8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ibn-Tamas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d 1257, 1277 (D.C. 2009) (acknowledging that we may affirm even where a trial court fails to exercise its discretion properly if the court, “as a matter of law, had ‘but one option’” (quoting Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 635 )). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Cruzgreen1 sentence2025Cir. 1947); see District of Columbia v. Cruz, 828 A.2d 181, 183 (D.C. 2003) (“Generally, this court reviews a trial court’s decision to dismiss a case for want of prosecution under a discretionary standard.”); see generally Super. | 1 | 1 |
Benn v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d 1257, 1277 (D.C. 2009) (acknowledging that we may affirm even where a trial court fails to exercise its discretion properly if the court, “as a matter of law, had ‘but one option’” (quoting Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 635 )). | 1 | 1 |
Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICKgreen1 sentence2018The situation was too fluid, and Barkley‟s “fighting stance” before the Williams “strike” was too well documented, for us to grant heft to Smith‟s argument here. 55 See (Markus) Johnson v. United States, 960 A.2d 281 , 294 (D.C. 2008) (“The judge must retain full authority to prevent this sort of trial-within-a-trial.”) (citation omitted). 38 IV. | 1 | 1 |
Rorie v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008But, as noted earlier, neither the prosecutor — who had the burden of proof once Johnson claimed self-defense, see Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763, 771 (D.C.2005) — nor the trial court ever mentioned excessive force. 2008But, as noted earlier, neither the prosecutorwho had the burden of proof once Johnson claimed self-defense, see Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763, 771 (D.C.2005)nor the trial court ever mentioned excessive force. | 1 | 1 |
Timus v. District of Columbia Department of Human Rightsgreen2 sentences1997The mere possibility of holding a discretionary hearing on a bid protest, therefore, particularly in a case where the CAB has decided not to hold one, does not meet the “required by law” element of the “trial-type hearing” criterion of the Communication Workers test for a “contested case.” See Timus v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751, 756 (D.C.1993) (en banc) (noting that for contested case, hearing must be “compelled” by statute or Constitution). 7 In support of the trial court’s ruling, however, RSI argues that we should hold that any time an administrative body adju 1997The mere possibility of holding a discretionary hearing on a bid protest, therefore, particularly in a case where the CAB has decided not to hold one, does not meet the "required by law" element of the "trial-type hearing" criterion of the Communication Workers test for a "contested case." See Timus v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751, 756 (D.C.1993) (en banc) (noting that for contested case, hearing must be "compelled" by statute or Constitution). [7] In support of the trial court's ruling, however, RSI argues that we should hold that any time an administrative body ad | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commissiongreen1 sentence1991Alexander v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm’n, 542 A.2d 359, 361 (D.C.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 425 (1965) (quoting Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952)). 1985JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 425 (1965) (quoting Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thomas v. NATIONAL CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC.
green
1 sentence2011Analysis The crux of the issue before us is whether, in providing that an overpaid claimant “may have such sum waived in the discretion of the Director,” D.C.Code § 51-119(d)(1) authorizes OAH to make a discretionary waiver decision (as the ALJ here assumed); or whether, instead, as DOES argues, the discretion to waive an overpayment lies solely with the DOES Director. 4 Although the ALJ’s interpretation would not be unreasonable in the absence of certain statutory provisions that we discuss below, we conclude that the ALJ’s interpretation was “not in accordance with the law,” Thomas, 961 A.2d | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.