discretionary immunity in Minnesota

2000“Discretionary immunity protects the government only when it can produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.” Steinke, 525 N.W.2d at 175 (emphasis added); see also Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 722 .

2000"Discretionary immunity protects the government only when it can produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments." Steinke, 525 N.W.2d at 175 (emphasis added); see also Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 722 .

2004Crucially, however, in all these cases we broadened the concept of ministerial functions in order to prevent defendants from having the special status of immunity because, as we reasoned in Larson , “the level of judgment [the teacher] exercised was not intended to be covered under the doctrine of discretionary immunity.” 289 N.W.2d at 121 .

2004Crucially, however, in all these cases we broadened the concept of ministerial functions in order to prevent defendants from having the special status of immunity because, as we reasoned in Larson , “the level of judgment [the teacher] exercised was not intended to be covered under the doctrine of discretionary immunity.” 289 N.W.2d at 121 .

1987Johnson v. County of Nicollet, 387 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn.Ct.App.1986).

1987Cf. Johnson v. County of Nicollet, 387 N.W.2d at 212 (decision on placement of a guardrail on a highway is an operational act implementing policy decision to permit public use of road); Marlow v. City of Columbia Heights, 284 N.W.2d at 392 (negligent operation of a city facility was at the operational level following a "planning" decision by the city to maintain a public landing).

2025To the extent those opinions suggest hiring decisions are necessarily and categorically subject to the discretionary-function exception, they are not good law. 30 cannot be characterized as “discretionary.” Snyder, 441 N.W.2d at 787 (suggesting that a decision to issue a permit that was explicitly not allowed under a municipal zoning ordinance was not subject to the discretionary-function exception); Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 24 ; see also id. at 27 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply where specific standards of conduct as set forth in statutes, regulat

2025To the extent those opinions suggest hiring decisions are necessarily and categorically subject to the discretionary-function exception, they are not good law. 30 cannot be characterized as “discretionary.” Snyder, 441 N.W.2d at 787 (suggesting that a decision to issue a permit that was explicitly not allowed under a municipal zoning ordinance was not subject to the discretionary-function exception); Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 24 ; see also id. at 27 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply where specific standards of conduct as set forth in statutes, regulat

2026See id. (“Discretionary immunity protects the government only when it can produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.”); Christensen v. Mower County, 587 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn. App. 1998) (“[E]xercising solely professional judgment as to . . . non-policy factors, is not discretionary.”).

2000“Discretionary immunity protects the government only when it can produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.” Steinke, 525 N.W.2d at 175 (emphasis added); see also Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 722 .

2025To the extent those opinions suggest hiring decisions are necessarily and categorically subject to the discretionary-function exception, they are not good law. 30 cannot be characterized as “discretionary.” Snyder, 441 N.W.2d at 787 (suggesting that a decision to issue a permit that was explicitly not allowed under a municipal zoning ordinance was not subject to the discretionary-function exception); Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 24 ; see also id. at 27 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply where specific standards of conduct as set forth in statutes, regulat

1993Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn.1989).

1991The purpose of the discretionary immunity exception is to preserve the separation of powers by assuring that "the courts do not pass judgment on policy decisions entrusted to coordinate branches of government." Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Minn.1988).

1991The purpose of the discretionary immunity exception is to preserve the separation of powers by assuring that “the courts do not pass judgment on policy decisions entrusted to coordinate branches of government.” Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Minn.1988).

1997In addition, “decisions regarding the placement of inmates and patients, and decisions regarding how much liberty to afford them, are protected policy decisions immune from suit under the doctrine of discretionary [statutory] immunity.” Johnson, 553 N.W.2d at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting Koelln v. Nexus Residential Treatment Facility, 494 N.W.2d 914, 919-20 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1993)).

1997In addition, "decisions regarding the placement of inmates and patients, and decisions regarding how much liberty to afford them, are protected policy decisions immune from suit under the doctrine of discretionary [statutory] immunity." Johnson, 553 N.W.2d at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting Koelln v. Nexus Residential Treatment Facility, 494 N.W.2d 914, 919-20 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1993)).

1995Official immunity 1 “[A] public official charged by law with duties which call for exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)).

1995Official immunity 1 “[A] public official charged by law with duties which call for exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)).

1993Abo El Ela v. State, 468 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. App.1991).

1993Abo El Ela v. State, 468 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.App.1991).

2007And in Vrieze, claimants were not entitled to a declaratory judgment because their underlying claims were barred because of the discretionary immunity doctrine. 542 N.W.2d at 67 .

1997In addition to the balancing of complex factors, application of the discretionary immunity doctrine requires a determination that “exposing the municipality to tort liability would undermine public policy.” Vrieze v. New Century Homes, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn.App.1996).

1987Id.

1982See, e.g., Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59 , 245 N.W.2d 242 (1976).

2026See id. (“Discretionary immunity protects the government only when it can produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.”); Christensen v. Mower County, 587 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn. App. 1998) (“[E]xercising solely professional judgment as to . . . non-policy factors, is not discretionary.”).

2016See Dean v. City of Winona, 8 68 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn.2015) ("We have the discretion to consider a case that is technically moot when the case is functionally justiciable and presents an important question of statewide significance that should be decided immediately.” (quotations omitted)).

2008For example, “A party does not have an automatic right to specific performance as a remedy for breach of a contract; the district court must balance the equities of the case and determine whether the equitable remedy of specific performance is appropriate.” Dakota County H.R.A. v. Blackwell, 602 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn.1999) (citing Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 134 , 94 N.W.2d 273, 283 (1959)).

2008For example, "A party does not have an automatic right to specific performance as a remedy for breach of a contract; the district court must balance the equities of the case and determine whether the equitable remedy of specific performance is appropriate." Dakota County H.R.A. v. Blackwell, 602 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn.1999) (citing Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 134 , 94 N.W.2d 273, 283 (1959)).

2008For example, "A party does not have an automatic right to specific performance as a remedy for breach of a contract; the district court must balance the equities of the case and determine whether the equitable remedy of specific performance is appropriate." Dakota County H.R.A. v. Blackwell, 602 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn.1999) (citing Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 134 , 94 N.W.2d 273, 283 (1959)).

2008For example, "A party does not have an automatic right to specific performance as a remedy for breach of a contract; the district court must balance the equities of the case and determine whether the equitable remedy of specific performance is appropriate." Dakota County H.R.A. v. Blackwell, 602 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn.1999) (citing Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 134 , 94 N.W.2d 273, 283 (1959)).

2005See State v. Pinkerton, 628 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 (Minn.App.2001) (noting court may deviate from rule of waiver' in interests of justice if neither party is unfairly surprised), review denied (Minn. July 24, 2001).

1997In addition, “decisions regarding the placement of inmates and patients, and decisions regarding how much liberty to afford them, are protected policy decisions immune from suit under the doctrine of discretionary [statutory] immunity.” Johnson, 553 N.W.2d at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting Koelln v. Nexus Residential Treatment Facility, 494 N.W.2d 914, 919-20 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1993)).

1997In addition, "decisions regarding the placement of inmates and patients, and decisions regarding how much liberty to afford them, are protected policy decisions immune from suit under the doctrine of discretionary [statutory] immunity." Johnson, 553 N.W.2d at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting Koelln v. Nexus Residential Treatment Facility, 494 N.W.2d 914, 919-20 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1993)).

1997Zank, 552 N.W.2d at 721 (citations omitted).

1996Finally, this court recently applied discretionary immunity to a municipality’s issuance of a permit to construct a sewage treatment system because “the procedure followed in deciding whether to grant a permit to construct a sewage treatment system is similar to that involved in deciding whether to grant a building permit.” McNamara v. McLean, 531 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn.App.1995).

1995Official immunity 1 “[A] public official charged by law with duties which call for exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)).

1995Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn.1993) (citing Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 720-22 (Minn.1988)).

1993See Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Prods., Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn.1977) (factors in distinguishing employee from independent contractor).

1992Finally, the court found “ample evidence of foreseeable harm to this child.” Sayers v. Beltrami County, 472 N.W.2d 656, 664-65 (Minn.App.1991).