discretionary immunity in Maine

2001Roberts v. Maine, 1999 ME 89 , { 8, 731 A.2d 855 ; Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Institute, 535 A.2d 421, 426 (Me. 1987).° However, despite the assistance of this test, determining what is a discretionary act as opposed to a ministerial act still presents a challenge, as can be seen in three of the many cases in which our Law Court has 2 Discretionary immunity applies even when the government official is negligent in performing the discretionary duty.

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") grants governmental employees "absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions." Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), [5] as long as the contested action is "essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective." Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants' conduct "clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of

2014See Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1022 (Me. 1988). ("Those who assist or participate in a decision or other action protected by the discretionary immunity provisions are themselves immune to the extent of their assistance or participation.").

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") grants governmental employees "absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions." Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), [5] as long as the contested action is "essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective." Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants' conduct "clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of

2008To support this conclusion, we held that "[in] cases where the questioned conduct has little or no purely governmental content but instead resembles decisions or activities carried on by people generally, there is an objective standard for judgment by the courts and the doctrine of discretionary immunity does not bar the action." Id. ¶ 22, 922 A.2d at 490 (quoting Adriance v. Town of Standish, 687 A.2d 238, 241 (Me., 1996)).

2008To support this conclusion, we held that “[in] cases where the questioned conduct has little or no purely governmental content but instead resembles decisions or activities carried on by people generally, there is an objective standard for judgment by the courts and the doctrine of discretionary immunity does not bar the action.” Id. ¶ 22, 922 A.2d at 490 (quoting Adriance v. Town of Standish, 687 A.2d 238, 241 (Me., 1996)).

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") grants governmental employees "absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions." Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), [5] as long as the contested action is "essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective." Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants' conduct "clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) grants governmental employees “absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions.” Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), 5 as long as the contested action is “essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective.” Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants’ conduct “clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of an

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") grants governmental employees "absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions." Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), [5] as long as the contested action is "essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective." Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants' conduct "clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) grants governmental employees “absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions.” Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), 5 as long as the contested action is “essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective.” Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants’ conduct “clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of an

2015When the conduct at issue "has little or no purely governmental content but instead resembles decisions or activities carried on by people generally, there is an objective standard for judgment by the courts and the doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply." Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 2007 ME 68 , ~ 22, 922 A.2d 484,490 .

2015When the conduct at issue "has little or no purely governmental content but instead resembles decisions or activities carried on by people generally, there is an objective standard for judgment by the courts and the doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply." Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 2007 ME 68 , ~ 22, 922 A.2d 484,490 .

1999To the extent that MacKerron v. Madura, 474 A.2d 166 (Me.1984), can be read to suggest that only a qualified immunity was intended, it is incorrect.

1990MacKerron v. Madura, 474 A.2d 166, 167 (Me.1984).

2018Discretionary immunity as found in the Maine Tort Claims Act, provides that government entities and government employees are immune from claims resulting from: "performing or failing to perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused ...." 14 M.R.S. §§ 8104-B(3), 8lll(l)(C); see Norton v. Hall, 2003 ME 118 , j 6, 834 A .2d 928 .

2018Discretionary immunity as found in the Maine Tort Claims Act, provides that government entities and government employees are immune from claims resulting from: "performing or failing to perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused ...." 14 M.R.S. §§ 8104-B(3), 8lll(l)(C); see Norton v. Hall, 2003 ME 118 , j 6, 834 A .2d 928 .

2018See Gove, 2001 ME 126 , ,r 14, 775 A.2d 368 ("Where ... the Legislature has explicitly delineated the duties of the government employee in question, [the Court] looks first to the plain language of that statute.

2018See Gove, 2001 ME 126 , ,r 14, 775 A.2d 368 ("Where ... the Legislature has explicitly delineated the duties of the government employee in question, [the Court] looks first to the plain language of that statute.

2014See generally Leach v. Betters, 599 A.2d 424, 426 (Me.1991) (assuming without deciding that the MTCA’s discretionary immunity provisions did not apply to shield defendant police officers from a claim alleging a violation of a statute that prohibited wanton and oppressive conduct in connection with making an arrest). [¶ 51] While the absolute immunity provision of section 8111(1) of the MTCA would bar a claim against Dr. Kem-merer, even perhaps an MCRA claim, based on negligence or carelessness, it does not bar this particular MCRA claim alleging violation of and disregard for the statutory man

2001See Bowen v. Dept. of Human Services, 606 A.2d 1051, 1055 (Me. 1992). 3 The four-prong test appears to be appropriate regardless of whether the discretionary function immunity is being claimed by a government official (14 M.R.S.A. § 8111) or a government entity (14 M.LR.S.A. § 8104-B(3)).

2001See Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821-22 (Me.1983); Levesque, 448 A.2d at 878 ; Fletcher v. Feeney, 400 A.2d 1084, 1090 (Me.1979); State ex rel.

2001See Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821-22 (Me.1983); Levesque, 448 A.2d at 878 ; Fletcher v. Feeney, 400 A.2d 1084, 1090 (Me.1979); *266 State ex rel.

2001See Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821-22 (Me.1983); Levesque, 448 A.2d at 878 ; Fletcher v. Feeney, 400 A.2d 1084, 1090 (Me.1979); State ex rel.

2001See Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821-22 (Me.1983); Levesque, 448 A.2d at 878 ; Fletcher v. Feeney, 400 A.2d 1084, 1090 (Me.1979); *266 State ex rel.

1999See Easler v. Dodge, 1999 ME 140, ¶ 4 , 738 A.2d 837, 838 . [¶ 5] The Huffs assert that the discretionary immunity extended to State employees by the Maine Tort Claims Act, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C) (Supp.1999), 1 does not apply to the instant case because of the alleged intentional misrepresentation of Ricky’s sexual history by the DHS caseworkers.

1999See Easler v. Dodge, 1999 ME 140, ¶ 4 , 738 A.2d 837, 838 . [¶ 5] The Huffs assert that the discretionary immunity extended to State employees by the Maine Tort Claims Act, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C) (Supp.1999), 1 does not apply to the instant case because of the alleged intentional misrepresentation of Ricky’s sexual history by the DHS caseworkers.

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") grants governmental employees "absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions." Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), [5] as long as the contested action is "essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective." Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants' conduct "clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) grants governmental employees “absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions.” Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), 5 as long as the contested action is “essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective.” Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants’ conduct “clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of an

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") grants governmental employees "absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions." Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), [5] as long as the contested action is "essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective." Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants' conduct "clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of

1995The Maine Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) grants governmental employees “absolute immunity from personal civil liability for performing discretionary functions.” Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 615 (Me.1991); see 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), (E) (Supp.1994), 5 as long as the contested action is “essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective.” Creamer, 652 A.2d at 114 (quoting Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021 (Me.1988).) Discretionary immunity applies unless the defendants’ conduct “clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of an

1981See State v. DiPietro, supra (criminal), and Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, Me., 417 A.2d 982 (1980) (civil).

1981While that testimony was indeed adverse to defendant’s position it did not rise to the level of “unfair” prejudice required to invoke the discretionary standard of Rule 403, see State v. Lagasse, supra at 541; State v. Hurd, Me., 360 A.2d 525 , 527 n. 5 (1976).

1981While that testimony was indeed adverse to defendant's position it did not rise to the level of "unfair" prejudice required to invoke the discretionary standard of Rule 403, see State v. Lagasse, supra at 541 ; State v. Hurd, Me., 360 A.2d 525 , 527 n. 5 (1976).

1981See State v. DiPietro, supra (criminal), and Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, Me., 417 A.2d 982 (1980) (civil).