discretionary immunity in Illinois

2013See Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 484 (“Because ‘[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable’ [citation], this broad discretionary immunity applies to the entities themselves.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). ¶ 59 Relying upon Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111 (2008), plaintiff argues that sections 2-201 and 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act do not afford defendant immunity for retaliatory discharge.

2013See Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 484 (“Because ‘[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable’ [citation], this broad discretionary immunity applies to the entities themselves.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). ¶ 59 Relying upon Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111 (2008), plaintiff argues that sections 2-201 and 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act do not afford defendant immunity for retaliatory discharge.

2025“Discretionary immunity for public officials is ‘premised upon the idea that such officials should be allowed to exercise their judgment in rendering decisions without fear that a good-faith mistake might subject them to liability.’ ” Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 2019 IL 124283, ¶ 26 (quoting Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 472 (2001)).

2025“Discretionary immunity for public officials is ‘premised upon the idea that such officials should be allowed to exercise their judgment in rendering decisions without fear that a good-faith mistake might subject them to liability.’ ” Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 2019 IL 124283, ¶ 26 (quoting Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 472 (2001)).

2019See Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 472 (1995). ¶ 56 In Courson v. Danville School District No. 118, 333 Ill.

1997In Snyder , the supreme court held that the doctrine of discretionary immunity does not provide absolute immunity to municipalities for the negligent placement of traffic warning devices. 167 Ill. 2d at 467 .

2000As recognized by the supreme court in Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370 (1997), the immunities under section 2 — 201 and under section 3 — 108 operate independently of one another: “The proper way to give meaning to both of these statutory immunities is to recognize that the discretionary immunity provided for in sections 2 — 109 and 2 — 201 does not in any way operate to remove or otherwise limit the immunity granted in section 3 — 108(a) for the failure to supervise.

2000As recognized by the supreme court in Epstein v. The Chicago Board of Education , 178 Ill. 2d 370 (1997), the immunities under section 2-201 and under section 3-108 operate independently of one another: "The proper way to give meaning to both of these statutory immunities is to recognize that the discretionary immunity provided for in section 2-201 does not in any way operate to remove or otherwise limit the immunity granted in section 3-108 for the failure to supervise.

2024Similarly here, it is not conclusive that Holmes was a part-time police officer as opposed to someone with - 14 - 2023 IL App (2d) 230009-U more power; he was still engaged in policy-making as the Village’s only TASER training instructor. ¶ 32 Discretionary immunity is “premised upon the idea that public officials should be allowed to exercise their judgment in rendering decisions without fear that a good-faith mistake might subject them to liability.” Harrison v. Hardin Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466 , 472 (2001) (citing White v. Village of Homewood, 285 Ill.

2021Discretionary immunity for public officials is “premised upon the idea that such officials should be allowed to exercise their judgment in rendering decisions without fear that a good- -7- faith mistake might subject them to liability.” Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 472 (2001) (citing White v. Village of Homewood, 285 Ill.

2015Id. at 335-36 . ¶ 17 As we explained in In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 193-94 (1997), the discretionary immunity doctrine is now codified in sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201 (West 2012)).

2015Id. at 335-36 . ¶ 17 As we explained in In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 193-94 (1997), the discretionary immunity doctrine is now codified in sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201 (West 2012)).

2025“Discretionary immunity for public officials is ‘premised upon the idea that such officials should be allowed to exercise their judgment in rendering decisions without fear that a good-faith mistake might subject them to liability.’ ” Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 2019 IL 124283, ¶ 26 (quoting Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 472 (2001)).

2025“Discretionary immunity for public officials is ‘premised upon the idea that such officials should be allowed to exercise their judgment in rendering decisions without fear that a good-faith mistake might subject them to liability.’ ” Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 2019 IL 124283, ¶ 26 (quoting Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 472 (2001)).

2008See Arteman, 198 Ill.2d at 484 , 261 Ill.Dec. 507 , 763 N.E.2d 756 ("Because `[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable' [citation], this broad discretionary immunity applies to the entities themselves"); Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill.2d 484, 496 , 256 Ill.Dec. 848 , 752 N.E.2d 1090 (2001) ("the discretionary immunity doctrine is codified in sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Act, which provide that `a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy

2008See Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 484 (“Because ‘[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable’ [citation], this broad discretionary immunity applies to the entities themselves”); Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 496 (2001) (“the discretionary immunity doctrine is codified in sections 2—109 and 2—201 of the Act, which provide that ‘a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion [and, thereby, the local public entity,]

2021This court has held that the “ ‘operation of government’ necessarily encompasses the policy decisions made by a municipality; that is, those decisions which require the municipality to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.” West, 147 Ill. 2d at 11 . ¶ 39 The discretionary immunity now codified in section 2-201 was originally termed “quasi- judicial immunity.” Kennell v. Clayton Township, 239 Ill.

2019This court has held that the “ ‘operation of government’ necessarily encompasses the policy decisions made by a municipality; that is, those decisions which require the municipality to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.” West, 147 Ill. 2d at 11 . ¶ 39 The discretionary immunity now codified in section 2-201 was originally termed “quasi-judicial immunity.” Kennell v. Clayton Township, 239 Ill.

2021App. 3d 634, 642 (1992) (citing Kelly v. Ogilvie, 64 Ill.

2019App. 3d 634, 642 (1992) (citing Kelly v. Ogilvie, 64 Ill.

2019See Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 472 (1995). ¶ 56 In Courson v. Danville School District No. 118, 333 Ill.

2018See Snyder v. Curran Township , 167 Ill. 2d 466 , 472, 212 Ill.Dec. 643 , 657 N.E.2d 988 (1995). ¶ 56 In Courson v. Danville School District No. 118 , 333 Ill.

2013See Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 484 (“Because ‘[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable’ [citation], this broad discretionary immunity applies to the entities themselves.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). ¶ 59 Relying upon Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111 (2008), plaintiff argues that sections 2-201 and 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act do not afford defendant immunity for retaliatory discharge.

2013See Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 484 (“Because ‘[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable’ [citation], this broad discretionary immunity applies to the entities themselves.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). ¶ 59 Relying upon Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111 (2008), plaintiff argues that sections 2-201 and 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act do not afford defendant immunity for retaliatory discharge.

2010Compton, 382 Ill.

2010Compton, 382 Ill.

2006Defendant acknowledges that the doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of judicial economy, to prevent litigants from taking A >two bites out of the same appellate apple= @ (People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002), -6- 1-03-1283 quoting People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37 (1988)), and that it is Aa way to foreclose continued appeals for reconsideration of prior rulings of law@ (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F. 2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1982)).

2006Defendant acknowledges that the doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of judicial economy, to prevent litigants from taking “ ‘two bites out of the same appellate apple’ ” (People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002), quoting People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37 (1988)), and that it is “a way to foreclose continued appeals for reconsideration of prior rulings of law” (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1982)).

2006Defendant acknowledges that the doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of judicial economy, to prevent litigants from taking A >two bites out of the same appellate apple= @ (People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002), -6- 1-03-1283 quoting People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37 (1988)), and that it is Aa way to foreclose continued appeals for reconsideration of prior rulings of law@ (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F. 2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1982)).

2006Defendant acknowledges that the doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of judicial economy, to prevent litigants from taking “ ‘two bites out of the same appellate apple’ ” (People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002), quoting People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37 (1988)), and that it is “a way to foreclose continued appeals for reconsideration of prior rulings of law” (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1982)).

2006Defendant acknowledges that the doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of judicial economy, to prevent litigants from taking A >two bites out of the same appellate apple= @ (People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002), -6- 1-03-1283 quoting People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37 (1988)), and that it is Aa way to foreclose continued appeals for reconsideration of prior rulings of law@ (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F. 2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1982)).

2006Defendant acknowledges that the doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of judicial economy, to prevent litigants from taking “ ‘two bites out of the same appellate apple’ ” (People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002), quoting People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37 (1988)), and that it is “a way to foreclose continued appeals for reconsideration of prior rulings of law” (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1982)).

2002See, e.g. , Villarreal v. Village of Schaumburg , 325 Ill.

2002See, e.g., Villarreal v. Village of Schaumburg, 325 Ill.

1996As such, "the broad discretionary standard ordinarily applied in deciding whether there exists a bona fide doubt yields when the accused is taking psychotropic medication under medical direction at the time of his trial or sentencing." Kinkead, 168 Ill.2d at 407 , 214 Ill.Dec. 145 , 660 N.E.2d 852 , citing People v. Brandon, 162 Ill.2d 450, 460-61 , 205 Ill.Dec. 421 , 643 N.E.2d 712 (1994).

1996As such, "the broad discretionary standard ordinarily applied in deciding whether there exists a bona fide doubt yields when the accused is taking psychotropic medication under medical direction at the time of his trial or sentencing.” Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 407 , citing People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, 460-61 (1994).

2011Because McNeil is no longer subject to the appellate process, the discretionary doctrine of the law of the case ( People v. McDonald, 366 Ill.App.3d 243, 248 , 304 Ill.Dec. 213 , 852 N.E.2d 463 (2006)) has been superseded by the nondiscretionary doctrine of res judicata ( Newberry Library v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 390 Ill. 48, 52 , 60 N.E.2d 552 (1945)).

2011Because McNeil is no longer subject to the appellate process, the discretionary doctrine of the law of the case ( People v. McDonald, 366 Ill.App.3d 243, 248 , 304 Ill.Dec. 213 , 852 N.E.2d 463 (2006)) has been superseded by the nondiscretionary doctrine of res judicata ( Newberry Library v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 390 Ill. 48, 52 , 60 N.E.2d 552 (1945)).

2011Because McNeil is no longer subject to the appellate process, the discretionary doctrine of the law of the case ( People v. McDonald, 366 Ill.App.3d 243, 248 , 304 Ill.Dec. 213 , 852 N.E.2d 463 (2006)) has been superseded by the nondiscretionary doctrine of res judicata ( Newberry Library v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 390 Ill. 48, 52 , 60 N.E.2d 552 (1945)).

2011Because McNeil is no longer subject to the appellate process, the discretionary doctrine of the law of the case ( People v. McDonald, 366 Ill.App.3d 243, 248 , 304 Ill.Dec. 213 , 852 N.E.2d 463 (2006)) has been superseded by the nondiscretionary doctrine of res judicata ( Newberry Library v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 390 Ill. 48, 52 , 60 N.E.2d 552 (1945)).