discretionary rule in Tennessee

2025Our review of a trial court’s determination of reasonable attorney’s fees is “a discretionary inquiry.” Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 104 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

2020See Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 104 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“[A] determination of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs is necessarily a discretionary inquiry.”).

2025The doctrine “is not a constitutional mandate nor a limitation on the power of a court” but “is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited.” Id. (citations omitted).

2024Instead, it is “a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice,” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d at 306 ; Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging Co., 213 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), reflecting the commonsense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction need not be revisited.

2020As explained in Memphis Publishing, the doctrine is not constitutionally mandated, nor is it a limitation on the court’s power, but “it is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited.” Id. (citing Ladd by Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 939 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted)).

2019The doctrine is not constitutionally mandated and is not a limitation on the court’s power, but “it is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited.” Id. (citing Ladd, 939 S.W.2d at 90 ).

2016Keith v. Howerton, 165 S.W.3d 248, 250-51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted).

2009Tenn. S. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5. -12- attorneys’ fees and costs is necessarily a discretionary inquiry’ by the Trial Court, to which the appellate courts will defer, absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 250-51 (quoting Killingsworth, 104 S.W.3d at 534 ).

2024In re Estate of Boote, 265 S.W.3d 402, 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Ladd ex rel.

2013In re Estate of Boote, 265 S.W.3d 402, 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Ladd ex rel.

2024Instead, it is “a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice,” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d at 306 ; Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging Co., 213 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), reflecting the commonsense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction need not be revisited.

2013Instead, it is “a longstanding discretionary rule of -6- judicial practice,” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d at 306 ; Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging Co., 213 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), reflecting the commonsense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction need not be revisited.

2018Because the law of the case principle “is merely a practice to guide the courts,” it “directs a court’s discretion [but] it does not limit the tribunal’s power.” Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 383 (Tenn. 2009).

2015Neither a constitutional mandate nor a limit on judicial power, the law of the case doctrine represents “a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice.” Memphis Publ’g Co., 975 S.W.2d at 306 ; see also Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 383 (Tenn.2009) (“Law of the case directs a court’s discretion; it does not limit the tribunal’s power.” (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 , 103 S.Ct. 1382 , 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)).

2016Our Supreme Court has indicated that a trial court has abused its discretion when it ―either applied an incorrect legal standard or reached a clearly unreasonable decision, thereby causing an injustice to the aggrieved party.‖ Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tenn. 2002).

2009“A [c]ourt abuses its discretion when it ‘either applie[s] an incorrect legal standard or reache[s] a clearly unreasonable decision, thereby causing an injustice to the aggrieved party.’” Id. at 251 (quoting Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197, 204, 209 (Tenn. 2002)).

2017In re Estate of Boote, 256 S.W.3d 402, 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Ladd ex rel.

2014In re Estate of Boote, 256 S.W.3d 402, 413 (Tenn. Ct. App.2007); Ladd ex rel.

2012See Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952).

2008See Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir.1952).

2025See Eaton, 216 S.W.3d at 343 .

2022Allen, 2011 WL 1601587 , at *9; see also Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Pike v. State, 164 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tenn. 2005)) (noting that “post-conviction relief is entirely a creature of statute”).

2022Allen, 2011 WL 1601587 , at *9; see also Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Pike v. State, 164 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tenn. 2005)) (noting that “post-conviction relief is entirely a creature of statute”).

2021See Rouse v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 300 F.3d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the law of the case doctrine, which generally prevents reconsideration of claims that have been decided at a previous stage in the same litigation); see also Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998) (recognizing that the law of the case doctrine “is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be

2020See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817 (“A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998) (recognizing that the law of the case doctrine “is not a constitutional mandate nor a limitation on the power of a

2019Bd. of Trustees, 857 So. 2d 611, 617 (La.

2019Whether to grant comity in a given situation is “purely a question of Tennessee law.” Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tenn. 1978). “[C]omity is a discretionary doctrine and may be granted or withheld depending on the 5 It is important to “distinguish the concepts of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and declining to exercise jurisdiction based on principles of comity.” Levert v. Univ. of Ill. at Urbana/Champaign ex rel.

2017This doctrine is neither a constitutional mandate nor an inflexible limit on the adjudicatory power of the courts; instead, “it is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice reflecting the commonsense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction need not be revisited.” Gray’s Disposal Co., Inc., 318 S.W.3d at 348 (internal citations omitted).4 Bajestani I and II are each previous appeals of the case currently before us.

2015The doctrine “is not a constitutional mandate nor a limitation on the power of a court,” but “a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited.” Id. “[I]t is a controlling principle that inferior courts must abide the orders, decrees and precedents of higher courts.” State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976)).

2015See Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tenn. 1996).

2015The doctrine “is not a constitutional mandate nor a limitation on the power of a court,” but “a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited.” Id. “[I]t is a controlling principle that inferior courts must abide the orders, decrees and precedents of higher courts.” State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976)).

2014This Court will grant relief under the discretionary doctrine of plain error review only when the following five prerequisites are satisfied: “(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused [must -12- not have] waive[d] the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error [must be] ‘necessary to do substantial justice.’” State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W

2014This Court will grant relief under the discretionary doctrine of plain error review only when the following five prerequisites are satisfied: “(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused [must -12- not have] waive[d] the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error [must be] ‘necessary to do substantial justice.’” State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W