planning level of government, but not to the actual construction and operation of a project. . . . [T]he state’s decision not to install barrier protection was an

2007While the scope of this opinion is confined to the liability of Dr. Martinez, we note that the estate does not appear to allege that MedAssociates was negligent in performance of these functions or that the actions of MedAssociates as an administrative entity otherwise contributed to Mr. Maruszczak’s death. 25 Arnesano v. State, Dep’t Transp., 113 Nev. 815, 823-24 , 942 P.2d 139, 144-45 (1997) (“[Discretionary immunity applies to the planning level of government, but not to the actual construction and operation of a project. . . . [T]he state’s decision not to install barrier protection was an

2017Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322.

2017Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322 .

2016Op. 83, 335 P.3d 211 , 214 (2014) ("Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 414 , 168 P.3d 1050, 1052 (2007) (this court reviews a district court's dismissal of a case for failure to comply with the requirements of NRCP 16.1(e)(2) for an abuse of discretion due to the language that the court "may" sanction noncompliance with the rule, and NRCP 16.1(e)(1) outlines a similar discretionary standard for noncompliance with NRCP 16.1(b)); see also Adamson v. Bowher, 8

2016Op. 83, 335 P.3d 211 , 214 (2014) ("Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 414 , 168 P.3d 1050, 1052 (2007) (this court reviews a district court's dismissal of a case for failure to comply with the requirements of NRCP 16.1(e)(2) for an abuse of discretion due to the language that the court "may" sanction noncompliance with the rule, and NRCP 16.1(e)(1) outlines a similar discretionary standard for noncompliance with NRCP 16.1(b)); see also Adamson v. Bowher, 8

2016Op. 83, 335 P.3d 211 , 214 (2014) ("Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 414 , 168 P.3d 1050, 1052 (2007) (this court reviews a district court's dismissal of a case for failure to comply with the requirements of NRCP 16.1(e)(2) for an abuse of discretion due to the language that the court "may" sanction noncompliance with the rule, and NRCP 16.1(e)(1) outlines a similar discretionary standard for noncompliance with NRCP 16.1(b)); see also Adamson v. Bowher, 8

2016Op. 83, 335 P.3d 211 , 214 (2014) ("Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 414 , 168 P.3d 1050, 1052 (2007) (this court reviews a district court's dismissal of a case for failure to comply with the requirements of NRCP 16.1(e)(2) for an abuse of discretion due to the language that the court "may" sanction noncompliance with the rule, and NRCP 16.1(e)(1) outlines a similar discretionary standard for noncompliance with NRCP 16.1(b)); see also Adamson v. Bowher, 8

2014Mainor v. Nault, 120 Nev. 750, 765 , 101 P.3d 308, 318 (2004).

2014Mainor v. Nault, 120 Nev. 750, 765 , 101 P.3d 308, 318 (2004).

2010See Gross v. Town of Cicero, Illinois, 528 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that in applying sanction for noncompliance with rules of appellate procedure, “it is important to match the sanction to the offense”).

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007While the scope of this opinion is confined to the liability of Dr. Martinez, we note that the estate does not appear to allege that MedAssociates was negligent in performance of these functions or that the actions of MedAssociates as an administrative entity otherwise contributed to Mr. Maruszczak’s death. 25 Arnesano v. State, Dep’t Transp., 113 Nev. 815, 823-24 , 942 P.2d 139, 144-45 (1997) (“[Discretionary immunity applies to the planning level of government, but not to the actual construction and operation of a project. . . . [T]he state’s decision not to install barrier protection was an

2007While the scope of this opinion is confined to the liability of Dr. Martinez, we note that the estate does not appear to allege that MedAssociates was negligent in performance of these functions or that the actions of MedAssociates as an administrative entity otherwise contributed to Mr. Maruszczak’s death. 25 Arnesano v. State, Dep’t Transp., 113 Nev. 815, 823-24 , 942 P.2d 139, 144-45 (1997) (“[Discretionary immunity applies to the planning level of government, but not to the actual construction and operation of a project. . . . [T]he state’s decision not to install barrier protection was an

2007While the scope of this opinion is confined to the liability of Dr. Martinez, we note that the estate does not appear to allege that MedAssociates was negligent in performance of these functions or that the actions of MedAssociates as an administrative entity otherwise contributed to Mr. Maruszczak’s death. 25 Arnesano v. State, Dep’t Transp., 113 Nev. 815, 823-24 , 942 P.2d 139, 144-45 (1997) (“[Discretionary immunity applies to the planning level of government, but not to the actual construction and operation of a project. . . . [T]he state’s decision not to install barrier protection was an

2007While the scope of this opinion is confined to the liability of Dr. Martinez, we note that the estate does not appear to allege that MedAssociates was negligent in performance of these functions or that the actions of MedAssociates as an administrative entity otherwise contributed to Mr. Maruszczak’s death. 25 Arnesano v. State, Dep’t Transp., 113 Nev. 815, 823-24 , 942 P.2d 139, 144-45 (1997) (“[Discretionary immunity applies to the planning level of government, but not to the actual construction and operation of a project. . . . [T]he state’s decision not to install barrier protection was an

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

2007Police Dep’t, 110 Nev. 307, 309 , 871 P.2d 932, 934 (1994) (quoting Board of Co. Comm’rs v. Cirac, 98 Nev. 57, 59 , 639 P.2d 538, 539 (1982)). 28 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 , 953 P.2d 18, 23 (1998) (concluding that no civil liability attached to a state trooper’s decision to arrest a driver for allegedly refusing to sign a traffic ticket because the decision to do so was a *444 discretionary decision requiring personal deliberation and judgment and thus entitled to immunity under NRS 41.032(2)); Maturi, 110 Nev. at 309-10 , 871 P.2d at 934 (determining that the police officers’ decision

1972The purpose of that act was stated in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955), to be “to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in circumstances like unto those in which a private person would be liable and not to leave just treatment to the caprice and legislative burden of individual private laws.” In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 (1951), the High Court stated that, in view of the clearly defined purpose of the act as a whole, “it is inconsistent to whittle it down by refinements.” The State’s position in conn