discretionary rule in Connecticut

2018"That standard of review reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the unique opportunity to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, including such factors as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties." Casey v. Casey , 82 Conn. App. 378 , 383, 844 A.2d 250 (2004).

2018"That standard of review reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the unique opportunity to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, including such factors as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties." Casey v. Casey , 82 Conn. App. 378 , 383, 844 A.2d 250 (2004).

2016In so concluding, the court stated that the statute "creates present and future effects on present and future conduct, and has no effect on past conduct," relying, in particular, on an observation by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that "[i]t would border on the absurd to argue that these aliens might have decided not to commit drug crimes, or might have resisted conviction more vigorously, had they known that if they were not only imprisoned but also, when their prison term ended, ordered deported, they could not ask for a discretionary waiver of deportation." (Inte

2016Cyr, supra, 533 U.S. 324 , the Supreme Court significantly narrowed its prior characterization of deportation as ‘‘look[ing] prospec- tively to the respondent’s right to remain in this country in the future’’; Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 , 104 S. Ct. 3479 , 82 L.

2016Cyr, supra, 533 U.S. 324 , the Supreme Court significantly narrowed its prior characterization of deportation as ‘‘look[ing] prospec- tively to the respondent’s right to remain in this country in the future’’; Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 , 104 S. Ct. 3479 , 82 L.

2013As such, “Practice Book § [42-23] is not a discretionary rule.” State v. Carmon, 47 Conn. App. 813, 826 , 709 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 918 , 714 A.2d 7 (1998).

2013As such, “Practice Book § [42-23] is not a discretionary rule.” State v. Carmon, 47 Conn. App. 813, 826 , 709 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 918 , 714 A.2d 7 (1998).

2013“Words and phrases are to be given their ordinary meaning in construing statutes unless the text indicates otherwise.” State v. Cook, 183 Conn. 520, 522 , 441 A.2d 41 (1981), citing General Statutes § 1-1.

2013“Words and phrases are to be given their ordinary meaning in construing statutes unless the text indicates otherwise.” State v. Cook, 183 Conn. 520, 522 , 441 A.2d 41 (1981), citing General Statutes § 1-1.

2013As such, “Practice Book § [42-23] is not a discretionary rule.” State v. Carmon, 47 Conn. App. 813, 826 , 709 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 918 , 714 A.2d 7 (1998).

2013As such, “Practice Book § [42-23] is not a discretionary rule.” State v. Carmon, 47 Conn. App. 813, 826 , 709 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 918 , 714 A.2d 7 (1998).

2009The plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion “because there was no factual basis from which the court could have found that (1) money was not payable to the plaintiff and (2) the detention of the money by the defendants was rightfully withheld under the circumstances, postverdict.” In Bower v. D’Onfro, 45 Conn. App. 543 , 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), this court set forth the applicable criteria for reviewing a trial court’s award of postjudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3b, prior to the 1997 amendment, under the discretionary standard for recovery.

2009The plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion “because there was no factual basis from which the court could have found that (1) money was not payable to the plaintiff and (2) the detention of the money by the defendants was rightfully withheld under the circumstances, postverdict.” In Bower v. D’Onfro, 45 Conn. App. 543 , 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), this court set forth the applicable criteria for reviewing a trial court’s award of postjudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3b, prior to the 1997 amendment, under the discretionary standard for recovery.

1997Evon v. Andrews , 211 Conn. 501 , 505 .

1994While questions of "fairness" may well be involved in connection with an analysis of the equitable relief sought in the complaint (see Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos , 227 Conn. 116 (1993)), the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, where it exists, is not a discretionary matter. "[S]overeign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation." Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Board of Equalization , 800 F.2d 1446 , 1051 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 , 107 S.Ct. 2184 , 95 L.Ed.2d 840

1994While questions of "fairness" may well be involved in connection with an analysis of the equitable relief sought in the complaint (see Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos , 227 Conn. 116 (1993)), the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, where it exists, is not a discretionary matter. "[S]overeign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation." Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Board of Equalization , 800 F.2d 1446 , 1051 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 , 107 S.Ct. 2184 , 95 L.Ed.2d 840

1994While questions of "fairness" may well be involved in connection with an analysis of the equitable relief sought in the complaint (see Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos , 227 Conn. 116 (1993)), the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, where it exists, is not a discretionary matter. "[S]overeign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation." Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Board of Equalization , 800 F.2d 1446 , 1051 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 , 107 S.Ct. 2184 , 95 L.Ed.2d 840

1994While questions of "fairness" may well be involved in connection with an analysis of the equitable relief sought in the complaint (see Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos , 227 Conn. 116 (1993)), the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, where it exists, is not a discretionary matter. "[S]overeign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation." Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Board of Equalization , 800 F.2d 1446 , 1051 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 , 107 S.Ct. 2184 , 95 L.Ed.2d 840

1994While questions of "fairness" may well be involved in connection with an analysis of the equitable relief sought in the complaint (see Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos , 227 Conn. 116 (1993)), the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, where it exists, is not a discretionary matter. "[S]overeign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation." Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Board of Equalization , 800 F.2d 1446 , 1051 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 , 107 S.Ct. 2184 , 95 L.Ed.2d 840

1993“Whether the grounds for termination [of parental rights] exist for not less than one year is a question of fact to be determined by the [trial] court from the facts and circumstances in any given case.” In re Saba P., 13 Conn. App. 605, 610 , 538 A.2d 711 , cert. denied, 207 Conn. 811 , 541 A.2d 1241 (1988).

1993“Whether the grounds for termination [of parental rights] exist for not less than one year is a question of fact to be determined by the [trial] court from the facts and circumstances in any given case.” In re Saba P., 13 Conn. App. 605, 610 , 538 A.2d 711 , cert. denied, 207 Conn. 811 , 541 A.2d 1241 (1988).

1993“Whether the grounds for termination [of parental rights] exist for not less than one year is a question of fact to be determined by the [trial] court from the facts and circumstances in any given case.” In re Saba P., 13 Conn. App. 605, 610 , 538 A.2d 711 , cert. denied, 207 Conn. 811 , 541 A.2d 1241 (1988).

1993“Whether the grounds for termination [of parental rights] exist for not less than one year is a question of fact to be determined by the [trial] court from the facts and circumstances in any given case.” In re Saba P., 13 Conn. App. 605, 610 , 538 A.2d 711 , cert. denied, 207 Conn. 811 , 541 A.2d 1241 (1988).

1987Practice Book § 3063 sets forth a discretionary standard under which the Supreme and Appellate Courts “may” review claims not properly raised in the trial court “in the interests of justice.” See State v. Tatem, 194 Conn. 594, 595 , 483 A.2d 1087 (1984); see generally Mickel v. New England Coal & Coke Co., 132 Conn. 671, 674 , 47 A.2d 187 (1946).

1987Practice Book § 3063 sets forth a discretionary standard under which the Supreme and Appellate Courts “may” review claims not properly raised in the trial court “in the interests of justice.” See State v. Tatem, 194 Conn. 594, 595 , 483 A.2d 1087 (1984); see generally Mickel v. New England Coal & Coke Co., 132 Conn. 671, 674 , 47 A.2d 187 (1946).

1980See, e.g., State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 172 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977); State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 598 , 353 A.2d 756 (1974); State v. Shelton, 160 Conn. 360, 363-65 , 278 A.2d 782 (1971); State v. Tucker, 146 Conn. 410, 415 , 115 A.2d 876 (1959); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518,533-34 (1880). *421 The defendant’s second argument of abuse of discretion is equally unavailing.

1980See, e.g., State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 172 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977); State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 598 , 353 A.2d 756 (1974); State v. Shelton, 160 Conn. 360, 363-65 , 278 A.2d 782 (1971); State v. Tucker, 146 Conn. 410, 415 , 115 A.2d 876 (1959); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518,533-34 (1880). *421 The defendant’s second argument of abuse of discretion is equally unavailing.

1980See, e.g., State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 172 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977); State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 598 , 353 A.2d 756 (1974); State v. Shelton, 160 Conn. 360, 363-65 , 278 A.2d 782 (1971); State v. Tucker, 146 Conn. 410, 415 , 115 A.2d 876 (1959); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518,533-34 (1880). *421 The defendant’s second argument of abuse of discretion is equally unavailing.

1980See, e.g., State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 172 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977); State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 598 , 353 A.2d 756 (1974); State v. Shelton, 160 Conn. 360, 363-65 , 278 A.2d 782 (1971); State v. Tucker, 146 Conn. 410, 415 , 115 A.2d 876 (1959); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518,533-34 (1880). *421 The defendant’s second argument of abuse of discretion is equally unavailing.

1980See, e.g., State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 172 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977); State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 598 , 353 A.2d 756 (1974); State v. Shelton, 160 Conn. 360, 363-65 , 278 A.2d 782 (1971); State v. Tucker, 146 Conn. 410, 415 , 115 A.2d 876 (1959); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518,533-34 (1880). *421 The defendant’s second argument of abuse of discretion is equally unavailing.

1980See, e.g., State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 172 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977); State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 598 , 353 A.2d 756 (1974); State v. Shelton, 160 Conn. 360, 363-65 , 278 A.2d 782 (1971); State v. Tucker, 146 Conn. 410, 415 , 115 A.2d 876 (1959); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518,533-34 (1880). *421 The defendant’s second argument of abuse of discretion is equally unavailing.