discretionary standard in Kansas

2024On appeal from summary judgment based on the discretionary immunity exception to the KTCA, the Patterson court found the "language from the 1978 edition of the MUTCD requiring signs where hazards were not self-evident was deleted from the manual in 2000 and not replaced with any comparable requirement to adhere to any particular directive in placing traffic warning signs." 307 Kan. at 632 .

2024On appeal from summary judgment based on the discretionary immunity exception to the KTCA, the Patterson court found the "language from the 1978 edition of the MUTCD requiring signs where hazards were not self-evident was deleted from the manual in 2000 and not replaced with any comparable requirement to adhere to any particular directive in placing traffic warning signs." 307 Kan. at 632 .

2019Cf. State v. Kleypas , 282 Kan. 560 , Syl. ¶ 2, 147 P.3d 1058 (2006) (ruling made as a matter of law less likely to change at trial; therefore, if it is truly one which substantially impairs the State's case, it is proper for interlocutory appeal)." State v. Sales , 290 Kan. 130 , 140, 224 P.3d 546 (2010) (finding appeal improvidently taken).

2019Cf. State v. Kleypas , 282 Kan. 560 , Syl. ¶ 2, 147 P.3d 1058 (2006) (ruling made as a matter of law less likely to change at trial; therefore, if it is truly one which substantially impairs the State's case, it is proper for interlocutory appeal)." State v. Sales , 290 Kan. 130 , 140, 224 P.3d 546 (2010) (finding appeal improvidently taken).

2024State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189 , 195, 485 P.3d 576 (2021); Sales, 290 Kan. at 140 .

2024Regarding Rule 170 specifically, in Lyndon State Bank, this court held that Rule 170 was a discretionary rule. 33 Kan.

2024As just explained, in Lyndon State Bank, this court held that Rule 170 was a discretionary rule created to help district courts with productivity. 33 Kan.

2022This court will sometimes review unpreserved claims when: (1) "The newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative of the case"; (2) consideration of the question is "necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights"; or (3) the judgment of a trial court should be upheld on appeal as "right for the wrong reason." State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1043 , 350 P.3d 1068 (2015).

2022This court will sometimes review unpreserved claims when: (1) "The newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative of the case"; (2) consideration of the question is "necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights"; or (3) the judgment of a trial court should be upheld on appeal as "right for the wrong reason." State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1043 , 350 P.3d 1068 (2015).

2013See, i.e., State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 82 , 201 P.3d 673 (2009) (although issue not properly preserved on appeal, court noted it is within district court’s discretion to control detective’s proximity to prosecutor during trial); State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329, 342-44 , 184 P.3d 247 (2008) (district court did not per se abuse its discretion in permitting one of the State’s witnesses to sit at counsel’s table during trial; fair trial rights not violated).

2013See, i.e., State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 82 , 201 P.3d 673 (2009) (although issue not properly preserved on appeal, court noted it is within district court’s discretion to control detective’s proximity to prosecutor during trial); State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329, 342-44 , 184 P.3d 247 (2008) (district court did not per se abuse its discretion in permitting one of the State’s witnesses to sit at counsel’s table during trial; fair trial rights not violated).

2010After that basic policy decision was made, however, the state defendants’ conduct in keeping plaintiff in jail after they knew or should have known that he was the wrong man was — like the failure in Johnson to warn the foster parents of the youth’s dangerous propensities — an action implementing the basic policy decision and thus outside the statutory immunity, making it subject to legal redress on the question of negligence by the state. [Citation omitted.] Just as [statutory discretion element of immunity] was inapplicable in Johnson to the state’s failure to warn the foster parents, so too

2010State, 69 Cal. 2d 782 (1968),] to place the dangerous youth on parole with the foster parents — a basic policy decision and thus within the governmental immunity provision of section 845.8(a) [California statute which includes a discretionary immunity element].

2002The Court gave great weight to the “significant and manifest” potential for unfairness in cutting off the possibility of waiver: “Relying upon settled practice, the advice of counsel, and perhaps even assurances in open court that the entry of the plea would not foreclose § 212(c) relief, a great number of defendants . . . agreed to plead guilty.” 533 U.S. at 323 . *958 Muriithi argues that there are other jurisdictions that recognize the responsibility of counsel to advise alien defendants when they will be made deportable by a conviction.

2001Discretionary immunity is defined within the KTCA by K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 75-6104(e): *643 “A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment shall not be liable for damages resulting from: “(e) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of the discretion involved.” Here, Long challenges the Court of Appeals’ finding that “[i]n executing the [probable cause] affidavit, Long acte

1995In Myers , we discussed the decisions in Redford and State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987), which also applied the discretionary standard to the manner in which the court responds to the jury's requests.

1995In Myers , we discussed the decisions in Redford and State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987), which also applied the discretionary standard to the manner in which the court responds to the jury's requests.

1995In Myers , we discussed the decisions in Redford and State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987), which also applied the discretionary standard to the manner in which the court responds to the jury's requests.