end inquiry in Indiana

2020Malone asserts that the trial court could have considered such evidence as a mitigating factor that may have resulted in a reduced sentence. [41] We initially observe that an argument at sentencing “focusing on chronological age is a common shorthand for measuring culpability, but for people in their teens and early twenties it is frequently not the end of the inquiry.” Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 2000).

2012As the Indiana Supreme Court observed in Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 736 (2000), “[f]ocusing on chronological age is a common shorthand for measuring culpability, but for people in their teens and early twenties it is frequently not the end of the inquiry.

2025However, as our Supreme Court has explained, “focusing on chronological age, while often a shorthand for measuring culpability, is frequently not the end of the inquiry for people in their teens” as there are “relatively young [offenders] who appear hardened and purposeful.” Monegan v. State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ind. 2001). [27] Despite Lenoir’s young age, he demonstrated an utter lack of remorse for killing Harris, not only by fleeing the state instead of facing the consequences of his actions but also by writing “lol he got hit 4 time[s]” in reference to Harris’s murder.

2020“There are cunning children and there are naïve adults.” Sensback v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ind. 1999). “[F]ocusing on chronological age, while often a shorthand for measuring culpability, is frequently not the end of the inquiry for people in their teens and early twenties.” Monegan v. State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ind. 2001).

2026See, e.g., Muldowney, 83 N.E.3d at 132–33 (observing “the trial court’s informality went too far” where “it appears to have based its judgment [on a claim for possession] strictly upon the facts alleged in the complaint and unsworn statements of [the tenant’s] counsel and [the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-EV-532 | February 10, 2026 Page 12 of 20 landlord]”); Harris v. Lafayette LIHTC, LP, 85 N.E.3d 871, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the tenant where there was no documentary evidence establishing the tenant owed the land

2026See, e.g., Muldowney, 83 N.E.3d at 132–33 (observing “the trial court’s informality went too far” where “it appears to have based its judgment [on a claim for possession] strictly upon the facts alleged in the complaint and unsworn statements of [the tenant’s] counsel and [the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-EV-532 | February 10, 2026 Page 12 of 20 landlord]”); Harris v. Lafayette LIHTC, LP, 85 N.E.3d 871, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the tenant where there was no documentary evidence establishing the tenant owed the land

2020“There are cunning children and there are naïve adults.” Sensback v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ind. 1999). “[F]ocusing on chronological age, while often a shorthand for measuring culpability, is frequently not the end of the inquiry for people in their teens and early twenties.” Monegan v. State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ind. 2001).

2019Cf. State v. Larkin, 100 N.E.3d 700, 705 (Ind. 2018) (“[I]nterlocutory appeals toll the 4(C) period despite who filed because the case cannot practically move forward[.]”), reh’g denied.

2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-305 | November 13, 2019 Page 7 of 9 [11] Even though the Fourth Amendment recognizes the new-crime exception, that is not the end of our analysis because “[i]t is well settled that a state may provide greater protection from searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment requires.” State v. Brown, 840 N.E.2d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DC-89 | September 20, 2019 Page 12 of 18 [21] That is not the end of the inquiry, however, as Indiana Code section 31-17-4- 1(a) provides that a non-custodial parent is entitled to exercise reasonable parenting time with his or her child “unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the noncustodial parent might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development.” To ensure the child’s well-being, therefore, this Court “has previously held that trial courts have discretion to set reasonable

2018See Smith v. State , 872 N.E.2d 169 , 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied . *1155 Focusing on chronological age is a common shorthand for measuring culpability, but for people in their teens and early twenties it is frequently not the end of the inquiry.

2016Decision [10] Before we address Foster’s argument, we note that no appellee’s brief has been filed in this appeal.4 When an appellee fails to submit an appellate brief, “‘we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the [A]ppellee’s behalf.’” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006)).

2016See Johnson v. State, 507 N.E.2d 980, 983 (Ind. 1987) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the trial court believed it lacked the authority to impose alternative Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1509-CR-1548 | June 9, 2016 Page 5 of 8 misdemeanor sentencing; record revealed the trial court concluded it had the authority but chose not to use it). [12] Guzman next claims that even if the trial court did not intend to enter judgment against him for a Class A misdemeanor, the court should have done so pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Debro v. State, 821 N.E.2d 367 (2

2016Decision [10] Before we address Foster’s argument, we note that no appellee’s brief has been filed in this appeal.4 When an appellee fails to submit an appellate brief, “‘we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the [A]ppellee’s behalf.’” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006)).

2015See Green, 355 U.S. at 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 . “[J]eopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where ‘unforeseeable circumstances ... arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)); see also Griffin, 717 N.E.2d at 79-80 .

2015See Green, 355 U.S. at 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 . “[J]eopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where ‘unforeseeable circumstances ... arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)); see also Griffin, 717 N.E.2d at 79-80 .

2015See Green, 355 U.S. at 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 . “[J]eopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where ‘unforeseeable circumstances ... arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)); see also Griffin, 717 N.E.2d at 79-80 .

2015See Green, 355 U.S. at 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 . “[J]eopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where ‘unforeseeable circumstances ... arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)); see also Griffin, 717 N.E.2d at 79-80 .

2015In Harrison v. State, we held that a trial court’s sentencing order imposing a capital sentence must, at a minimum, address the following four issues: (1) “identify each mitigating and aggravating circumstance found”; (2) “include the specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance”; (3) “articulate that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence”; and (4) “the trial court’s personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime.” 644 N.E

2015However, during the weekend, the prosecutor contacted the defendants’ attorneys to notify them that the State was going to call Archer as a witness. 13 In Bruton, “the United States Supreme Court held that in a joint trial, admission of one defendant’s confession that implicates another defendant is a violation of the second defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.” Fayson v. State, 726 N.E.2d 292, 294 (Ind. 2000) (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124-26 ).

2015See Green, 355 U.S. at 188 , 78 S.Ct. 221 . “[J]eopardy is not regarded as having come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those cases where ‘unforeseeable circumstances ... arise during [the first] trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)); see also Griffin, 717 N.E.2d at 79-80 .