27 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coates, Reid & Waldron v. Vigilgreen2 sentences2026Avalanche Indus., 198 P.3d at 592 . ¶ 11 “In cases applying the discretionary exception, we review the ALJ’s decision for an abuse of discretion, only reversing where it ‘exceed[ed] the bounds of reason’ and was unsupported by applicable law.” Id. at 596 (quoting Coates, Reid & Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850, 856 (Colo. 1993)). 2009The fourth, Dugan v. Industrial Commission, 690 P.2d 267 (Colo.App.1984), merely stands for the principle that a claimant cannot receive the higher salary from an earlier job when injured at a later, lower-paying job, see Coates, 856 P.2d at 857 n. 8 (finding Dugan "readily distinguishable"), and that a claimant cannot receive an increased award under the discretionary exception when the claimant cannot prove that he or she was able to earn the higher wage, see St. | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Walter v. Waltergreen2 sentences2019In re Estate of Walter, 97 P.3d 188, 191 (Colo. App. 2003). 2007In re Estate of Walter, 97 P.3d 188, 191 (Colo.App.2003). | 2 | 2 |
People Ex Rel. Gallagher v. District Court Ex Rel. County of Arapahoegreen2 sentences2016Court, 666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983) (the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice directing that prior relevant rulings in the same case must generally be followed). ¶36 Furthermore, Lensky had the right to exclude defendants and other third parties from the subject property because, as a putative adverse possessor, he has an interest in the property “enforceable against everyone except the owner or one claiming through the owner.” Spring Valley Estates, 181 Colo, at 438, 510 P.2d at 338 . 2007Id. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Dunlapgreen1 sentence2025A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶ 41 As applied to earlier rulings of a trial judge, the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice that provides that “prior relevant rulings made in the same case are to be followed unless such application would result in error or unless the ruling is no longer sound due to changed conditions.” Stockdale v. Ellsworth, 2017 CO 109, ¶ 37 (quoting People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 758 (Colo. 1999)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Herreragreen1 sentence2025People v. Abdul, 935 P.2d 4, 10 (Colo. 1997); see also People v. Herrera, 2014 COA 20, ¶ 10 . ¶ 13 We review the district court’s denial of a discretionary hearing for an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Stockdale v. Ellsworthgreen1 sentence2025A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶ 41 As applied to earlier rulings of a trial judge, the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice that provides that “prior relevant rulings made in the same case are to be followed unless such application would result in error or unless the ruling is no longer sound due to changed conditions.” Stockdale v. Ellsworth, 2017 CO 109, ¶ 37 (quoting People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 758 (Colo. 1999)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abdulgreen1 sentence2025People v. Abdul, 935 P.2d 4, 10 (Colo. 1997); see also People v. Herrera, 2014 COA 20, ¶ 10 . ¶ 13 We review the district court’s denial of a discretionary hearing for an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vialpandogreen1 sentence2025See People v. Vialpando, 954 P.2d 617, 624 (Colo. App. 1997) (“Law of the case, 28 when applied to a court’s power to reconsider its own prior rulings, is a discretionary rule of practice because it merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.” (citing People ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Zpgreen2 sentences2024See People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 214 (Colo. App. 2007). ¶7 The discretionary standard set forth in C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-1(2)(b), together with its required advisements and the Children’s Code, provide sufficient safeguards to protect a parent’s interests in a dependency and neglect proceeding. 2024Z.P., 167 P.3d at 214 . | 1 | 1 |
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2010The United States Supreme Court has held that the similar attorney fee provisions in federal civil rights statutes are intended to further the goal of ensuring that private parties enforce those laws, since "few aggrieved parties would be in a position" to seek relief "[ilf successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 [ 88 S.Ct. 964 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 ] (1968). (3) In adopting this discretionary standard, the General Assembly intends to make the wage claim act a useful tool for employees to recover wag 2010The United States Supreme Court has held that the similar attorney fee provisions in federal civil rights statutes are intended to further the goal of ensuring that private parties enforce those laws, since "few aggrieved parties would be in a position" to seek relief "[ilf successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 [ 88 S.Ct. 964 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 ] (1968). (3) In adopting this discretionary standard, the General Assembly intends to make the wage claim act a useful tool for employees to recover wag | 1 | 1 |
RJS PAINTING v. Industrial Com'n of Stategreen2 sentences2009Comm'n, 732 P.2d 239, 241 (Colo.App. 1986) (affirming the ALJ's decision to set aside the contract of hire in force at the time of the injury and instead apply the discretionary exception to lower the award where the default statute overstated the claimant's AWW); W. 2009Comm'n, 732 P.2d 239, 241 (Colo.App. 1986) (affirming the ALJ's decision to set aside the contract of hire in force at the time of the injury and instead apply the discretionary exception to lower the award where the default statute overstated the claimant's AWW); W. | 1 | 1 |
Sterling Colorado Beef v. Bacagreen2 sentences2009See Sterling Colo. Beef v. Baca, 699 P.2d 1347 (Colo.App.1985) (commenting on the default rule); Bellendir v. Keger, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo.1982) (rejecting the argument that the workers' compensation statute violated due process and equal protection because it did not adjust awards for inflation); Lytile v. State Comp. 2009See Sterling Colo. Beef v. Baca, 699 P.2d 1347 (Colo.App.1985) (commenting on the default rule); Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo.1982) (rejecting the argument that the workers' compensation statute violated due process and equal protection because it did not adjust awards for inflation); Lyttle v. State Comp. | 1 | 1 |
City of Colorado Springs v. Powellgreen1 sentence2009We have consistently regarded the General Assembly's decision not to alter a statute when it makes amendments to related statutes "as evidence of its acquiescence to the judicial construction of the terms in those opinions." See City of Colorado Springs v. Powell, 156 P.3d 461, 467 (Colo.2007) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Bassgreen2 sentences2009In re Bass, 142 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Colo.2006). 2009In re Bass, 142 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Colo.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. IBM Corp.green1 sentence2009Campbell v. IBM Corp., 867 P.2d 77, 82 (Colo.App.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Western Sizzlin Steak House v. Axtongreen2 sentences2009Sizzlin Steak House v. Axton, 701 P.2d 96, 98 (Colo.App.1984) ('Under such circumstances, it is not for the commission or this court to substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ]."). . 2009Sizzlin Steak House v. Axton, 701 P.2d 96, 98 (Colo.App.1984) ("Under such circumstances, it is not for the commission or this court to substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ]."). [2] Only disabilities manifesting within five years are considered to be caused by the precipitating accident. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gallantgreen2 sentences2008App.1989) (theft); State v. Gallant, 307 Or. 152 , 764 P.2d 920, 923 (1988) (petty theft); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484 , 533 A.2d 120, 123 (1987) (theft); State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454 , 492 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1997) (shoplifting); State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.1981) (shoplifting); State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531 , 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991) (theft). [8] See federal cases cited supra note 5. [9] See cases cited supra notes 6 and 7. [10] The trial court in this case did not engage in a discretionary analysis under CRE 403. [11] There is no question that jeopardy has attach 2008App.1989) (theft); State v. Gallant, 307 Or. 152 , 764 P.2d 920, 923 (1988) (petty theft); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484 , 533 A.2d 120, 123 (1987) (theft); State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454 , 492 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1997) (shoplifting); State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.1981) (shoplifting); State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531 , 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991) (theft). [8] See federal cases cited supra note 5. [9] See cases cited supra notes 6 and 7. [10] The trial court in this case did not engage in a discretionary analysis under CRE 403. [11] There is no question that jeopardy has attach | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Kylegreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Raygreen2 sentences2008App.1989) (theft); State v. Gallant, 307 Or. 152 , 764 P.2d 920, 923 (1988) (petty theft); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484 , 533 A.2d 120, 123 (1987) (theft); State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454 , 492 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1997) (shoplifting); State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.1981) (shoplifting); State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531 , 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991) (theft). [8] See federal cases cited supra note 5. [9] See cases cited supra notes 6 and 7. [10] The trial court in this case did not engage in a discretionary analysis under CRE 403. [11] There is no question that jeopardy has attach 2008App.1989) (theft); State v. Gallant, 307 Or. 152 , 764 P.2d 920, 923 (1988) (petty theft); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484 , 533 A.2d 120, 123 (1987) (theft); State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454 , 492 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1997) (shoplifting); State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.1981) (shoplifting); State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531 , 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991) (theft). [8] See federal cases cited supra note 5. [9] See cases cited supra notes 6 and 7. [10] The trial court in this case did not engage in a discretionary analysis under CRE 403. [11] There is no question that jeopardy has attach | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shawgreen2 sentences2008App.1989) (theft); State v. Gallant, 307 Or. 152 , 764 P.2d 920, 923 (1988) (petty theft); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484 , 533 A.2d 120, 123 (1987) (theft); State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454 , 492 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1997) (shoplifting); State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.1981) (shoplifting); State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531 , 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991) (theft). [8] See federal cases cited supra note 5. [9] See cases cited supra notes 6 and 7. [10] The trial court in this case did not engage in a discretionary analysis under CRE 403. [11] There is no question that jeopardy has attach 2008App.1989) (theft); State v. Gallant, 307 Or. 152 , 764 P.2d 920, 923 (1988) (petty theft); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484 , 533 A.2d 120, 123 (1987) (theft); State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454 , 492 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1997) (shoplifting); State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.1981) (shoplifting); State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531 , 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991) (theft). [8] See federal cases cited supra note 5. [9] See cases cited supra notes 6 and 7. [10] The trial court in this case did not engage in a discretionary analysis under CRE 403. [11] There is no question that jeopardy has attach | 1 | 1 |
State v. Butlergreen1 sentence2008App.1989) (theft); State v. Gallant, 307 Or. 152 , 764 P.2d 920, 923 (1988) (petty theft); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484 , 533 A.2d 120, 123 (1987) (theft); State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454 , 492 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1997) (shoplifting); State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.1981) (shoplifting); State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531 , 806 P.2d 1220, 1228 (1991) (theft). [8] See federal cases cited supra note 5. [9] See cases cited supra notes 6 and 7. [10] The trial court in this case did not engage in a discretionary analysis under CRE 403. [11] There is no question that jeopardy has attach | 1 | 1 |
People v. Berrethgreen1 sentence2008See People v. Berreth, 13 P.3d 1214, 1216 (Colo. 2000). [12] The Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
| Perez v. Withamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Marriage of Mallongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dentongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Phelps v. Sovran Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ackerman v. American Airlines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fiore v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mayer v. Sampsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Avalanche Industries, Inc. v. Clark
green
2 sentences2026Avalanche Indus., 198 P.3d at 592 . ¶ 11 “In cases applying the discretionary exception, we review the ALJ’s decision for an abuse of discretion, only reversing where it ‘exceed[ed] the bounds of reason’ and was unsupported by applicable law.” Id. at 596 (quoting Coates, Reid & Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850, 856 (Colo. 1993)). 2026Avalanche Indus., 198 P.3d at 592 . ¶ 11 “In cases applying the discretionary exception, we review the ALJ’s decision for an abuse of discretion, only reversing where it ‘exceed[ed] the bounds of reason’ and was unsupported by applicable law.” Id. at 596 (quoting Coates, Reid & Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850, 856 (Colo. 1993)). | 2 | 2010–2026 |
Verzuh v. Rouse
green
2 sentences2003Fortner v. Cousar, 992 P.2d 697 (Colo.App.1999); Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301 (Colo.App.1982). 1999Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301 (Colo.App.1982). | 2 | 1999–2003 |
Kuhn v. State Ex Rel. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2001Kuhn v. State Dept. of Revenue, 897 P.2d 792 (fn.5)(Colo.1995). 1998Further, “[a]pplication by a trial court of law of the case to its prior rulings is a discretionary rule of practice.” Kuhn v. State Department of Revenue, supra, (fn. 5). | 2 | 1998–2001 |
BENCHMARK/ELITE, INC. v. Simpson
green
1 sentence2026Colorado courts describe subsection (2) as “the default provision” and subsection (3) as “the discretionary exception.” Id. ¶9 Under the default provision, the ALJ calculates the AWW “upon the monthly, weekly, daily, hourly, or other remuneration” the claimant received “at the time of the injury.” § 8-42-102(2). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hardesty v. Pino
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Spring Valley Estates, Inc. v. Cunningham
green
1 sentence2016Court, 666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983) (the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice directing that prior relevant rulings in the same case must generally be followed). ¶36 Furthermore, Lensky had the right to exclude defendants and other third parties from the subject property because, as a putative adverse possessor, he has an interest in the property “enforceable against everyone except the owner or one claiming through the owner.” Spring Valley Estates, 181 Colo, at 438, 510 P.2d at 338 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Industrial Commission v. Employers Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2009In addition, this court found that awards calculated under the discretionary exception must arrive at an AWW through a mathematical calculation rather than any "other method" allowed by the statute, stating, as it overturned the Commission's award, "We are not acquainted with any mathematical process by which the available facts can be made to produce any such result." Id. (citation omitted). 2009In addition, this court found that awards calculated under the discretionary exception must arrive at an AWW through a mathematical calculation rather than any "other method" allowed by the statute, stating, as it overturned the Commission's award, "We are not acquainted with any mathematical process by which the available facts can be made to produce any such result." Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Dugan v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences2009The fourth, Du-gan v. Industrial Commission, 690 P.2d 267 (Colo. App.1984), merely stands for the principle that a claimant cannot receive the higher salary from an earlier job when injured at a later, lower-paying job, see Coates, 856 P.2d at 857 n. 8 (finding Dugan "readily distinguishable"), and that a claimant cannot receive an increased award under the discretionary exception when the claimant cannot prove that he or she was able to earn the higher wage, see St. 2009The fourth, Dugan v. Industrial Commission, 690 P.2d 267 (Colo.App.1984), merely stands for the principle that a claimant cannot receive the higher salary from an earlier job when injured at a later, lower-paying job, see Coates, 856 P.2d at 857 n. 8 (finding Dugan "readily distinguishable"), and that a claimant cannot receive an increased award under the discretionary exception when the claimant cannot prove that he or she was able to earn the higher wage, see St. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Bellendir v. Kezer
green
2 sentences2009See Sterling Colo. Beef v. Baca, 699 P.2d 1347 (Colo.App.1985) (commenting on the default rule); Bellendir v. Keger, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo.1982) (rejecting the argument that the workers' compensation statute violated due process and equal protection because it did not adjust awards for inflation); Lytile v. State Comp. 2009See Sterling Colo. Beef v. Baca, 699 P.2d 1347 (Colo.App.1985) (commenting on the default rule); Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo.1982) (rejecting the argument that the workers' compensation statute violated due process and equal protection because it did not adjust awards for inflation); Lyttle v. State Comp. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| UIH-SFCC Holdings, L.P. v. Brigato green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Fortner v. Cousar green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Moore v. 1600 Downing Street, Ltd. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Clinger v. Hartshorn green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Irvin v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Fulton green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Romero green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Garrett green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.