8 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kennery v. State of Vermont, Valcourt, LaBombard and Other Members of the Dept. of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2021Ingerson, 2019 VT 40, ¶ 14 ; see also Kennery v. State, 2011 VT 121, ¶ 36 , 191 Vt. 44 , 38 A.3d 35 (holding that troopers’ welfare check on the wrong house did not fall under discretionary function exception because the “discretionary activity at issue was to apply the information given the officers to search the right house” and there was “no public policy analysis in [that] activity”). 2021Ingerson, 2019 VT 40, ¶ 14 ; see also Kennery v. State, 2011 VT 121, ¶ 36 , 191 Vt. 44 , 38 A.3d 35 (holding that troopers’ welfare check on the wrong house did not fall under discretionary function exception because the “discretionary activity at issue was to apply the information given the officers to search the right house” and there was “no public policy analysis in [that] activity”). | 1 | 1 |
Cloutier v. Blowersgreen2 sentences2009See Cloutier, 172 Vt. at 456-57 , 783 A.2d at 966 . 2009See Cloutier, 172 Vt. at 456-57 , 783 A.2d at 966 . | 1 | 1 |
Morrisseau v. Fayettegreen2 sentences2004Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 364 , 670 A.2d 820, 824 (1995). ¶ 8. 2004Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 364 , 670 A.2d 820, 824 (1995). ¶ 8. | 1 | 1 |
Aiken v. Malloygreen2 sentences1990We have required exhaustion of a discretionary exception process when plaintiffs were making a constitutional attack on a statute, and have been unwilling to accept the characterization of the exception process as a “futile gesture.” See Choquette v. Perrault, 144 Vt. 218, 223 , 475 A.2d 1078, 1081 (1984) (attack on constitutionality of Vermont fence viewer law); see also Aiken v. Malloy, 132 Vt. 200, 214 , 315 A.2d 488, 496-97 (1974) (persons challenging due process protections where driver’s license suspension was sanction for nonpayment of poll tax were required to exhaust potential remedy 1990We have required exhaustion of a discretionary exception process when plaintiffs were making a constitutional attack on a statute, and have been unwilling to accept the characterization of the exception process as a “futile gesture.” See Choquette v. Perrault, 144 Vt. 218, 223 , 475 A.2d 1078, 1081 (1984) (attack on constitutionality of Vermont fence viewer law); see also Aiken v. Malloy, 132 Vt. 200, 214 , 315 A.2d 488, 496-97 (1974) (persons challenging due process protections where driver’s license suspension was sanction for nonpayment of poll tax were required to exhaust potential remedy | 1 | 1 |
Choquette v. Perraultgreen2 sentences1990We have required exhaustion of a discretionary exception process when plaintiffs were making a constitutional attack on a statute, and have been unwilling to accept the characterization of the exception process as a “futile gesture.” See Choquette v. Perrault, 144 Vt. 218, 223 , 475 A.2d 1078, 1081 (1984) (attack on constitutionality of Vermont fence viewer law); see also Aiken v. Malloy, 132 Vt. 200, 214 , 315 A.2d 488, 496-97 (1974) (persons challenging due process protections where driver’s license suspension was sanction for nonpayment of poll tax were required to exhaust potential remedy 1990We have required exhaustion of a discretionary exception process when plaintiffs were making a constitutional attack on a statute, and have been unwilling to accept the characterization of the exception process as a “futile gesture.” See Choquette v. Perrault, 144 Vt. 218, 223 , 475 A.2d 1078, 1081 (1984) (attack on constitutionality of Vermont fence viewer law); see also Aiken v. Malloy, 132 Vt. 200, 214 , 315 A.2d 488, 496-97 (1974) (persons challenging due process protections where driver’s license suspension was sanction for nonpayment of poll tax were required to exhaust potential remedy | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
James Ingerson v. Andrew Pallito, Commissioner, Vermont Department of Corrections and Leanne Salls
green
1 sentence2021Ingerson, 2019 VT 40, ¶ 14 ; see also Kennery v. State, 2011 VT 121, ¶ 36 , 191 Vt. 44 , 38 A.3d 35 (holding that troopers’ welfare check on the wrong house did not fall under discretionary function exception because the “discretionary activity at issue was to apply the information given the officers to search the right house” and there was “no public policy analysis in [that] activity”). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 529-30 . ¶ 9. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Burlington Free Press v. University of Vermont
green
1 sentence2010Those factors are “(1) the public benefit derived by the lawsuit; (2) the commercial benefit the requesting party will receive from release of the requested documents; (3) the nature of the requesting party’s interest in the documents; and (4) whether the public agency had a reasonable basis for withholding the documents.” Burlington Free Press, 172 Vt. at 306 . 1. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Malshuk
green
2 sentences2007State v. Malshuk, 2004 VT 54, ¶ 7 , 177 Vt. 475 , 857 A.2d 282 (mem.). 2007State v. Malshuk, 2004 VT 54, ¶ 7 , 177 Vt. 475 , 857 A.2d 282 (mem.). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Searles v. Agency of Transportation
green
2 sentences2002Id. at 564 , 762 A.2d at 815 . 2002Id. at 564 , 762 A.2d at 815 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.