discretionary standard (New Mexico) · Go Syfert
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discretionary standard in New Mexico

10 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Armijo v. PUEBLO OF LAGUNAgreen
nmctapp · 2010 · cited in 3 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Third, “sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation}, and,] it presents a pure jurisdictional question.” Armijo, 2011-NMCA-006, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2013“There is a difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.” Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755 ; see also Armijo, 2011-NMCA-006, ¶ 18 (stating that cases involving a tribe bringing suit to preclude a municipality from imposing taxes or other local laws “do not explore the boundaries of a tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit[, and r]ather, they explore a tribe’s 11 sovereign authority over purchased lands”). {30} Third, “sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given si

33
State v. SMILEgreen
nmctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 13 (“Appellate courts have a duty to construe a statute in such a manner that it is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {19} Considered as part of the statute by which district courts make discretionary custodial or probationary determinations in the context of the uniquely pernicious offense of child sexual abuse, Section 31-20-5.2(B) simply cannot be read to lack “standard or guidelines” such that it encourages “subjective and ad hoc application.” See Sm

11
State v. Lagunagreen
nmctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 13 (“Appellate courts have a duty to construe a statute in such a manner that it is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {19} Considered as part of the statute by which district courts make discretionary custodial or probationary determinations in the context of the uniquely pernicious offense of child sexual abuse, Section 31-20-5.2(B) simply cannot be read to lack “standard or guidelines” such that it encourages “subjective and ad hoc application.” See Sm

11
State v. Duttlegreen
nmctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 13 (“Appellate courts have a duty to construe a statute in such a manner that it is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {19} Considered as part of the statute by which district courts make discretionary custodial or probationary determinations in the context of the uniquely pernicious offense of child sexual abuse, Section 31-20-5.2(B) simply cannot be read to lack “standard or guidelines” such that it encourages “subjective and ad hoc application.” See Sm

11
Reese v. Stategreen
nm · 1987 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004Under these circumstances, we decline to apply this discretionary doctrine, see Reese v. State, 106 N.M. 505, 507 , 745 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1987) (holding that the law of the case is a flexible, discretionary doctrine), and we reverse the district court.

2004Under these circumstances, we decline to apply this discretionary doctrine, see Reese v. State, 106 N.M. 505, 507 , 745 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1987) (holding that the law of the case is a flexible, discretionary doctrine), and we reverse the district court.

11
State v. Rossgreen
nmctapp · 1986 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Although as discussed hereafter we disapprove of how this evidence was ultimately used at trial, we conclude that the court did not commit reversible error. {25} Rule 11^403 is a discretionary rule that allows a trial court to exclude relevant evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” The trial court found the evidence of drugs in the possession of others in the mobile home was “highly relevant” and “also coincidentally to be the truth.” The court concluded that such evidence was “very probative of the issue of knowledge, [and] very prob

2000Although as discussed hereafter we disapprove of how this evidence was ultimately used at trial, we conclude that the court did not commit reversible error. {25} Rule 11^403 is a discretionary rule that allows a trial court to exclude relevant evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” The trial court found the evidence of drugs in the possession of others in the mobile home was “highly relevant” and “also coincidentally to be the truth.” The court concluded that such evidence was “very probative of the issue of knowledge, [and] very prob

11
Denmark v. Stategreen
fladistctapp · 1994 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000Although as discussed hereafter we disapprove of how this evidence was ultimately used at trial, we conclude that the court did not commit reversible error. {25} Rule 11^403 is a discretionary rule that allows a trial court to exclude relevant evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” The trial court found the evidence of drugs in the possession of others in the mobile home was “highly relevant” and “also coincidentally to be the truth.” The court concluded that such evidence was “very probative of the issue of knowledge, [and] very prob

11
Beckett v. Stategreen
fladistctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 New Mexico opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000Although as discussed hereafter we disapprove of how this evidence was ultimately used at trial, we conclude that the court did not commit reversible error. {25} Rule 11^403 is a discretionary rule that allows a trial court to exclude relevant evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” The trial court found the evidence of drugs in the possession of others in the mobile home was “highly relevant” and “also coincidentally to be the truth.” The court concluded that such evidence was “very probative of the issue of knowledge, [and] very prob

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. green
scotus · 1998
2 sentences

2013“There is a difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.” Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755 ; see also Armijo, 2011-NMCA-006, ¶ 18 (stating that cases involving a tribe bringing suit to preclude a municipality from imposing taxes or other local laws “do not explore the boundaries of a tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit[, and r]ather, they explore a tribe’s 11 sovereign authority over purchased lands”). {30} Third, “sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given si

2013“There is a difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.” Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755 ; see also Armijo, 2011-NMCA-006, ¶ 18 (stating that cases involving a tribe bringing suit to preclude a municipality from imposing taxes or other local laws “do not explore the boundaries of a tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit[, and r]ather, they explore a tribe’s 11 sovereign authority over purchased lands”). {30} Third, “sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given si

22013–2013
Barwin v. Reidy green
nm · 1957
2 sentences

1994In Barwin , one of our earliest decisions addressing the validity and revocability of consent to adoption, we suggested a discretionary standard: "The better authority is that prior to the entry of an adoption decree, the court may grant or refuse revocation of consent giving due consideration to the circumstances of the particular case ... and all those matters pertaining to the past, present and future welfare of the child." 62 N.M. at 198 , 307 P.2d at 185 .

1994In Barwin , one of our earliest decisions addressing the validity and revocability of consent to adoption, we suggested a discretionary standard: "The better authority is that prior to the entry of an adoption decree, the court may grant or refuse revocation of consent giving due consideration to the circumstances of the particular case ... and all those matters pertaining to the past, present and future welfare of the child." 62 N.M. at 198 , 307 P.2d at 185 .

21994–1994
State v. Greenwood green
nmctapp · 2011
1 sentence

2019See Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 13 (“Appellate courts have a duty to construe a statute in such a manner that it is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {19} Considered as part of the statute by which district courts make discretionary custodial or probationary determinations in the context of the uniquely pernicious offense of child sexual abuse, Section 31-20-5.2(B) simply cannot be read to lack “standard or guidelines” such that it encourages “subjective and ad hoc application.” See Sm

12019–2019
State v. Andrews green
nmctapp · 1997
2 sentences

2019See Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 13 (“Appellate courts have a duty to construe a statute in such a manner that it is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {19} Considered as part of the statute by which district courts make discretionary custodial or probationary determinations in the context of the uniquely pernicious offense of child sexual abuse, Section 31-20-5.2(B) simply cannot be read to lack “standard or guidelines” such that it encourages “subjective and ad hoc application.” See Sm

2019See Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 13 (“Appellate courts have a duty to construe a statute in such a manner that it is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {19} Considered as part of the statute by which district courts make discretionary custodial or probationary determinations in the context of the uniquely pernicious offense of child sexual abuse, Section 31-20-5.2(B) simply cannot be read to lack “standard or guidelines” such that it encourages “subjective and ad hoc application.” See Sm

12019–2019
STATE, EX REL. NM PRESS ASS'N v. Kaufman green
nm · 1982
2 sentences

1989New Mexico Press Association v. Kaufman, 98 N.M. 261 , 648 P.2d 300 (1982), is not sufficient.

1989New Mexico Press Association v. Kaufman, 98 N.M. 261 , 648 P.2d 300 (1982), is not sufficient.

11989–1989
Bower v. Western Fleet Maintenance green
nmctapp · 1986
2 sentences

1988Relying on Bower v. Western Fleet Maintenance, 104 N.M. 731 , 726 P.2d 885 (Ct.App.1986), where we said the 1983 amendment appears to liberalize the standard by which a court may award certain costs and authorized a discretionary standard, the trial court awarded the expert witness fees, notwithstanding the lack of subpoena.

1988Relying on Bower v. Western Fleet Maintenance, 104 N.M. 731 , 726 P.2d 885 (Ct.App.1986), where we said the 1983 amendment appears to liberalize the standard by which a court may award certain costs and authorized a discretionary standard, the trial court awarded the expert witness fees, notwithstanding the lack of subpoena.

11988–1988

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NM § N.M. Stat. § 42-6-1 (3) NM § N.M. Stat. § 67-1-1 (3) NM § N.M. Stat. § 67-2-1 (3) NM § N.M. Stat. § 67-3-11 (3) NM § N.M. Stat. § 67-3-12 (3) USC § 25u.s.c.1301-1303 (3) USC § 28u.s.c.1360 (3) USC § 28u.s.c.2409 (3) USC § 43u.s.c.932 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 241 (1924–2026) CA 106 (1904–2026) OH 80 (1977–2026) IL 67 (1974–2025) TN 67 (1982–2026) WI 50 (1970–2026) IA 49 (2005–2026) OR 48 (1980–2025) MN 46 (1966–2026) LA 43 (1971–2023) NY 42 (1939–2025) IN 38 (1872–2025) AZ 36 (1957–2026) NJ 32 (1966–2026) CO 27 (1983–2026) WA 25 (1965–2026) ME 20 (1981–2018) MI 20 (1972–2025) AL 19 (1978–2025) VA 18 (2004–2025) ID 18 (1978–2020) TX 15 (1978–2025) SC 15 (1997–2020) NV 14 (1972–2018) WV 14 (1998–2024) FL 14 (1970–2019) KS 14 (1995–2025) GA 14 (1999–2022) MS 13 (1990–2024) MA 13 (1962–2025) UT 12 (1989–2026) CT 12 (1980–2018) MO 12 (1962–2019) NM 10 (1988–2019) MD 10 (1997–2016) WY 9 (2004–2024) DC 8 (1985–2025) VT 8 (1990–2021) NC 7 (1993–2017) AK 6 (1970–2025) HI 6 (1984–2012) SD 6 (1979–2010) ND 6 (1988–2018) RI 6 (1987–2008) OK 5 (1930–2016) NH 5 (1874–2009) MT 4 (1994–2023) DE 3 (1976–2026) NE 2 (1989–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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