end inquiry in Iowa

2024As explained, the Shelton court did not adopt a categorical ban on depositions of opposing counsel. 805 F.2d at 1327 .

2024As explained, the Shelton court did not adopt a categorical ban on depositions of opposing counsel. 805 F.2d at 1327 .

2022Although a repeal does not extinguish prior penalties unless the “repealing Act shall so expressly provide,” 1 U.S.C. § 109 , “the Court has long recognized that this saving statute creates what is in effect a less demanding interpretive requirement,” Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 273–74 (recognizing that the federal “saving statute permits Congress to apply a new Act’s more lenient penalties to pre-Act offenders without expressly saying so in the new Act”).

2022Although a repeal does not extinguish prior penalties unless the “repealing Act shall so expressly provide,” 1 U.S.C. § 109 , “the Court has long recognized that this saving statute creates what is in effect a less demanding interpretive requirement,” Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 273–74 (recognizing that the federal “saving statute permits Congress to apply a new Act’s more lenient penalties to pre-Act offenders without expressly saying so in the new Act”).

1940At least this court has so held and determined in Cummings v. Easton, 46 Iowa, 183 ; Hough v. Easley, 47 Ia. 330 ; Jiska v. Ringgold Co., 57 Ia. 630 ; Parker v. Cochran, 64 Ia. 757 .’’ In that case, however, we held, as to the owner, that, since the taxes were legally assessed, he was under a duty to pay them and hence, as to him, the sale was voidable only and could not be challenged unless he paid or offered to pay the taxes.

1886At least this court has so held and determined in Cummings v. Easton, 46 Iowa, 183 ; Hough v. Easley, 47 Id., 330 ; Jiska v. Ringgold Co., 57 Id., 630; Parker v. Cochran, 64 Id., 757.

2025She just shuts down.” At the end of the hearing, the defense argued that the State had not met the standard for remote testimony under Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 , 855–56 (1990), and section 915.38.

2024We reiterate our guidance from Hill and “encourage sentencing courts to give more detailed reasons for a sentence specific to the individual defendant and crimes and to . . . explicitly state the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.” 878 N.W.2d at 275 .

2016Blair that [it] had reviewed the Iowa Supreme Court opinion that affirmed his convictions[, see Blair, 347 N.W.2d at 416 ,] and finds that the first-degree-murder conviction was based upon premeditation, not felony murder where the predicate felony was willful injury.

2015Hostile Work Environment That is not the end of our inquiry, however, as the Iowa Supreme Court has rejected the contention that “only cases involving the loss of a tangible job benefit are actionable under the [ICRA].” Lynch, 454 N.W.2d at 834 .

2012In Johnson, we held that after a sentencing hearing the reviewing court could look to the sentencing order to determine if the court gave adequate reasons for its sentence. 445 N.W.2d at 343–44.

2012In Johnson , we held that after a sentencing hearing the reviewing court could look to the sentencing order to determine if the court gave adequate reasons for its sentence. 445 N.W.2d at 343-44 .

1992In support, they cite Eister, 420 N.W.2d at 445 , in which we said: "The trial court correctly concluded that our holding in Koll does not apply to claims brought against a coemployee." Eister is clear support for the proposition that a coemployee's violation of an OSHA regulation is not negligence per se as to the injured worker's coemployee.

1992In support, they cite Eister, 420 N.W.2d at 445 , in which we said: “The trial court correctly concluded that our holding in Roll does not apply to claims brought against a coem-ployee.” Eister is clear support for the proposition that a coemployee’s violation of an OSHA regulation is not negligence per se as to the injured worker’s coemployee.

1953We said in Mackland v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Iowa 604 , at page 607, 144 N.W. 317, 318 , a similar ease: “Proceedings before a board of supervisors and other tribunals of that character are necessarily informal, and the courts are not disposed to review them with technical strictness.” There a demand for “damage for the taking of said land” appeared at the end of his claim for compensation for 3.46 acres for right of way for a ditch and was held sufficient to base his appeal and recover for damage to his farm.

1953We said in Mackland v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Iowa 604 , at page 607, 144 N.W. 317, 318 , a similar ease: “Proceedings before a board of supervisors and other tribunals of that character are necessarily informal, and the courts are not disposed to review them with technical strictness.” There a demand for “damage for the taking of said land” appeared at the end of his claim for compensation for 3.46 acres for right of way for a ditch and was held sufficient to base his appeal and recover for damage to his farm.

1943Becvar v. Batesole, 218 Iowa 858, 860 , *263 256 N. W. 297 ; Stokes v. City of Sac City, 162 Iowa 514, 522 , 144 N. W. 639 ; Roth v. Buettell Bros.

1943Becvar v. Batesole, 218 Iowa 858, 860 , *263 256 N. W. 297 ; Stokes v. City of Sac City, 162 Iowa 514, 522 , 144 N. W. 639 ; Roth v. Buettell Bros.

1943Becvar v. Batesole, 218 Iowa 858, 860 , *263 256 N. W. 297 ; Stokes v. City of Sac City, 162 Iowa 514, 522 , 144 N. W. 639 ; Roth v. Buettell Bros.

1943Becvar v. Batesole, 218 Iowa 858, 860 , *263 256 N. W. 297 ; Stokes v. City of Sac City, 162 Iowa 514, 522 , 144 N. W. 639 ; Roth v. Buettell Bros.

1940At least this court has so held and determined in Cummings v. Easton, 46 Iowa, 183 ; Hough v. Easley, 47 Ia. 330 ; Jiska v. Ringgold Co., 57 Ia. 630 ; Parker v. Cochran, 64 Ia. 757 .’’ In that case, however, we held, as to the owner, that, since the taxes were legally assessed, he was under a duty to pay them and hence, as to him, the sale was voidable only and could not be challenged unless he paid or offered to pay the taxes.

1940At least this court has so held and determined in Cummings v. Easton, 46 Iowa, 183 ; Hough v. Easley, 47 Ia. 330 ; Jiska v. Ringgold Co., 57 Ia. 630 ; Parker v. Cochran, 64 Ia. 757 .’’ In that case, however, we held, as to the owner, that, since the taxes were legally assessed, he was under a duty to pay them and hence, as to him, the sale was voidable only and could not be challenged unless he paid or offered to pay the taxes.

1940At least this court has so held and determined in Cummings v. Easton, 46 Iowa, 183 ; Hough v. Easley, 47 Ia. 330 ; Jiska v. Ringgold Co., 57 Ia. 630 ; Parker v. Cochran, 64 Ia. 757 .’’ In that case, however, we held, as to the owner, that, since the taxes were legally assessed, he was under a duty to pay them and hence, as to him, the sale was voidable only and could not be challenged unless he paid or offered to pay the taxes.

1933Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank of Sioux City, 204 Iowa 497 , 212 N. W. 748 , 215 N. W. 728 .

1933Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank of Sioux City, 204 Iowa 497 , 212 N. W. 748 , 215 N. W. 728 .

1916Reed v. Lane, 96 Iowa 454 . 5' validity1^estopfngbenefltí1" However, the record shows that a decree was rendered on the issues joined, and that plaintiff accepted and received the money awarded him.

1892Burton v. Hintrager, 18 Iowa, 348 ; Stout v. Merrill, 35 Iowa, 47 ; Jacobs v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 341 ; Stevens v. Cassaday, supra. It appears to us that when it is conceded, as it must be, that the disability of minority is removed by death, .and that no one can redeem any part of the land except that owned by him at the time of the sale, with the exception that the land of a minor may be redeemed within one year after the disability of minority is removed, it is an end of inquiry and discussion upon the right of the plaintiff in this case.

1892Burton v. Hintrager, 18 Iowa, 348 ; Stout v. Merrill, 35 Iowa, 47 ; Jacobs v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 341 ; Stevens v. Cassaday, supra. It appears to us that when it is conceded, as it must be, that the disability of minority is removed by death, .and that no one can redeem any part of the land except that owned by him at the time of the sale, with the exception that the land of a minor may be redeemed within one year after the disability of minority is removed, it is an end of inquiry and discussion upon the right of the plaintiff in this case.