end hearing in Texas

2025See Cobb v. State, 95 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (Where “challenge is to language in the written judgment, rather than to anything that occurred in the court hearing,” and “the judgment was not prepared until after the end of the hearing, appellant could not have complained at the hearing about any alleged defect in the judgment.”).

2019See Edwards v. State, 21 S.W.3d 625 , 626 n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.) (holding that the defendant’s argument “that the court erred in entering a deadly weapon finding because the jury did not find that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon” was not forfeited by failure to object in the trial court); Cobb v. State, 95 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (holding that failure to object does not forfeit complaint that “‘the judgments in the cases merely recite that an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon has been entered,’ rather than being in the form required b

2014See Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 601 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Blount v. State, 64 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Lee v. State, 964 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d).

2008Murphy v. State , 112 S.W.3d 592, 601 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

2003Parr v. State , 658 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. Crim.

2003Parr v. State , 658 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. Crim.

2025The State made the same assertion in State v. Nonparty Patient No. 1.14 We agreed that the nonparty patients had failed to show standing to seek protection of the documents pertaining to others.15 That was not the end of the analysis because the State had not raised the issue of standing until on appeal. 16 When a jurisdictional issue is not raised in the trial court, the record may show that the plaintiff did not have a “fair opportunity” to address the issue “by amending its pleadings or developing the record.” 17 In those circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to a remand unless the recor

2025The State made the same assertion in State v. Nonparty Patient No. 1.14 We agreed that the nonparty patients had failed to show standing to seek protection of the documents pertaining to others.15 That was not the end of the analysis because the State had not raised the issue of standing until on appeal.16 When a jurisdictional issue is not raised in the trial court, the record may show that the plaintiff did not have a “fair opportunity” to address the issue “by amending its pleadings or developing the record.”17 In those circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to a remand unless the record

2025The State made the same assertion in State v. Nonparty Patient No. 1.14 We agreed that the nonparty patients had failed to show standing to seek protection of the documents pertaining to others.15 That was not the end of the analysis because the State had not raised the issue of standing until on appeal. 16 When a jurisdictional issue is not raised in the trial court, the record may show that the plaintiff did not have a “fair opportunity” to address the issue “by amending its pleadings or developing the record.” 17 In those circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to a remand unless the recor

2025The State made the same assertion in State v. Nonparty Patient No. 1.14 We agreed that the nonparty patients had failed to show standing to seek protection of the documents pertaining to others.15 That was not the end of the analysis because the State had not raised the issue of standing until on appeal. 16 When a jurisdictional issue is not raised in the trial court, the record may show that the plaintiff did not have a “fair opportunity” to address the issue “by amending its pleadings or developing the record.” 17 In those circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to a remand unless the recor

2009See State v. Gerstenkorn, 239 S.W.3d 357 , 358 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (citing Cullen and noting that “explicit verbal findings at the end of the hearing” constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law).

2009See State v. Gerstenkorn , 239 S.W.3d 357 , 358 n.1 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (citing Cullen and noting that "explicit verbal findings at the end of the hearing" constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law).

2013See Rickels v. State, 108 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (appellant did not forfeit his objection since “the [trial] court modified the terms of Rick-els’s probation without a hearing, and Rickels had no opportunity to object.”); Cobb v. State, 95 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (appellant did not forfeit challenge to language in written judgment “because the judgment was not prepared until after the end of the hearing, [therefore] appellant could not have complained at the hearing about any alleged defect in the judgment.”). 6 In this case, the Court of Appea

2013See Rickels v. State, 108 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (appellant did not forfeit his objection since “the [trial] court modified the terms of Rickels’s probation without a hearing, and Rickels had no opportunity to object.”); Cobb v. State, 95 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (appellant did not forfeit challenge to language in written judgment “because the judgment was not prepared until after the end of the hearing, [therefore) appellant could not have complained at the hearing about any alleged defect in the judgment.”).

2011See Keough v. Cyrus USA, Inc. , 204 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

2011See Keough v. Cyrus USA Inc., 204 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

2010I appreciate everybody’s hard work on this, and I will approve the agreement and render it as an order of the court this day .” [Emphasis added.] We hold that the trial court’s specific words of rendition show its present intent to orally render judgment on the parties’ agreement and that its statements about future acts show only its intent to sign the written memorialization of its rendition and to allow performance of the judgment at a later date. (footnote: 7) Cf. Samples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the trial court rendered judgment when it said

2010I appreciate everybody’s hard work on this, and I will approve the agreement and render it as an order of the court this day.” [Emphasis added.] We hold that the trial court’s specific words of rendition show its present intent to orally render judgment on the parties’ agreement and that its statements about future acts show only its intent to sign the written 6 Terry and his parents were to execute documents attached to the unsigned written settlement agreement within two weeks, and they were to pay TMS $6,000 within thirty days. 13 memorialization of its rendition and to allow performance of

2009See id.

2009See id.

2023This is because, when we can ascertain the parties’ intent from the language of the deed, “that should [generally] be the end of our analysis.” Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 794 .

2022If a court can ascertain the parties’ intent from the language of the deed, “that should [generally] . . . be the end of our analysis.” Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. 2017).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, 440 S.W.3d 18 (2014) 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 831 [12] When an arbitration agreement incorporates by reference outside rules, “the specific provisions in the arbitration agreement take precedence and the arbitration rules are incorporated only to the extent that they do not conflict with the express provisions of the arbitration agreement.” Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir.1991).

2014When an arbitration agreement incorporates by reference outside rules, “the specific provisions in the arbitration agreement take precedence and the arbitration rules are incorporated only to the extent that they do not conflict with the express provisions of the arbitration agreement.” Sz uts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830 , 832 . (11th Cir.1991).

2016Cf. id. 10 2 But whether it makes sense to apply the dichotomy as a common-law matter is not the end of our inquiry.

2009The UDJA is not a general waiver of sovereign immunity; it "does not enlarge a trial court's jurisdiction, and litigant's request for declaratory relief does not alter a suit's underlying nature." City of El Paso v. Heinrich , No. 06-0778, ___ S.W. 3d ___ , 2009 Tex. LEXIS 253, at *6 (Tex. May 1, 2009).

2015Id. at 543 , 125 S.Ct. at 2084 (“[I]f a government action is found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry.”).

2015Id. at 543 , 125 S.Ct. at 2084 (“[I]f a government action is found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry.”).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, 440 S.W.3d 18 (2014) 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 831 [12] When an arbitration agreement incorporates by reference outside rules, “the specific provisions in the arbitration agreement take precedence and the arbitration rules are incorporated only to the extent that they do not conflict with the express provisions of the arbitration agreement.” Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir.1991).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, 440 S.W.3d 18 (2014) 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 831 [12] When an arbitration agreement incorporates by reference outside rules, “the specific provisions in the arbitration agreement take precedence and the arbitration rules are incorporated only to the extent that they do not conflict with the express provisions of the arbitration agreement.” Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir.1991).

2015Courts must next consider: [1] whether [the] offenses are in the same statutory section; [2] whether the offenses are phrased in the alternative; [3] whether the offenses are named similarly; [4] whether the offenses have common punishment ranges; [5] whether the offenses have a common focus; [6] whether the common focus tends to indicate a single instance of conduct; [7] whether the elements that differ between the two offenses can be considered the same under an imputed theory of liability that would result in the offenses being considered the same under Blockburger; and [8] whether there is

2015Courts must next consider: [1] whether [the] offenses are in the same statutory section; [2] whether the offenses are phrased in the alternative; [3] whether the offenses are named similarly; [4] whether the offenses have common punishment ranges; [5] whether the offenses have a common focus; [6] whether the common focus tends to indicate a single instance of conduct; [7] whether the elements that differ between the two offenses can be considered the same under an imputed theory of liability that would result in the offenses being considered the same under Blockburger; and [8] whether there is

2015Valdez also asked how many times the sexual assaults occurred by asking a “multiple-choice question,” such as “was it more like five times?” At the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled that Valdez’s recorded interview with Ana complied with the applicable statutory requirements and procedures, and held that Valdez was competent to testify about the details provided by Ana during the interview. 2 A leading question is one that “suggest[s] the desired answer, instruct[s] the witness how to answer, or put[s] words into the witness’s mouth to be echoed back.” Tinlin v. State, 983 S.W.2d 65, 7

2015Valdez also asked how many times the sexual assaults occurred by asking a "multiple-choice question," such as "was it more like five times?" At the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled that Valdez's recorded interview with Ana complied with the applicable statutory requirements and procedures, and held that Valdez was competent to testify about the details provided by Ana during the interview. 2 A leading question is one that "suggest[s] the desired answer, instruct [s] the witness how to answer, or put[s] words into the witness's mouth to be echoed back." Tinlin v. State, 983 S.W.2d 65,7

2015Valdez also asked how many times the sexual assaults occurred by asking a “multiple-choice question,” such as “was it more like five times?” At the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled that Valdez’s recorded interview with Ana complied with the applicable statutory requirements and procedures, and held that Valdez was competent to testify about the details provided by Ana during the interview. 2 A leading question is one that “suggest[s] the desired answer, instruct[s] the witness how to answer, or put[s] words into the witness’s mouth to be echoed back.” Tinlin v. State, 983 S.W.2d 65, 7

2015Valdez also asked how many times the sexual assaults occurred by asking a "multiple-choice question," such as "was it more like five times?" At the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled that Valdez's recorded interview with Ana complied with the applicable statutory requirements and procedures, and held that Valdez was competent to testify about the details provided by Ana during the interview. 2 A leading question is one that "suggest[s] the desired answer, instruct [s] the witness how to answer, or put[s] words into the witness's mouth to be echoed back." Tinlin v. State, 983 S.W.2d 65,7

2015See id. 12 However, this is not the end of our inquiry for appellant also contends that, even if the evidence was otherwise admissible, the probative value of such evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

2015See id. 12 However, this is not the end of our inquiry for appellant also contends that, even if the evidence was otherwise admissible, the probative value of such evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

2014See Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 601 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Blount v. State, 64 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Lee v. State, 964 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d).

2001Parr v. State, 658 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Amunson v. State, 928 S.W.2d 601, 607-08 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, pet. ref'd); see also Lee v. State, 964 S.W.2d 3, 12 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. refd); Perkins v. State, 779 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, no pet.); Horn v. State, 699 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, no pet.).

2014Code § 25.231 (b); see also GTE-Sw., 901 S.W.2d at 411 (historic test year amounts must be adjusted to more accurately reflect known costs to be incurred in future).

2014Code § 25.231 (b); see also GTE-Sw., 901 S.W.2d at 411 (historic test year amounts must be adjusted to more accurately reflect known costs to be incurred in future).

2011Even though a standard of review is not an outcome-determinative formula, the bottom line is that the appropriate standard of review, and an appellate court's intellectually honest adherence to it, can generally determine the outcome of an appeal. [2] To the extent that White was based on the presumption that the factual-conclusivity clause was an affirmative grant of power to the courts of civil appeals, rather than a restriction on the power of the higher court, that view was expressly rejected in Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). [3] As noted in the chart above, the

2010Even though a standard of review is not an outcome-determinative formula, the bottom line is that the appropriate standard of review, and an appellate court’s intellectually honest adherence to it, can generally determine the outcome of an appeal. [2] To the extent that White was based on the presumption that the factual-conclusivity clause was an affirmative grant of power to the courts of civil appeals, rather than a restriction on the power of the higher court, that view was expressly rejected in Meraz v. State , 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim.

2010I appreciate everybody’s hard work on this, and I will approve the agreement and render it as an order of the court this day.” [Emphasis added.] We hold that the trial court’s specific words of rendition show its present intent to orally render judgment on the parties’ agreement and that its statements about future acts show only its intent to sign the written 6 Terry and his parents were to execute documents attached to the unsigned written settlement agreement within two weeks, and they were to pay TMS $6,000 within thirty days. 13 memorialization of its rendition and to allow performance of

2010I appreciate everybody’s hard work on this, and I will approve the agreement and render it as an order of the court this day .” [Emphasis added.] We hold that the trial court’s specific words of rendition show its present intent to orally render judgment on the parties’ agreement and that its statements about future acts show only its intent to sign the written memorialization of its rendition and to allow performance of the judgment at a later date. (footnote: 7) Cf. Samples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the trial court rendered judgment when it said

2008Kothe, 152 S.W. 3d at 64-65 (citations omitted).

2008Kothe , 152 S.W. 3d at 64-65 (citations omitted).

2026At the end of the hearing, the trial court advised the parties that it was “going to review everything that was submitted to the Court.” After the hearing, the trial court signed an order stating that “the requested estate and transfer plan is consistent with and does not conflict with Carlos’s will dated May 20, 1986.” Offering an exhibit into evidence requires “no magic or exclusive words.” Robertson Truck Lines Inc. v. Hogden, 487 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Holman v. State, No. 07-96-0066-CR, 1997 WL 23061 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 22, 1997