end analysis in Connecticut

2018If the trial court determines that there was no unduly suggestive identification procedure, that is the end of the analysis, and the identification evidence is admissible." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dickson , supra, 322 Conn. at 420 -21 , 141 A.3d 810 .

2018If the trial court determines that there was no unduly suggestive identification procedure, that is the end of the analysis, and the identification evidence is admissible." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dickson , supra, 322 Conn. at 420 -21 , 141 A.3d 810 .

2020Nevertheless, the familial relationship may be an important factor when evaluated in the context of all the other relevant factors guiding the [c]ourt in its resolution of the . . . claim.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803 , 814–15, 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007).

2020Nevertheless, the familial relationship may be an important factor when evaluated in the context of all the other relevant factors guiding the [c]ourt in its resolution of the . . . claim.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803 , 814–15, 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007).

2018If the trial court determines that there was no unduly suggestive identification procedure, that is the end of the analysis, and the identification evidence is admissible." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420-21, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed. 2d 713 (2017).

2018If the trial court determines that there was no unduly suggestive identification procedure, that is the end of the analysis, and the identification evidence is admissible.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dickson, 322 Conn. 410 , 420–21, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 2263 , 198 L.

2018If the trial court determines that there was no unduly suggestive identification procedure, that is the end of the analysis, and the identification evidence is admissible." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dickson , 322 Conn. 410 , 420-21, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2263 , 198 L.Ed. 2d 713 (2017).

2018If the trial court determines that there was no unduly suggestive identification procedure, that is the end of the analysis, and the identification evidence is admissible.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dickson, 322 Conn. 410 , 420–21, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 2263 , 198 L.

2020Nevertheless, the familial relationship may be an important factor when evaluated in the context of all the other relevant factors guiding the [c]ourt in its resolution of the . . . claim.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803 , 814–15, 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007).

2020Nevertheless, the familial relationship may be an important factor when evaluated in the context of all the other relevant factors guiding the [c]ourt in its resolution of the . . . claim.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803 , 814–15, 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007).

2020Nevertheless, the familial relationship may be an important factor when evaluated in the context of all the other relevant factors guiding the [c]ourt in its resolution of the . . . claim.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803 , 814–15, 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007).

2020Nevertheless, the familial relationship may be an important factor when evaluated in the context of all the other relevant factors guiding the [c]ourt in its resolution of the . . . claim.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803 , 814–15, 927 A.2d 921 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907 , 931 A.2d 265 (2007).

1987Because the right implicated is the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial, we proceed next to an examination of the remarks to determine their likely impact. ‘[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’ Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 , 102 S. Ct. 940 , 71 L.

1987Because the right implicated is the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial, we proceed next to an examination of the remarks to determine their likely impact. ‘[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’ Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 , 102 S. Ct. 940 , 71 L.

2026“If the court finds that there was an unduly sugges- tive procedure, the court goes on to address the second reliability prong, under which the corruptive effect of the suggestive procedure is weighed against certain fac- tors, such as the opportunity of the [eyewitness] to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the [eyewitness’] degree of attention, the accuracy of [the eyewitness’] prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the [identification] and the time between State v. Harvey the crime and the [identification].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation

2024Although severance of the emotional ties between a nonparent and a child who have developed a parent-like relationship, without more, should not be the end of the analysis with respect to the harm prong, in Roth, this court concluded that there could be ‘‘cir- cumstances in which a nonparent and a child have developed such substantial emotional ties that the denial of visitation could cause serious and immediate harm to that child.’’ Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 225 ; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183, 191 (Iowa 2003) (‘‘when a grandparent has established a substanti

2024Although severance of the emotional ties between a nonparent and a child who have developed a parent-like relationship, without more, should not be the end of the analysis with respect to the harm prong, in Roth, this court concluded that there could be ‘‘cir- cumstances in which a nonparent and a child have developed such substantial emotional ties that the denial of visitation could cause serious and immediate harm to that child.’’ Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 225 ; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183, 191 (Iowa 2003) (‘‘when a grandparent has established a substanti

2024Although severance of the emotional ties between a nonparent and a child who have developed a parent-like relationship, without more, should not be the end of the analysis with respect to the harm prong, in Roth, this court concluded that there could be ‘‘cir- cumstances in which a nonparent and a child have developed such substantial emotional ties that the denial of visitation could cause serious and immediate harm to that child.’’ Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 225 ; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183, 191 (Iowa 2003) (‘‘when a grandparent has established a substanti

2024Although severance of the emotional ties between a nonparent and a child who have developed a parent-like relationship, without more, should not be the end of the analysis with respect to the harm prong, in Roth, this court concluded that there could be ‘‘cir- cumstances in which a nonparent and a child have developed such substantial emotional ties that the denial of visitation could cause serious and immediate harm to that child.’’ Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 225 ; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183, 191 (Iowa 2003) (‘‘when a grandparent has established a substanti

2024Although severance of the emotional ties between a nonparent and a child who have developed a parent-like relationship, without more, should not be the end of the analysis with respect to the harm prong, in Roth, this court concluded that there could be ‘‘cir- cumstances in which a nonparent and a child have developed such substantial emotional ties that the denial of visitation could cause serious and immediate harm to that child.’’ Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 225 ; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183, 191 (Iowa 2003) (‘‘when a grandparent has established a substanti

2024Ed. 2d 1022 (2003); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117 , 827 A.2d 203 (2003) Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. 1 Hepburn v. Brill (‘‘the termination of a long-standing relationship between the grandparents and the child . . . [can] form the basis for a finding of harm’’), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177 , 124 S. Ct. 1408 , 158 L.

2024Ed. 2d 1022 (2003); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117 , 827 A.2d 203 (2003) Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. 1 Hepburn v. Brill (‘‘the termination of a long-standing relationship between the grandparents and the child . . . [can] form the basis for a finding of harm’’), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177 , 124 S. Ct. 1408 , 158 L.

2024Ed. 2d 1022 (2003); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117 , 827 A.2d 203 (2003) Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. 1 Hepburn v. Brill (‘‘the termination of a long-standing relationship between the grandparents and the child . . . [can] form the basis for a finding of harm’’), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177 , 124 S. Ct. 1408 , 158 L.

2024Ed. 2d 1022 (2003); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117 , 827 A.2d 203 (2003) Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. 1 Hepburn v. Brill (‘‘the termination of a long-standing relationship between the grandparents and the child . . . [can] form the basis for a finding of harm’’), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177 , 124 S. Ct. 1408 , 158 L.

2024Ed. 2d 1022 (2003); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117 , 827 A.2d 203 (2003) Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 26 ,0 0 Conn. 1 Hepburn v. Brill (‘‘the termination of a long-standing relationship between the grandparents and the child . . . [can] form the basis for a finding of harm’’), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177 , 124 S. Ct. 1408 , 158 L.

2020This is not the end of the inquiry, however, because § 7-433c applies only to the injured worker’s establish- ment of a compensable claim in the first instance. ‘‘[O]nce § 7-433c coverage is established, the measure- ment of the plaintiff’s benefits under this statute is identical to the benefits that may be awarded to a plain- tiff under [the act].’’ Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 185 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); see also Lambert v. Bridgeport, 204 Conn. 563, 566 , 529 A.2d 184 (1987) (‘‘§ 7-433c enti- tles a qualified, hypertensive or [heart disabled] fire- fighter or police officer to receive c

2020This is not the end of the inquiry, however, because § 7-433c applies only to the injured worker’s establish- ment of a compensable claim in the first instance. ‘‘[O]nce § 7-433c coverage is established, the measure- ment of the plaintiff’s benefits under this statute is identical to the benefits that may be awarded to a plain- tiff under [the act].’’ Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 185 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); see also Lambert v. Bridgeport, 204 Conn. 563, 566 , 529 A.2d 184 (1987) (‘‘§ 7-433c enti- tles a qualified, hypertensive or [heart disabled] fire- fighter or police officer to receive c

2018If the court finds that there was an unduly suggestive procedure, the court goes on to address the second reliability prong, under which the corruptive effect of the suggestive procedure is weighed against *400 certain factors, such as the opportunity of the [eyewitness] to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the [eyewitness'] degree of attention, the accuracy of [the eyewitness'] prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the [identification] and the time between the crime and the [identification]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

2018If the court finds that there was an unduly suggestive procedure, the court goes on to address the second reliability prong, under which the corruptive effect of the suggestive procedure is weighed against *400 certain factors, such as the opportunity of the [eyewitness] to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the [eyewitness'] degree of attention, the accuracy of [the eyewitness'] prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the [identification] and the time between the crime and the [identification]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

2017If the suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him." (Citations omitted.) Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452 , 457-58, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).

2017If the suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him." (Citations omitted.) Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452 , 457-58, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).

2017At the end of the hearing, the court issued an oral ruling denying the defendant's motion to suppress. 11 A We begin by setting forth the legal principles that guide our analysis of the defendant's claim that the detectives violated Edwards by continuing to question him after he clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel during the second interview. 12 In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 469-73, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that "a suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have couns

2017At the end of the hearing, the court issued an oral ruling denying the defendant's motion to suppress. 11 A We begin by setting forth the legal principles that guide our analysis of the defendant's claim that the detectives violated Edwards by continuing to question him after he clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel during the second interview. 12 In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 469-73, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that "a suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have couns

2016State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300 , 306 n.8, 857 A.2d 329 (2004) (‘‘[r]eason- able suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informa- tion that is less reliable to show probable cause’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949 , 125 S. Ct. 1711 , 161 L.

2016State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300 , 306 n.8, 857 A.2d 329 (2004) (‘‘[r]eason- able suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informa- tion that is less reliable to show probable cause’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949 , 125 S. Ct. 1711 , 161 L.

2016State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300 , 306 n.8, 857 A.2d 329 (2004) (‘‘[r]eason- able suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informa- tion that is less reliable to show probable cause’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949 , 125 S. Ct. 1711 , 161 L.

2016State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34 , 54, 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225 , 131 S.Ct. 1479 , 179 L.Ed.2d 316 (2011).

2016State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34, 54 , 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225 , 131 S. Ct. 1479 , 179 L.

2016State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34 , 54, 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225 , 131 S.Ct. 1479 , 179 L.Ed.2d 316 (2011).

2016State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34, 54 , 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225 , 131 S. Ct. 1479 , 179 L.

2016State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34 , 54, 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225 , 131 S.Ct. 1479 , 179 L.Ed.2d 316 (2011).

2016State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34, 54 , 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225 , 131 S. Ct. 1479 , 179 L.

2016State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300 , 306 n.8, 857 A.2d 329 (2004) (‘‘[r]eason- able suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informa- tion that is less reliable to show probable cause’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949 , 125 S. Ct. 1711 , 161 L.

2016State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34, 54 , 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225 , 131 S. Ct. 1479 , 179 L.

2016State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34, 54 , 3 A.3d 1 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1225 , 131 S. Ct. 1479 , 179 L.