12 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dahlingreen1 sentence2024See Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d at 306 . | 1 | 1 |
Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLCgreen1 sentence2016“We will reverse a ULJ’s decision if it was made on an unlawful procedure.” Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Minn. App. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Longgreen2 sentences2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c 2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c 2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cartergreen1 sentence2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c | 1 | 1 |
Kahn v. Griffingreen2 sentences2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c 2012“As the highest court of this state, we have said that we are and should be the ‘first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist system.’ ” Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 828 (quoting Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 726 ; Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 97 ). | 1 | 1 |
O'CONNOR v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c 2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fullergreen2 sentences2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c 2012“As the highest court of this state, we have said that we are and should be the ‘first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist system.’ ” Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 828 (quoting Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 726 ; Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 97 ). | 1 | 1 |
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robinsgreen2 sentences2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c 2012Indeed, if it was the end of the analysis, there would be no need for a similarly-worded provision in the Minnesota Constitution. 1 We have long recognized the axiom that owing to our “duty to independently safeguard the rights of our citizens,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn.1999); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.1999); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979)), “we can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kromahgreen1 sentence2011As our decisions in Lessley, 779 N.W.2d at 832 , and State v. Kromah, 657 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn.2003), clearly demonstrate, this court has the authority to consider a pretrial appeal brought by the State even if critical impact has not been shown. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rourkegreen1 sentence2011See State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 923 (Minn.2009) (noting our disinclination to hear appeals by the State in criminal cases). | 1 | 1 |
Fetsch v. Holmgreen2 sentences2010In evaluating a claim of laches, “the practical question in each case is whether there has been such an unreasonable delay in asserting a known right, resulting in prejudice to others, as would make it inequitable to grant the relief prayed for.” Fetsch v. Holm, 236 Minn. 158, 163 , 52 N.W.2d 113, 115 (1952). 2010In evaluating a claim of laches, “the practical question in each case is whether there has been such an unreasonable delay in asserting a known right, resulting in prejudice to others, as would make it inequitable to grant the relief prayed for.” Fetsch v. Holm, 236 Minn. 158, 163 , 52 N.W.2d 113, 115 (1952). | 1 | 1 |
Blazel v. Bradleygreen1 sentence1992Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 232 (Mo.1982) (finding the means reasonable, the goal legitimate, and safeguards adequate, along with the need for prompt action); Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F.Supp. 756, 768 (W.D.Wisc.1988) (finding statute constitutional that allowed ex parte temporary restraining order to issue); but see Deacon v. Landers, 68 Ohio App.3d 26 , 587 N.E.2d 395 (1990) (The petitioner's due process rights were violated when a mutual order for protection was issued at the end of the hearing scheduled, upon oral request of the respondent, without any testimony presented in support). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Williams v. Marshgreen1 sentence1992Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 232 (Mo.1982) (finding the means reasonable, the goal legitimate, and safeguards adequate, along with the need for prompt action); Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F.Supp. 756, 768 (W.D.Wisc.1988) (finding statute constitutional that allowed ex parte temporary restraining order to issue); but see Deacon v. Landers, 68 Ohio App.3d 26 , 587 N.E.2d 395 (1990) (The petitioner's due process rights were violated when a mutual order for protection was issued at the end of the hearing scheduled, upon oral request of the respondent, without any testimony presented in support). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Swansongreen1 sentence1984As we stated recently in State v. Swanson, 353 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Minn., filed August 24, 1984), “Generally, in order to obtain a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the defendant has to establish that the evidence was not known to him at the time of trial, that his failure to learn of it was not due to lack of diligence, that the evidence is material, and that it will probably produce an acquittal at a retrial.” Petitioner relies on three different types of alleged newly discovered evidence: (a) testimony that Peglow was seen alive as recently as 1980, (b) evidence bearing dir | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Deacon v. Landersgreen2 sentences1992Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 232 (Mo.1982) (finding the means reasonable, the goal legitimate, and safeguards adequate, along with the need for prompt action); Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F.Supp. 756, 768 (W.D.Wisc.1988) (finding statute constitutional that allowed ex parte temporary restraining order to issue); but see Deacon v. Landers, 68 Ohio App.3d 26 , 587 N.E.2d 395 (1990) (The petitioner's due process rights were violated when a mutual order for protection was issued at the end of the hearing scheduled, upon oral request of the respondent, without any testimony presented in support). 1992Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 232 (Mo.1982) (finding the means reasonable, the goal legitimate, and safeguards adequate, along with the need for prompt action); Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F.Supp. 756, 768 (W.D.Wisc.1988) (finding statute constitutional that allowed ex parte temporary restraining order to issue); but see Deacon v. Landers, 68 Ohio App.3d 26 , 587 N.E.2d 395 (1990) (The petitioner's due process rights were violated when a mutual order for protection was issued at the end of the hearing scheduled, upon oral request of the respondent, without any testimony presented in support). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Larson v. Jesson
green
1 sentence2026Larson, 847 N.W.2d at 535 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In Re the Welfare of M.P.Y.
green
1 sentence2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Meintsma v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Absent narrow exceptions, see, e.g. , Meintsma , 684 N.W.2d at 439 , or further legislative enactment, this should be the end of our inquiry. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Petition for Transfer, Disability Woroby
green
1 sentence2011As our decisions in Lessley, 779 N.W.2d at 832 , and State v. Kromah, 657 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn.2003), clearly demonstrate, this court has the authority to consider a pretrial appeal brought by the State even if critical impact has not been shown. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Balts v. Balts
green
2 sentences1969If there is to be a change in the law, it should come from the Supreme Court or, as the Supreme Court has suggested, from the legislature." [3] Mr. Justice Sheran, dissenting, observed ( 273 Minn. 438 , 142 N.W.2d 78 ) that "acceptance of the reasoning which supports this decision forecasts the end of immunity with respect to actions for damages incurred by a child and caused by the negligence of a parent, and suits for tort between husband and wife as well." Mr. Justice Rogosheske, concurring specially, expressed a more limited disagreement ( 273 Minn. 437 , 142 N.W.2d 78 ): "* * * I find it 1969If there is to be a change in the law, it should come from the Supreme Court or, as the Supreme Court has suggested, from the legislature." [3] Mr. Justice Sheran, dissenting, observed ( 273 Minn. 438 , 142 N.W.2d 78 ) that "acceptance of the reasoning which supports this decision forecasts the end of immunity with respect to actions for damages incurred by a child and caused by the negligence of a parent, and suits for tort between husband and wife as well." Mr. Justice Rogosheske, concurring specially, expressed a more limited disagreement ( 273 Minn. 437 , 142 N.W.2d 78 ): "* * * I find it | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Hovanetz v. Anderson
neutral
2 sentences1969The revisor of statutes did make report of Hovanetz v. Anderson, 276 Minn. 543 , 148 N.W.2d 564 , in January 1969, at the outset of the last regular legislative session, specifically setting forth the above-quoted language. [6] This legislative inaction is in marked contrast to the intensive legislative consideration of the subject of governmental immunity at the 1963-1964 regular session, following the 1962 decision in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. 1969The revisor of statutes did make report of Hovanetz v. Anderson, 276 Minn. 543 , 148 N.W.2d 564 , in January 1969, at the outset of the last regular legislative session, specifically setting forth the above-quoted language. [6] This legislative inaction is in marked contrast to the intensive legislative consideration of the subject of governmental immunity at the 1963-1964 regular session, following the 1962 decision in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
In re Cloquet Lumber Co.
neutral
2 sentences1909In re Cloquet Lumber Co., 61 Minn. 233 , 63 N. W. 628 . 1909In re Cloquet Lumber Co., 61 Minn. 233 , 63 N. W. 628 . | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.