end inquiry in Georgia

2012Based upon these facts, the trial court properly concluded Deputy Roper’s “decision to ask [Greenway] to sign the release for his two dogs” was “discretionary” and one which required “Deputy Roper to exercise personal deliberation and judgment.” See Todd, supra, 292 Ga. App. at 330-331 (1) (officer’s decision to shoot bull during attempted impound discretionary act). 16 This is not the end of our analysis, however, as Greenway’s complaint against Deputy Roper is not based solely upon Deputy Roper’s decision to ask Greenway to sign the form – instead it also focuses upon the manner in which Dep

2012Based upon these facts, the trial court properly concluded Deputy Roper’s “decision to ask [Greenway] to sign the release for his two dogs” was “discretionary” and one which required “Deputy Roper to exercise personal deliberation and judgment.” See Todd, supra, 292 Ga. App. at 330-331 (1) (officer’s decision to shoot bull during attempted impound discretionary act). 16 This is not the end of our analysis, however, as Greenway’s complaint against Deputy Roper is not based solely upon Deputy Roper’s decision to ask Greenway to sign the form – instead it also focuses upon the manner in which Dep

2017See, e.g., Eubanks v. Rabon, 281 Ga. 708, 711 (3) ( 642 SE2d 652 ) (2007) (considering harmless error in the context of judicial notice of an adjudicative fact); Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 450 (2) ( 651 SE2d 66 ) (2007) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 84, 86 ( 453 SE2d 716 ) (1995) (“ ‘A constitutional error ... will not require reversal if it can be shown to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not contribute to the conviction.’ ”)

2017See, e.g., Eubanks v. Rabon, 281 Ga. 708, 711 (3) ( 642 SE2d 652 ) (2007) (considering harmless error in the context of judicial notice of an adjudicative fact); Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 450 (2) ( 651 SE2d 66 ) (2007) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 84, 86 ( 453 SE2d 716 ) (1995) (“ ‘A constitutional error ... will not require reversal if it can be shown to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not contribute to the conviction.’ ”)

2017See, e.g., Eubanks v. Rabon, 281 Ga. 708, 711 (3) ( 642 SE2d 652 ) (2007) (considering harmless error in the context of judicial notice of an adjudicative fact); Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 450 (2) ( 651 SE2d 66 ) (2007) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 84, 86 ( 453 SE2d 716 ) (1995) (“ ‘A constitutional error ... will not require reversal if it can be shown to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not contribute to the conviction.’ ”)

2017See, e.g., Eubanks v. Rabon, 281 Ga. 708, 711 (3) ( 642 SE2d 652 ) (2007) (considering harmless error in the context of judicial notice of an adjudicative fact); Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 450 (2) ( 651 SE2d 66 ) (2007) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 84, 86 ( 453 SE2d 716 ) (1995) (“ ‘A constitutional error ... will not require reversal if it can be shown to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not contribute to the conviction.’ ”)

2017See, e.g., Eubanks v. Rabon, 281 Ga. 708, 711 (3) ( 642 SE2d 652 ) (2007) (considering harmless error in the context of judicial notice of an adjudicative fact); Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 450 (2) ( 651 SE2d 66 ) (2007) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 84, 86 ( 453 SE2d 716 ) (1995) (“ ‘A constitutional error ... will not require reversal if it can be shown to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not contribute to the conviction.’ ”)

2017See, e.g., Eubanks v. Rabon, 281 Ga. 708, 711 (3) ( 642 SE2d 652 ) (2007) (considering harmless error in the context of judicial notice of an adjudicative fact); Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 450 (2) ( 651 SE2d 66 ) (2007) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 84, 86 ( 453 SE2d 716 ) (1995) (“ ‘A constitutional error ... will not require reversal if it can be shown to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not contribute to the conviction.’ ”)

2015Johnson v. State, 292 Ga. 785, 789 (4) ( 741 SE2d 627 ) (2013).

2015Johnson v. State, 292 Ga. 785, 789 (4) ( 741 SE2d 627 ) (2013).

2014In interpreting federal statutes, we must strive “to give effect to the will of Congress,” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U. S. 564, 570 (II) (A) ( 102 SCt 3245 , 73 LE2d 973) (1982), and “if the intent of Congress is clear and unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at issue, that [is] the end of our analysis.” Zuni Public School Dist.

2014In interpreting federal statutes, we must strive “to give effect to the will of Congress,” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U. S. 564, 570 (II) (A) ( 102 SCt 3245 , 73 LE2d 973) (1982), and “if the intent of Congress is clear and unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at issue, that [is] the end of our analysis.” Zuni Public School Dist.

2014(Emphasis supplied.) The day after the hearing, however, the juvenile court entered an “Order of Adjudication and Disposition.” While we recognize that an order is defined not by its nomenclature but by its substance, see generally In re Estate of Sims, 246 Ga. App. 451, 452 ( 540 SE2d 650 ) (2000), in substance this was indeed an adjudicatory order.

2014(Emphasis supplied.) The day after the hearing, however, the juvenile court entered an “Order of Adjudication and Disposition.” While we recognize that an order is defined not by its nomenclature but by its substance, see generally In re Estate of Sims, 246 Ga. App. 451, 452 ( 540 SE2d 650 ) (2000), in substance this was indeed an adjudicatory order.

2013See Soloman v. State, 294 Ga. App. 520, 524 (2) (b), n. 16 ( 669 SE2d 430 ) (2008).

2013See Soloman v. State, 294 Ga. App. 520, 524 (2) (b), n. 16 ( 669 SE2d 430 ) (2008).

2012“An accused is entitled to rely on the provisions set forth in the sentencing document if he is not informed to the contrary when the sentence is imposed.” (Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Otuwa v. State, 303 Ga. App. 410, 411 (1) ( 693 SE2d 610 ) (2010).

2012“An accused is entitled to rely on the provisions set forth in the sentencing document if he is not informed to the contrary when the sentence is imposed.” (Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Otuwa v. State, 303 Ga. App. 410, 411 (1) ( 693 SE2d 610 ) (2010).

1977See Oster v. Rich’s, Inc., 140 Ga. App. 373 ( 231 SE2d 140 ) (1976).

1977See Oster v. Rich’s, Inc., 140 Ga. App. 373 ( 231 SE2d 140 ) (1976).

2012Thus, “no evidence shows that the trial court disregarded [Thompson’s] appraisal.” Blue Marlin Dev., supra. 4.

2012Thus, “no evidence shows that the trial court disregarded [Thompson’s] appraisal.” Blue Marlin Development, supra. 4 .

2024Compare State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39 , 39 n.1 ( 897 SE2d 432 ) (2024). 14 As we mentioned above, the trial court’s written orders granting the motions said only that “the State failed to meet its burden of proving” that the defendants “understood [their] Miranda rights and knowingly, voluntarily[,] and intelligently waived those rights before giving a statement.” But when the trial court pronounced that ruling at the end of the hearing on the motions, the court made additional (though limited) factual findings as part of its analysis of the totality of the circumstances—and the parties do not

2024Compare State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39 , 39 n.1 ( 897 SE2d 432 ) (2024). 14 As we mentioned above, the trial court’s written orders granting the motions said only that “the State failed to meet its burden of proving” that the defendants “understood [their] Miranda rights and knowingly, voluntarily[,] and intelligently waived those rights before giving a statement.” But when the trial court pronounced that ruling at the end of the hearing on the motions, the court made additional (though limited) factual findings as part of its analysis of the totality of the circumstances—and the parties do not

2024See Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746 .

2024See Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746.

2022As we have said before, “the legislature has the authority to create reasonable statutory rules concerning venue when the Constitution leaves space to do so.” Carpenter v. McMann, 304 Ga. 209, 211 (817 SE2d 686) (2018).

2022As we have said before, “the legislature has the authority to create reasonable statutory rules concerning venue when the Constitution leaves space to do so.” Carpenter, 304 Ga. at 211 .

2020Slater does require consideration of whether an inconsistent position was “‘calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.’” Slater, 871 F3d at 1181 (III) (A) (citation omitted).

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2017Bottom line: In the absence of an explicit textual basis, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”6 As we have previously explained, “[i]t is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of powers, for this Court to fashion causes of action out of whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”7 Thus, I take this opportunity to reiterate that, so long as the meaning of the relevant statutory text is plain and does not lead

2016Id. at 277 , citing Armour v. Holcombe, 288 Ga. 50, 51-52 (1) ( 701 SE2d 169 ) (2010).

2016Id. at 277 , citing Armour v. Holcombe, 288 Ga. 50, 51-52 (1) ( 701 SE2d 169 ) (2010).