end inquiry in Washington

2025Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 816. “‘If there is clear legislative intent to impose multiple punishments for the same act or conduct, this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’” Id. (quoting State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72, 77 , 226 P.3d 773 (2010)).

2023If the legislature clearly intended to impose multiple punishments for the same conduct, “ ‘this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’ ” Id. at 816 (quoting State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72, 77 , 226 P.3d 773 (2010)).

2025Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 816. “‘If there is clear legislative intent to impose multiple punishments for the same act or conduct, this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’” Id. (quoting State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72, 77 , 226 P.3d 773 (2010)).

2023If the legislature clearly intended to impose multiple punishments for the same conduct, “ ‘this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’ ” Id. at 816 (quoting State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72, 77 , 226 P.3d 773 (2010)).

2024If unambiguous, a statute’s plain language “provides the beginning and the end of the analysis.” State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708, 714 , 487 P.3d 482 (2021).

2024If unambiguous, the plain language provides “the beginning and the end of the analysis.” Id. 11 The amendment has the effect of removing a person’s prior juvenile dispositions from use when calculating a person’s offender score for any subsequent adult convictions, except for juvenile adjudications of guilt for murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and class A felony sex offenses.

2010Beal for Martinez v. City of Seattle, 134 Wash.2d 769, 777 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998).

2010Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 777 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998).

2010Beal for Martinez v. City of Seattle, 134 Wash.2d 769, 777 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998).

2010Beal v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769, 777 , 954 P.2d 237 (1998).

2026At the end of the hearing, the trial court discussed Sanchez’s silence and perceived lack of remorse and then immediately stated, “so that’s kind of the mindset that I have.” Id.

2025At the end of the analysis, we will reverse “where there is any reasonable possibility that the use of inadmissible evidence was necessary to reach a guilty verdict.” Id.

2023App. 2d 37 , 47-50, 493 P.3d 1220 (2021) (quoting State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28 , 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 21 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017)), review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1001 , 506 P.3d 1230 (2022). 20 Because RCW 9.94A.533(3) clearly expresses the legislature’s intent for multiple punishments from the same conduct, “ ‘this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’ ” Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 816 (quoting Kelley, 168 Wn.2d at 77 ).

2023App. 2d 37 , 47-50, 493 P.3d 1220 (2021) (quoting State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28 , 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 21 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017)), review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1001 , 506 P.3d 1230 (2022). 20 Because RCW 9.94A.533(3) clearly expresses the legislature’s intent for multiple punishments from the same conduct, “ ‘this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’ ” Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 816 (quoting Kelley, 168 Wn.2d at 77 ).

2023Liability in a medical malpractice action can be based on negligence too, but our precedent is clear that “the objective symptom requirement is not necessary to prove emotional distress damages under chapter 7.70 RCW.” Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wn.2d 91, 113 , 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (emphasis added).

2023App. 2d 37 , 47-50, 493 P.3d 1220 (2021) (quoting State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28 , 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 21 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017)), review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1001 , 506 P.3d 1230 (2022). 20 Because RCW 9.94A.533(3) clearly expresses the legislature’s intent for multiple punishments from the same conduct, “ ‘this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’ ” Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 816 (quoting Kelley, 168 Wn.2d at 77 ).

2023Liability in a medical malpractice action can be based on negligence too, but our precedent is clear that “the objective symptom requirement is not necessary to prove emotional distress damages under chapter 7.70 RCW.” Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wn.2d 91, 113 , 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (emphasis added).

2023App. 2d 37 , 47-50, 493 P.3d 1220 (2021) (quoting State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28 , 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 21 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017)), review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1001 , 506 P.3d 1230 (2022). 20 Because RCW 9.94A.533(3) clearly expresses the legislature’s intent for multiple punishments from the same conduct, “ ‘this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’ ” Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 816 (quoting Kelley, 168 Wn.2d at 77 ).

2023App. 2d 37 , 47-50, 493 P.3d 1220 (2021) (quoting State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28 , 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 21 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017)), review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1001 , 506 P.3d 1230 (2022). 20 Because RCW 9.94A.533(3) clearly expresses the legislature’s intent for multiple punishments from the same conduct, “ ‘this is the end of the inquiry and no double jeopardy violation exists.’ ” Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 816 (quoting Kelley, 168 Wn.2d at 77 ).

2021Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9-12 .

2021The petition stated that “respondent has been advised that involuntary commitment pursuant to this 14-day petition will result in the loss of firearm rights.”13 Additionally, before the probable cause hearing began, the court advised J.H., “[I]f you decline to accept or seek voluntary treatment at this time; and at the end of this hearing, if I conclude that you need to be involuntarily detained for your own benefit, then that could result in your loss of firearm rights.”14 The court also urged J.H. to take a moment to 12 City of Seattle v. Evans, 182 Wn.

2021App. 188, 191 , 327 P.3d 1303 (2014). 13 CP at 18. 14 RP (Mar. 4, 2020) at 6. 5 No. 81294-7-I/6 confer with his counsel.

2020Westerman, 125 Wn.2d at 286-87 .

2020Archaga-Reyes was convicted under the assault prong of the no-contact order statute, RCW 26.50.110(4), which provides that “[amy assault that is a violation of an order issued under. . . chapter 10.99, . . . and that does not amount to assault in the first or second degree . . . is a class C felony. . . .“ As applicable here, an assault is “an intentional touching or striking of another person, with unlawful force, that is harmful or offensive regardless of whether any physical injury is done to the person.” ~ State v. Madarash, 116 Wn.

2017Eike, 72 Wn.2d at 764 .

2016App. 405, 408 , 819 P.2d 399 (1991) (vacation of judgment is not proper under CR 60(b)(11) absent extraordinary circumstances relating to irregularities which are extraneous to the court's action or implicate the regularity of its proceedings). 6 Regardless, at the end of the hearing on his motion to vacate a void order, Eggum acknowledged he was the prevailing party: "[Yjou've denied the order.

2015Vickers. 148 Wn.2d at 118 .

1986On point is this court's decision in State v. Mickens, 61 Wn.2d 83 , 377 P.2d 240 (1962).

1986On point is this court's decision in State v. Mickens, 61 Wn.2d 83 , 377 P.2d 240 (1962).

1964NOTES [*] Reported in 389 P. (2d) 422 . [1] In his opening statement to the court, plaintiffs' counsel said: "The evidence will show that the defendants in this case, in order to attract new customers, offered to sell fuel oil at prices less than those regularly established prices at which they are selling to the great bulk of their customers.