end inquiry in District of Columbia

1999United States v. Walton, 411 A.2d 333, 337-38 (D.C.1979).

1999United States v. Walton, 411 A.2d 333, 337-38 (D.C.1979).

2026“There may well be some capacity above which magazines are not in common use but . . . that capacity surely is not ten.” Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”), 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C.

2025See (James) Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365 (explaining that discretionary rulings must be based on “reasoning [that] . . . supports the trial court’s action”); see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 635 (D.C. 1979) (explaining that, where the trial court’s own reasoning is not sufficient, “the very reason for [our] deference[,] i.e. the trial court’s opportunity to observe, hear, and otherwise evaluate the witness[,] will be compromised”).

2025See (James) Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365 (explaining that discretionary rulings must be based on “reasoning [that] . . . supports the trial court’s action”); see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 635 (D.C. 1979) (explaining that, where the trial court’s own reasoning is not sufficient, “the very reason for [our] deference[,] i.e. the trial court’s opportunity to observe, hear, and otherwise evaluate the witness[,] will be compromised”).

2024However, no party suggests (and we do not see) that this is a case in which a “court may refuse to adhere strictly to the plain language of a statute in order ‘to effectuate the legislative purpose’ as determined by a reading of the legislative history or by an examination of the statute as a whole.” Id. (quoting Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C. 1983) (en banc)). 32 owners’ association” for purposes of applying Subsection (c) to those amendments.34 Therefore, Erie argues, any challenge to the validity of the amendments had to be brought by August 19, 2

2023We could hardly have been clearer on this point, stating at the end of our analysis that “the evidence is such that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a ‘firm belief’ that Kline intentionally withheld the statement because he did not think it was exculpatory.” Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 21 Respondents and their amici resist this understanding of Rule 3.8(e)’s state-of-mind requirements.

2018See Reynolds, supra, 86 A.3d at 1162 (stating that “it is logical to conclude that a doctor’s continued prescription of medication, especially narcotics, is an implicit statement that the doctor believes it is reasonable and necessary for treating the patient”). 9 At the end of the hearing, ALJ Bertram stated that he found the Petitioner to be “very credible” and stated his belief that the petitioner testified truthfully.

2018See Reynolds, supra, 86 A.3d at 1162 (stating that “it is logical to conclude that a doctor’s continued prescription of medication, especially narcotics, is an implicit statement that the doctor believes it is reasonable and necessary for treating the patient”). 9 At the end of the hearing, ALJ Bertram stated that he found the Petitioner to be “very credible” and stated his belief that the petitioner testified truthfully.

2017Riley v. California, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014); see also United States v. Lewis, 147 A.3d 236, 239 (D.C. 2016) (en banc) (“A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a few specific and well-established exceptions.” (quoting United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 821 (D.C. 2012))). 28 Our conclusion that the government violated Mr. Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights is not the end of our inquiry.

2017Nov. 9, 2015); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1170 (Vt. 2012) (―Warrants for electronic surveillance routinely set out ‗minimization‘ requirements—procedures for how and under what conditions the electronic surveillance may be conducted—in order to ‗afford similar protections to those that are present in the use of conventional warrants authorizing (continued…) 26 Our conclusion that the government violated Mr. Jones‘s Fourth Amendment rights is not the end of our inquiry.

2017Riley v. California, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014); see also United States v. Lewis, 147 A.3d 236, 239 (D.C. 2016) (en banc) (“A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a few specific and well-established exceptions.” (quoting United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 821 (D.C. 2012))). 28 Our conclusion that the government violated Mr. Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights is not the end of our inquiry.

2015Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360, 366 .28 That, however, is the beginning rather than the end of our analysis.

2012See West Publ’g Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 720 , 128 P.2d 777, 783 (1942) (legal publisher “maintain[ed] places of business” in law-firm libraries where publisher’s employees were permitted to work and store books for sale). 2 We therefore are unpersuaded by OTR’s arguments as to the natural understanding of the word “maintain” in the phrase “maintain[ ] an office ... or base of operations.” 3 Nevertheless, that is not the end of the inquiry, because we must also consider the structure and legislative history of the franchise-tax exemption.

2012See West Publ’g Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 720 , 128 P.2d 777, 783 (1942) (legal publisher “maintain[ed] places of business” in law-firm libraries where publisher’s employees were permitted to work and store books for sale). 2 We therefore are unpersuaded by OTR’s arguments as to the natural understanding of the word “maintain” in the phrase “maintain[ ] an office ... or base of operations.” 3 Nevertheless, that is not the end of the inquiry, because we must also consider the structure and legislative history of the franchise-tax exemption.

2010See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 , 99 S.Ct. 1946 .

2010See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 , 99 S.Ct. 1946 .

2009See 35 D.C.Reg. 5084 (June 24, 1988). 23 DCMR § 1705.4 provided that "within fifteen (15) calendar days from the end of the challenge period,” the Board "shall ... determine whether the challenged petition signatures are valid.” Without reference to a fifteen-day deadline, 23 DCMR § 1706.2 provided that "[w]hen the approved signatures on the petitions demonstrate that a majority of the registered voters object to the granting of the license sought, the Board shall deny the license.” Thus, the Board’s regulations divorced the Board’s determination with respect to "a majority of the registered v

2009See 35 D.C.Reg. 5084 (June 24, 1988). 23 DCMR § 1705.4 provided that "within fifteen (15) calendar days from the end of the challenge period,” the Board "shall ... determine whether the challenged petition signatures are valid.” Without reference to a fifteen-day deadline, 23 DCMR § 1706.2 provided that "[w]hen the approved signatures on the petitions demonstrate that a majority of the registered voters object to the granting of the license sought, the Board shall deny the license.” Thus, the Board’s regulations divorced the Board’s determination with respect to "a majority of the registered v

2009See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (no balancing test is required because “[t]he summary judgment test is itself the balance”).

2009See, e.g., Miranda v. Contreras, 754 A.2d 277, 281 (D.C.2000) ("a judgment secured by misrepresentations by one counsel to another ... warrants] relief” from the judgment); Branch v. District of Columbia Dep't of Pub. & Assisted Hous., 661 A.2d 1102 , 1103 n. 2 (D.C.1995) (noting that public housing benefits obtained through fraudulent means must be terminated). 15 .

2005For purposes of Rule 26(b)(4), a witness “may be an ‘expert’ as to some matters and an ‘actor’ as to others.” Patel, 984 F.2d at 218 (quoting Nelco Corp. v. Slater Elec., Inc., 80 F.R.D. 411, 414 (E.D.N.Y.1978)).

2005See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 , 124 n. 25, 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). 2 .

2005See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 , 124 n. 25, 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). 2 .

2004“Despite its status as a pariah, ... not all references to polygraph tests warrant reversal.” Peyton, 709 A.2d at 70 n. 13 (quoting State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270 , 604 A.2d 489, 492 (1992)).

2004“Despite its status as a pariah, ... not all references to polygraph tests warrant reversal.” Peyton, 709 A.2d at 70 n. 13 (quoting State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270 , 604 A.2d 489, 492 (1992)).

1999Our conclusion on the relevance of the bullet-proof vest is not the end of the inquiry because, even if relevant, evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1099 (D.C. 1996) (en banc) (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 403), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1148 , 117 S.Ct. 1323 , 137 L.Ed.2d 484 (1997) (emphasis added).