end inquiry in Colorado

2025At the end of the hearing, the court found that Dr. Pillai had testified “credibly and persuasively,” and concluded that the People had proved all four factors set forth in People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985).

2024At the end of the hearing, the court concluded that the People had proved all four elements set forth in People v. Medina , 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985), and issued an or der allowing 2 CMHHIP staff to administer the requested medications — Fanapt/iloperidone, Depakote or Depakene/valproate, Thorazine/chlopromazine, and Ativan/lorazepam — to G.L.C. against his will, and for “[l]aboratory studies (and associated blood draws) to safely and effectively utilize the [medications] [and] periodic or as medically indicated physical examination[s] by a qualified practitioner.” II.

2014Meads, 78 P.3d at 293 .

2013Id.

2025He argues, however, that the simple fact of parole eligibility “is not the end of the analysis.” Rather, relying on People v. Drake, 785 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1990), he asserts that the trial court should have considered “the unlikelihood” that he will actually be paroled in his lifetime.

2025Id. ¶14 When the statutory language is unambiguous, that is the end of our inquiry: We effectuate its plain and ordinary meaning.

2025Id. ¶14 When the statutory language is unambiguous, that is the end of our inquiry: We effectuate its plain and ordinary meaning.

2024The third time — at the end of the hearing — mother’s counsel said only that he wanted to present information from a single witness who would “dispute” father’s testimony, “corroborat[e]” mother’s testimony, and “describe what was witnessed in terms of [father’s] behavior toward [mother] in public.” Mother’s counsel didn’t explain what parts of the parties’ testimony would be “disputed” or “corroborated” or describe in any detail the behavior about which the witness would testify. ¶ 35 This isn’t sufficient to “aid [the] trial court in addressing [mother’s] request[] to depart from [the] previ

2022While “[t]he powers of an arbitrator derive from the arbitration agreement,” Magenis, 187 P.3d at 1224 , federal cases have entertained the possibility — which Santangelo urges us to adopt — that, notwithstanding the lack of an agreement binding nonparty attorneys, arbitrators possess “inherent authority” to sanction attorneys appearing before them as a part of their “obligation to protect the forum.” InterChem Asia 2000 Pte.

2019But the Court made clear that, since nothing "precludes imprisonment" when the defendant's refusal to pay is willful, id. at 668 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting Williams , 399 U.S. at 242 n.19, 90 S.Ct. 2018 ), there is no "constitutional infirmity" in imprisoning a defendant who has the means to pay, but nevertheless fails to do so, id. (quoting Tate , 401 U.S. at 400 , 91 S.Ct. 668 ). 5 ¶34 The presence or absence of fault, however, is not the end of the analysis under Bearden .

2019But the Court made clear that, since nothing "precludes imprisonment" when the defendant's refusal to pay is willful, id. at 668 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting Williams , 399 U.S. at 242 n.19, 90 S.Ct. 2018 ), there is no "constitutional infirmity" in imprisoning a defendant who has the means to pay, but nevertheless fails to do so, id. (quoting Tate , 401 U.S. at 400 , 91 S.Ct. 668 ). 5 ¶34 The presence or absence of fault, however, is not the end of the analysis under Bearden .

2019But the Court made clear that, since nothing "precludes imprisonment" when the defendant's refusal to pay is willful, id. at 668 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting Williams , 399 U.S. at 242 n.19, 90 S.Ct. 2018 ), there is no "constitutional infirmity" in imprisoning a defendant who has the means to pay, but nevertheless fails to do so, id. (quoting Tate , 401 U.S. at 400 , 91 S.Ct. 668 ). 5 ¶34 The presence or absence of fault, however, is not the end of the analysis under Bearden .

2019But the Court made clear that, since nothing "precludes imprisonment" when the defendant's refusal to pay is willful, id. at 668 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting Williams , 399 U.S. at 242 n.19, 90 S.Ct. 2018 ), there is no "constitutional infirmity" in imprisoning a defendant who has the means to pay, but nevertheless fails to do so, id. (quoting Tate , 401 U.S. at 400 , 91 S.Ct. 668 ). 5 ¶34 The presence or absence of fault, however, is not the end of the analysis under Bearden .

2019In making its decision, the court discussed factors bearing on the reliability of a waiver of rights as articulated in Grant v. People , 48 P.3d 543 , 549-50 (Colo. 2002).

2019But the Court made clear that, since nothing "precludes imprisonment" when the defendant's refusal to pay is willful, id. at 668 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting Williams , 399 U.S. at 242 n.19, 90 S.Ct. 2018 ), there is no "constitutional infirmity" in imprisoning a defendant who has the means to pay, but nevertheless fails to do so, id. (quoting Tate , 401 U.S. at 400 , 91 S.Ct. 668 ). 5 ¶34 The presence or absence of fault, however, is not the end of the analysis under Bearden .

2019But the Court made clear that, since nothing "precludes imprisonment" when the defendant's refusal to pay is willful, id. at 668 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting Williams , 399 U.S. at 242 n.19, 90 S.Ct. 2018 ), there is no "constitutional infirmity" in imprisoning a defendant who has the means to pay, but nevertheless fails to do so, id. (quoting Tate , 401 U.S. at 400 , 91 S.Ct. 668 ). 5 ¶34 The presence or absence of fault, however, is not the end of the analysis under Bearden .

2018Fair debatability, however, "is not a threshold inquiry that is outcome determinative as a matter of law, nor is it both the beginning and the end of the analysis in a bad faith case." Sanderson , 251 P.3d at 1218 . ¶ 21 Having described the elements of the claims at issue, as well as GEICO's pertinent defense thereto, we turn to the question of whether the district court erred in ordering Schultz to undergo the IME that GEICO had requested.

2017It occurs when a defendant "specifically removes claims from the trial court's consideration." People v. Rediger , 2015 COA 26 , ¶ 54, 411 P.3d 907 ( cert. granted Feb. 16, 2016). ¶ 13 At the end of the conference, the following exchange occurred.

2015This procedure was consistent with Colorado law, as we have outlined it above, ¶ 25 We disagree with deféndant's assertion that the district court here "essentially made the same ruling" as the trial court had in Romero, which requires reversal, Unlike the court here, the trial court in Romero "failed to make a finding of [the] defendant's ability to make the payments as of the time of the revocation hearing." 192 Colo. at 108 , 559 P.2d at 1102 , Consequently, Romero does not suggest that the district court erred in this case. | III.

2015This procedure was consistent with Colorado law, as we have outlined it above, ¶ 25 We disagree with deféndant's assertion that the district court here "essentially made the same ruling" as the trial court had in Romero, which requires reversal, Unlike the court here, the trial court in Romero "failed to make a finding of [the] defendant's ability to make the payments as of the time of the revocation hearing." 192 Colo. at 108 , 559 P.2d at 1102 , Consequently, Romero does not suggest that the district court erred in this case. | III.

2014Id. at 1178 .

2002We recognize that "relevancy is not the end of the inquiry," Williams, 866 P.2d at 912 , and that C.RC.P. 26(c) allows the trial court to issue protective orders as justice requires ""to protect a party ... from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."

1979As the United States Supreme Court observed in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 , 64 S.Ct. 281 , 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944), it is the result reached, not the method employed, which determines whether a rate is just and reasonable.

1979As the United States Supreme Court observed in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 , 64 S.Ct. 281 , 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944), it is the result reached, not the method employed, which determines whether a rate is just and reasonable.

1960We should do as was done in the case of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, Fla., 96 So.2d 130 , 60 A.L.R.2d 1193 : put an end to a doctrine which should never have gained viability in this country.

1960We should do as was done in the case of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, Fla., 96 So.2d 130 , 60 A.L.R.2d 1193 : put an end to a doctrine which should never have gained viability in this country.