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14 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Herranz v. Siamgreen1 sentence2019P’ship v. Lemontang, 19 So. 3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); see also Herranz v. Siam, 2 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“[I]f the court is to allow testimony in disputed 2 motion calendar hearings, specific notice of such intention must be given, with a sufficient interval to prepare and adequate opportunity to present contrary testimony prior to ruling.”) (quoting Juliano v. Juliano, 687 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
1445 Washington Ltd. Partnership v. Lemontanggreen1 sentence2019P’ship v. Lemontang, 19 So. 3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); see also Herranz v. Siam, 2 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“[I]f the court is to allow testimony in disputed 2 motion calendar hearings, specific notice of such intention must be given, with a sufficient interval to prepare and adequate opportunity to present contrary testimony prior to ruling.”) (quoting Juliano v. Juliano, 687 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Juliano v. Julianogreen1 sentence2019P’ship v. Lemontang, 19 So. 3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); see also Herranz v. Siam, 2 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“[I]f the court is to allow testimony in disputed 2 motion calendar hearings, specific notice of such intention must be given, with a sufficient interval to prepare and adequate opportunity to present contrary testimony prior to ruling.”) (quoting Juliano v. Juliano, 687 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Finding that Dr. Brigham’s proffered testimony would be no different than his proposed testimony, it concluded that “the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in disallowing Dr. Brigham’s testimony.” Id. at 1117. | 1 | 1 |
Keesee v. Bank of America, NAgreen1 sentence2006In Keesee v. Bank of America, NA, 371 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1376 (M.D.Fla.2005), the court found that section 768.79 was "inconsistent" with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because its provision for mandatory fees would "override" the discretionary test applied under federal law. | 1 | 1 |
Fleming v. Fleminggreen1 sentence2006We believe the trial court's action conformed with the discretionary factors governing the consideration of such motions, as set out in Fleming v. Fleming, 710 So.2d 601, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Bossegreen1 sentence1999This discretionary standard for costs in disciplinary proceedings had earlier been adopted by this Court explicitly over the alternative civil standard, under which the prevailing party "shall recover all his or her legal costs." § 57.041(1) Fla. Stat.; see Florida Bar v. Davis, 419 So.2d 325, 328 (Fla.1982); accord Florida Bar v. Chilton, 616 So.2d 449, 451 (Fla.1993); Florida Bar v. Bosse, 609 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Fla.1992). | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Davisgreen1 sentence1999This discretionary standard for costs in disciplinary proceedings had earlier been adopted by this Court explicitly over the alternative civil standard, under which the prevailing party "shall recover all his or her legal costs." § 57.041(1) Fla. Stat.; see Florida Bar v. Davis, 419 So.2d 325, 328 (Fla.1982); accord Florida Bar v. Chilton, 616 So.2d 449, 451 (Fla.1993); Florida Bar v. Bosse, 609 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Fla.1992). | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Chiltongreen1 sentence1999This discretionary standard for costs in disciplinary proceedings had earlier been adopted by this Court explicitly over the alternative civil standard, under which the prevailing party "shall recover all his or her legal costs." § 57.041(1) Fla. Stat.; see Florida Bar v. Davis, 419 So.2d 325, 328 (Fla.1982); accord Florida Bar v. Chilton, 616 So.2d 449, 451 (Fla.1993); Florida Bar v. Bosse, 609 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Fla.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Evangelical United Brethren Church v. Stategreen2 sentences1988It quoted with approval the test for drawing the line between discretionary and other executive and administrative functions set forth in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246 , 407 P.2d 440, 445 (1965): Whatever the suitable characterization or label might be, it would appear that any determination of a line of demarcation between truly discretionary and other executive and administrative processes, so far as susceptibility to potential sovereign tort liability be concerned, would necessitate a posing of at least the following four preliminary questions: (1) Does the cha 1988It quoted with approval the test for drawing the line between discretionary and other executive and administrative functions set forth in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246 , 407 P.2d 440, 445 (1965): Whatever the suitable characterization or label might be, it would appear that any determination of a line of demarcation between truly discretionary and other executive and administrative processes, so far as susceptibility to potential sovereign tort liability be concerned, would necessitate a posing of at least the following four preliminary questions: (1) Does the cha | 1 | 1 |
Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co.green1 sentence1984In applying the discretionary standard of review the test of correctness is also found in Canakaris , quoting from Delno v. Market Street Railway, 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.1942): Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Beta Eta House Corporation v. Gregorygreen1 sentence1970(Emphasis added) [7] Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. v. Gregory, 230 So.2d 495, 499 (Fla.App. 1970), modified on other grounds, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meltzer v. Meltzer
green
2 sentences1987We do not read Friedman v. Friedman, 307 So.2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and Meltzer v. Meltzer, 262 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), cited by appellant, as abrogating this discretionary rule and requiring, as a matter of law, that the modification must always become effective on the date the petition is filed. 1985We do not read Friedman v. Friedman, 307 So.2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and Meltzer v. Meltzer, 262 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), cited by appellant, as abrogating this discretionary rule and requiring, as a matter of law, that the modification must always become effective on the date the petition is filed. | 2 | 1985–1987 |
Friedman v. Friedman
green
2 sentences1987We do not read Friedman v. Friedman, 307 So.2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and Meltzer v. Meltzer, 262 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), cited by appellant, as abrogating this discretionary rule and requiring, as a matter of law, that the modification must always become effective on the date the petition is filed. 1985We do not read Friedman v. Friedman, 307 So.2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and Meltzer v. Meltzer, 262 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), cited by appellant, as abrogating this discretionary rule and requiring, as a matter of law, that the modification must always become effective on the date the petition is filed. | 2 | 1985–1987 |
Henderson v. Bowden
green
1 sentence2003The panel relies heavily on Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532 (Fla.1999), but it appears to me that the panel has misapprehended the rule set forth in that case. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Grossman v. Dugger
green
1 sentence1999My very deep concern is that the majority of this Court in overruling Grossman v. Dugger, 708 So.2d 249 (Fla.1997), has determined that it no longer trusts trial judges to exercise proper judgment in weighing conflicting evidence and applying existing legal principles. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Davis v. Florida Power Co.
green
1 sentence1985Davis v. Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 246 , 60 So. 759 (1913). [9] Other district courts have made similar comments. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Canakaris v. Canakaris
green
1 sentence1984If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. 382 So.2d at 1203 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Johnson v. State of California
green
2 sentences1979For a time, the lower appellate courts in California labored unsuccessfully *1021 to develop a dictionary definition of "discretion" which established liability for minor discretionary actions but preserved immunity for high-level decisions. [12] Disavowal of this definitional approach came in Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 (1968), where the California Supreme Court recognized that all governmental functions, no matter how seemingly ministerial, can be characterized as embracing the exercise of some discretion in the manner of their performance. 1979For a time, the lower appellate courts in California labored unsuccessfully *1021 to develop a dictionary definition of "discretion" which established liability for minor discretionary actions but preserved immunity for high-level decisions. [12] Disavowal of this definitional approach came in Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 (1968), where the California Supreme Court recognized that all governmental functions, no matter how seemingly ministerial, can be characterized as embracing the exercise of some discretion in the manner of their performance. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory
green
1 sentence1970(Emphasis added) [7] Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. v. Gregory, 230 So.2d 495, 499 (Fla.App. 1970), modified on other grounds, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.