end hearing in Utah

2025Claimants argue that the City’s conveyance of the Water Rights to Phillips was constitutional because it was part of an “exchange” of water rights consistent with the Utah Constitution’s provision allowing municipalities to “exchang[e] water rights or sources of water supply for other water rights or sources of water supply that the municipality determines will equally enable the municipality to meet the needs of its designated water service area.” Utah Const. 20220794-CA; 20220795-CA 27 2025 UT App 115 Hall v. Springville City art.

2025Claimants argue that the City’s conveyance of the Water Rights to Phillips was constitutional because it was part of an “exchange” of water rights consistent with the Utah Constitution’s provision allowing municipalities to “exchang[e] water rights or sources of water supply for other water rights or sources of water supply that the municipality determines will equally enable the municipality to meet the needs of its designated water service area.” Utah Const. 20220794-CA; 20220795-CA 27 2025 UT App 115 Hall v. Springville City art.

2025Defense counsel remarked that Mullins had “the most profoundly dysfunctional upbringing and rearing and family life that . . . members of the defense team ha[d] ever seen, and that says a lot.” He stated that Mullins’s removal from that dysfunctional environment gave him “some hope that Mr. Mullins c[ould] turn things around.” Counsel also stated that Mullins had been discouraged from interacting with anyone outside his small and dysfunctional community, had an IQ well below average, suffered physical abuse by his parents, witnessed severe alcohol 2 Cite as: 2025 UT 2 Opinion of the Court abus

2025I’m hesitant to adjudicate on this case or anything like that until we figure out if this case is staying here or going somewhere else . . . .” • At the September 11 pretrial hearing, Counsel agreed that South Dakota was the preferable jurisdiction given Parents’ current location, and Counsel told the juvenile court that “there’s nothing that we can do until it’s decided which Court is ultimately going to have jurisdiction.” 20240242-CA 12 2025 UT App 154 In re P.M. • At the October 2 pretrial hearing, Counsel stated that he was “in favor of” continuing Child in DCFS custody until a petition w

2022Because the State has not refuted Carter’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove aggravated arson as a matter of law, we should assume for 20190708-CA 28 2022 UT App 9 State v. Carter purposes of this appeal that he was entitled to a directed verdict. 10 Therefore, we cannot affirm on futility alone. ¶70 But that is not the end of the analysis.

2022But absent extraordinary circumstances, that is the end of our inquiry, and any defenses or counter-arguments that the nonmovant might have raised in a never-filed opposition 20210390-CA 15 2022 UT App 85 Turley v. Childs memorandum are unpreserved and cannot be raised or considered on appeal. ¶30 A nonmovant is therefore entitled to challenge, on appeal, whether the district court correctly determined, after examination of the movant’s papers, that the movant’s “motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the moving party is entitled to” judgment as a m

2021I think there will be some measurement of what was known, when was it known and some more surgical precision as opposed to a complete dismissal.” It further noted, “You may have and you may end up with expert reports that say we can’t make a decision, we can’t give an opinion, but I don’t have those.” The court thus intimated that it may have to delay the imposition of 20191071-CA 33 2021 UT App 71 Diversified Concepts v. Koford sanctions “until trial to determine exactly what was known or what wasn’t known or what could be reconstructed and what couldn’t be reconstructed.” The court finished

2021Lee 20200234-CA 12 2021 UT App 130 Johansen v. Johansen v. Williams, 2018 UT App 54, ¶ 69 , 420 P.3d 88 (quotation simplified).

2021Lee 20200234-CA 12 2021 UT App 130 Johansen v. Johansen v. Williams, 2018 UT App 54, ¶ 69 , 420 P.3d 88 (quotation simplified).

2021Lee 20200234-CA 12 2021 UT App 130 Johansen v. Johansen v. Williams, 2018 UT App 54, ¶ 69 , 420 P.3d 88 (quotation simplified).

2021No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. ¶33 But “determining that a danger is open and obvious is not the end of the analysis in assessing whether a defendant breached his duty of care.” Hale, 2005 UT 24, ¶ 34 .

2021I think there will be some measurement of what was known, when was it known and some more surgical precision as opposed to a complete dismissal.” It further noted, “You may have and you may end up with expert reports that say we can’t make a decision, we can’t give an opinion, but I don’t have those.” The court thus intimated that it may have to delay the imposition of 20191071-CA 33 2021 UT App 71 Diversified Concepts v. Koford sanctions “until trial to determine exactly what was known or what wasn’t known or what could be reconstructed and what couldn’t be reconstructed.” The court finished

2021I think there will be some measurement of what was known, when was it known and some more surgical precision as opposed to a complete dismissal.” It further noted, “You may have and you may end up with expert reports that say we can’t make a decision, we can’t give an opinion, but I don’t have those.” The court thus intimated that it may have to delay the imposition of 20191071-CA 33 2021 UT App 71 Diversified Concepts v. Koford sanctions “until trial to determine exactly what was known or what wasn’t known or what could be reconstructed and what couldn’t be reconstructed.” The court finished

2020First, in Peterson v. Labor Commission, 2016 UT App 12 , 367 P.3d 569 , Peterson was injured when she was twisting around and “reaching with her right arm to remove a [16-pound] tray of cakes from a rack located directly behind her work table . . . positioned about shoulder-height on the rack.” Id. ¶ 3.

2020First, in Peterson v. Labor Commission, 2016 UT App 12 , 367 P.3d 569 , Peterson was injured when she was twisting around and “reaching with her right arm to remove a [16-pound] tray of cakes from a rack located directly behind her work table . . . positioned about shoulder-height on the rack.” Id. ¶ 3.

2020VI, § 1. 20190090-CA 11 2020 UT App 41 LD III LLC v. Mapleton City referendum holdings in Baker v. Carlson, 2018 UT 59 , 437 P.3d 333 , in an attempt to stave off Krejci’s holding and to show that the rezoning was not legislative and therefore not referable.

2020So the legislature’s failure to delegate referendum power is not the end of the inquiry.” Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs, 2013 UT 74, ¶ 24 , 322 P.3d 662 ; see also Utah Const. art.

2020So the legislature’s failure to delegate referendum power is not the end of the inquiry.” Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs, 2013 UT 74, ¶ 24 , 322 P.3d 662 ; see also Utah Const. art.

2020VI, § 1. 20190090-CA 11 2020 UT App 41 LD III LLC v. Mapleton City referendum holdings in Baker v. Carlson, 2018 UT 59 , 437 P.3d 333 , in an attempt to stave off Krejci’s holding and to show that the rezoning was not legislative and therefore not referable.

2020VI, § 1. 20190090-CA 11 2020 UT App 41 LD III LLC v. Mapleton City referendum holdings in Baker v. Carlson, 2018 UT 59 , 437 P.3d 333 , in an attempt to stave off Krejci’s holding and to show that the rezoning was not legislative and therefore not referable.

2017Rather, “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . ¶93 In 2012, almost two years prior to Reigelsperger’s trial, this court addressed a jury instruction similar to the one given in this ease, in that it set out the elements of rape and added, at the end of the instruction, the requirement that “the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or recklessly,” State v. Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ¶ 18 , 284 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Rather, “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . ¶93 In 2012, almost two years prior to Reigelsperger’s trial, this court addressed a jury instruction similar to the one given in this ease, in that it set out the elements of rape and added, at the end of the instruction, the requirement that “the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or recklessly,” State v. Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ¶ 18 , 284 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Rather, “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . ¶93 In 2012, almost two years prior to Reigelsperger’s trial, this court addressed a jury instruction similar to the one given in this ease, in that it set out the elements of rape and added, at the end of the instruction, the requirement that “the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or recklessly,” State v. Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ¶ 18 , 284 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Rather, “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . ¶93 In 2012, almost two years prior to Reigelsperger’s trial, this court addressed a jury instruction similar to the one given in this ease, in that it set out the elements of rape and added, at the end of the instruction, the requirement that “the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or recklessly,” State v. Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ¶ 18 , 284 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014See White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994); Clover, 808 P.2d at 1044 .

2012Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1978) (determining that the trial court improperly converted the defendant's motion to dismiss *926 into a motion for summary judgment where the issue of converting the motion was not mentioned during the hearing on the motion or any other time prior to the trial court's order granting summary judgment), and Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, ¶ 10 , 155 P.3d 893 (reversing the trial court for "failling] to properly convert Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment" where "[njeither party knew until the end of the hearing that the trial co

2012Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1978) (determining that the trial court improperly converted the defendant's motion to dismiss *926 into a motion for summary judgment where the issue of converting the motion was not mentioned during the hearing on the motion or any other time prior to the trial court's order granting summary judgment), and Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, ¶ 10 , 155 P.3d 893 (reversing the trial court for "failling] to properly convert Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment" where "[njeither party knew until the end of the hearing that the trial co

1997Therefore, Peterson was given ample opportunity to correct any errors contained in his file, and the procedure the Board followed “adequately safeguarded] against serious risks of error and thus satisfie[d] due process.” Green-holtz, 442 U.S. at 15 , 99 S.Ct. at 2108 .

1997Therefore, Peterson was given ample opportunity to correct any errors contained in his file, and the procedure the Board followed “adequately safeguarded] against serious risks of error and thus satisfie[d] due process.” Green-holtz, 442 U.S. at 15 , 99 S.Ct. at 2108 .