13 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1962–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dominick v. Dominickgreen2 sentences2018L. c. 208, § 34." Ansin , 457 Mass. at 298 , quoting from Dominick v. Dominick , 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85 , 92 (1984). 2. 1999L. c. 208, § 34.” Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 92 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
Vartelas v. Holdergreen2 sentences2025See Vartelas, 566 U.S. at 262 . [10] A person may seek a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility due to a crime of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (h). 2025See Vartelas, 566 U.S. at 262. [10] A person may seek a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility due to a crime of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clarkegreen2 sentences2018Even were we to accept the defendant's proposition that plea counsel had an obligation to give immigration advice concerning a discretionary defense to deportation to which the defendant was not then entitled and for which he may or may not have qualified in the future, the defendant failed to show that (1) there was a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial," and (2) "a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Commonwealth v. Mercado , 474 Mass. 80 , 83 (201 2018"To prove the latter proposition, the defendant bears the substantial burden of showing that (1) he had an 'available, substantial ground of defence' that would have been pursued if he had been correctly advised of the dire immigration consequences attendant to accepting the plea bargain; (2) there is a reasonable probability that a different plea bargain (absent such consequences) could have been negotiated at the time; or (3) the presence of 'special circumstances' that support the conclusion that he placed, or would have placed, particular emphasis on immigration consequences in deciding wh | 1 | 1 |
Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc.green1 sentence2011See Keene v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 439 Mass. 223, 234-235 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
McLaughlin v. Board of Selectmengreen1 sentence2009See McLaughlin v. Selectmen of Amherst, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 171 (1995), S.C., 422 Mass. 359 (1996) (“[w]e are aware of no reported case or other authority that orders or requires a board to grant a discretionary waiver”). | 1 | 1 |
McLaughlin v. Board of Selectmengreen1 sentence2009See McLaughlin v. Selectmen of Amherst, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 171 (1995), S.C., 422 Mass. 359 (1996) (“[w]e are aware of no reported case or other authority that orders or requires a board to grant a discretionary waiver”). | 1 | 1 |
Whitney v. City of Worcestergreen1 sentence1994The second prong of the discretionary test may be fulfilled “if the inquiry-producing conduct was an integral part of governmental policy making or planning, if the imposition of liability might jeopardize the quality of the governmental process, or if the case could not be decided without usurping the power and responsibility of either the legislative or executive branch of government.” Stoller, supra, 412 Mass. at 142 , citing Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 219 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Knox v. Remickgreen1 sentence1984See Knox v. Remick, supra; Stansel v. Stansel, supra. In making a determination of fairness and reasonableness in circumstances such as here presented, a judge should consider at least the following: (1) the nature and substance of the objecting party’s complaint; (2) the financial and property division provisions of the agreement as a whole; (3) the context in which the negotiations took place; (4) the complexity of the issues involved; (5) the background and knowledge of the parties; (6) the experience and ability of counsel; 5 (7) the need for and availability of experts to assist the parti | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. Ricegreen1 sentence1980See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401 (1977); King v. King, 373 Mass. 37, 39 (1977); Putnam v. Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 12, 14 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Putnam v. Putnamgreen1 sentence1980See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401 (1977); King v. King, 373 Mass. 37, 39 (1977); Putnam v. Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 12, 14 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
King v. Kinggreen1 sentence1980See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401 (1977); King v. King, 373 Mass. 37, 39 (1977); Putnam v. Putnam, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 12, 14 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hassey v. Hassey
green
1 sentence2021The discretionary factors are 'the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit.'" Hassey, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 522 n.10, quoting G. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Furr
green
2 sentences2019Commonwealth v. Furr , 454 Mass. 101 , 106, 907 N.E.2d 664 (2009). 2019Commonwealth v. Furr , 454 Mass. 101 , 106, 907 N.E.2d 664 (2009). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Williams
green
1 sentence2018Although neither the Supreme Judicial Court nor this court has yet adopted this exception, the court cited it with apparent approval in Commonwealth v. Williams , 431 Mass. 71 (2000), referring to "the discretionary exception that permits a reviewing court to authorize re-litigation of an issue because of an intervening change in the applicable law. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ansin v. Craven-Ansin
green
1 sentence2018L. c. 208, § 34." Ansin , 457 Mass. at 298 , quoting from Dominick v. Dominick , 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85 , 92 (1984). 2. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Mercado
green
1 sentence2018Even were we to accept the defendant's proposition that plea counsel had an obligation to give immigration advice concerning a discretionary defense to deportation to which the defendant was not then entitled and for which he may or may not have qualified in the future, the defendant failed to show that (1) there was a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial," and (2) "a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Commonwealth v. Mercado , 474 Mass. 80 , 83 (201 | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Harry Stoller & Co. v. City of Lowell
green
1 sentence1994The second prong of the discretionary test may be fulfilled “if the inquiry-producing conduct was an integral part of governmental policy making or planning, if the imposition of liability might jeopardize the quality of the governmental process, or if the case could not be decided without usurping the power and responsibility of either the legislative or executive branch of government.” Stoller, supra, 412 Mass. at 142 , citing Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 219 (1977). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sena v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1994The Sena decision makes clear that “[t]he decisions of law enforcement officers whether, when, how, and whom to investigate, and whether and when to seek warrants . . . are based on considerations of, and necessarily affect, public policy.” Sena, supra, 417 Mass. at 256 . 1994The Sena decision makes clear that “[t]he decisions of law enforcement officers whether, when, how, and whom to investigate, and whether and when to seek warrants . . . are based on considerations of, and necessarily affect, public policy.” Sena, supra, 417 Mass. at 256 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Stansel v. Stansel
green
1 sentence1984See Knox v. Remick, supra; Stansel v. Stansel, supra. In making a determination of fairness and reasonableness in circumstances such as here presented, a judge should consider at least the following: (1) the nature and substance of the objecting party’s complaint; (2) the financial and property division provisions of the agreement as a whole; (3) the context in which the negotiations took place; (4) the complexity of the issues involved; (5) the background and knowledge of the parties; (6) the experience and ability of counsel; 5 (7) the need for and availability of experts to assist the parti | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Institution for Savings in Newburyport & Its Vicinity v. Puffer
green
1 sentence1962Por the discretionary rule when equitable relief fails, see Newburyport Inst. for Sav. v. Puffer, 201 Mass. 41, 46-49 , and cases cited. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.